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This dissertation focuses on U.S. institutional investor activism regarding climate change 
from 1990-2009. During that time period, over 300 climate change shareholder 
resolutions have been filed at U.S. firms. The dissertation includes three empirical studies 
that examine the relationship between investors and firms on climate change. The first 
study looks at how diverse investors reconcile different organizational identities to create 
a ―sustainability logic of investing‖ and engage in collective action. The second study 
analyzes how firm and investor organizational identities affect the process of reaching 
consensus on climate change policy during a shareholder dialogue at Ford Motor 
Company. The third study tests what shareholder and firm variables influence whether 
climate resolutions are successfully withdrawn using a dataset of climate change 








This is a dissertation about climate change and organizational identity. In brief, the 
dissertation examines the effect of identity on organizational responses to climate change. 
For a student of economic sociology and public policy, this type of inquiry is especially 
appropriate and timely. In 2005, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown 
commissioned a review of the economic costs of addressing climate change. In the final 
assessment, referred to as the Stern Review (Stern 2006), Sir Nicholas Stern refers to 
climate change as ―the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen.‖ This market 
failure provides a fitting setting to apply theories from organizational theory and 
economic sociology to the problems and solutions connected to climate change in the 
market. The dissertation begins with the assumption that many of the obstacles to 
addressing climate change are cultural and organizational as much as scientific and 
technical. With this assumption in mind, the studies included in the dissertation consider 
how organizational identity affects climate negotiations among activist investors and 
large U.S. firms.  
 
The challenge of changing individual and organizational behavior to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions has remained a ―wicked problem‖ (Rittel and Webber 1973) in the 
market and policy arena alike. However, the failure of the market and policymakers to 
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address this environmental and social issue produces a window of opportunity to expand 
problem-centered organizational research and theory (Davis and Marquis 2005). As 
Biggart and Lutzenhiser (2007) have noted, ―What economic sociology has not done, and 
which it now seems well poised to do, is to deal with social problems, issues such as 
poverty, unemployment, crime, addiction, and conflict. These are all issues that have 
material bases or supports, at least in part, or are embedded in market relations in some 
way‖ (1071). There is perhaps no contemporary social problem that is more embedded in 
market relations and material bases than climate change. Even without accounting for 
business transportation emissions, the industrial sector in the United States contributes 
the largest share of annual U.S. GHG emissions (EPA 2009). 
 
Furthermore, large U.S. firms have been active and influential in the policy debates 
surrounding climate science and proposed climate legislation, and their position has 
changed over time. The Global Climate Coalition (GCC), founded in 1989, was a forceful 
spokesperson for business interests against climate science and regulation until its 
deactivation in 2002. The GCC‘s membership included large U.S. firms such as Exxon, 
General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and Texaco. It is notable, however, that today 
many of the most prominent members of the GCC are now members of a business and 
environmental coalition called the United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP). 
Member firms of USCAP – including firms like Ford Motor Company, Shell Oil, 
American Electric Power, Bank of America, and others - have made repeated public calls 
for federal regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. USCAP strongly influenced 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey bill) climate bill 
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through their Blueprint for Legislative Action (USCAP 2009) and most recently put a 
full-page ad in The Washington Post newspaper calling on federal lawmakers to pass bi-
partisan energy and climate legislation (USCAP 2010). Even Exxon, arguably the longest 
hold-out on acknowledging the science of climate change, has halted funding to the 
Heartland Institute, one of the largest and most high-profile climate skeptic organizations 
(Revkin 2009b).  
 
Over the past twenty years, many U.S. firms have shifted their stance toward climate 
change. Notably, though, this shift has occurred in the absence of clearly defined federal 
policies on GHG emissions or consistent regulatory direction on how to address climate 
change in their business operations. Rather, direct efforts to persuade companies to 
address climate change have occurred more frequently in corporate boardrooms than 
congressional back rooms, making interactions among U.S. firms, shareholders, and 
stakeholders on climate change an extremely relevant site of inquiry. Baron (2003) terms 
these interactions ―private politics.‖ Private politics can either play out through formal 
corporate governance processes – such as the shareholder activism examined in this 
dissertation – or through more informal processes like consumer boycotts or media 
campaigns against firms. Regardless of their form, private politics encompass ―situations 
of conflict and their resolution without reliance on law or government‖ (Baron 2003: 31). 
 
Baron (2003) notes that stakeholders and activists are increasingly working through 
private politics rather than public governance structures to achieve their goals due to the 
length of time it takes to change government regulations and the new mobilizing power 
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activists have access to through technological developments like the Internet and social 
networking sites. As I discuss below, the partisan divide over climate change and 
legislative stalemate on the issue has also made private politics particularly attractive to 
stakeholders and activists who want U.S. firms to reduce their GHG emissions.  
 
The question of whether private politics is an appropriate or effective way to address 
social and environmental issues is a separate issue not addressed in this dissertation but 
worth mentioning briefly here. In a recent essay, Robert Reich (2008) – former Labor 
Secretary under President Bill Clinton and current Professor of Public Policy at the 
Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley – has roundly 
criticized the notion that we can or should rely on corporations to solve social and 
environmental problems. Reich argues that resolving social and environmental issues 
through private politics rather than the democratic process will continue to fall short of 
protecting societal interests. Whether this criticism is valid or not, the scope of issues 
being raised and addressed through corporate rather than public governance structures 
continues to expand. As a result, private politics and corporate social action will remain a 
necessary and important realm of scholarly inquiry among economic sociologists, 
organizational theorists, and policy scholars for the foreseeable future.  
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
Under Rule 14-a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, any shareholder owning 
at least $2,000 of stock in a company has the right to file an advisory shareholder 
resolution at publicly-traded U.S. firms. These shareholder resolutions – and the 
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dialogues that occur between shareholders and managers preceding them – provide the 
empirical setting for the dissertation. Shareholder resolutions are non-binding advisory 
proposals regarding corporate governance or social and environmental issues. They are 
included in a firm‘s proxy statement and are voted upon by all shareholders. The 
proposals must be under five hundred words in length, and each one ends with a 
―resolved‖ clause asking the firm to take a given action (e.g. separate C.E.O. and 
chairman roles, report on GHG emissions). Almost all shareholder proposals that go to a 
vote are opposed by management, and the company will recommend a ―no‖ vote on 
proposals in their proxy statement. An example of a climate change shareholder 
resolution filed by religious investors at Southern Company in 2007 is excerpted from the 
firm‘s proxy statement below:  
 
―RESOLVED: Shareholders request that the Board of Directors report to 
shareholders actions the company would need to take to reduce total CO2 
emissions, including quantitative goals for existing and proposed plants based 
on current and emerging technologies, by September 20, 2007. Such report shall 
omit proprietary information and be prepared at reasonable cost.‖ 
 
Firms can also petition the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to exclude 
shareholder resolutions from the proxy ballot. The SEC will permit the company to omit 
a resolution if it rules the issue to be a personal grievance or part of ―ordinary business.‖ 
In order to file the same resolution in subsequent years, shareholders must receive a 
minimum of a three percent vote in favor of the resolution in the first year, six percent in 
the second year, and ten percent or higher thereafter. Shareholders generally withdraw 
resolutions from the ballot if they hold dialogue meetings with firm managers who then 
agree to take action on the issue outlined in the resolution. Regardless of whether a 
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resolution is withdrawn through dialogue or not, the shareholder resolution process 
requires repeated interactions between firm managers and shareholders. Many resolution 
proponents file the same or multiple resolutions with firms for many years. Therefore, it 
is a fruitful setting to consider how organizational identity affects the relationship 
between managers and shareholders, a relationship that economic sociologists argue is 
too often characterized as being purely economic and arms-length in nature (Uzzi 1996).  
 
The roots of U.S. shareholder activism can be traced back to Quaker religious 
congregations in the early twentieth century. These groups chose not to invest in alcohol 
and weapons manufacturing firms. This type of ―negative screening‖ in investment 
portfolios characterized early socially responsible investing (SRI) in the U.S. (see Talner 
1983 for a complete history). Although the shareholder proposal was introduced by the 
SEC in the 1930‘s, modern shareholder activism on social and environmental issues 
emerged in 1970. Two years prior, the Medical Committee on Human Rights filed a 
resolution at Dow Chemical requesting that the firm halt napalm production that was 
being used during the Vietnam War. The SEC omitted the proposal under the ordinary 
business rule in 1969, but the filers won a lawsuit through the U.S. Court of Appeals and 
ultimately won the right to file the proxy in 1970. A year later, a group of Methodist 
ministers reached out to other religious investors and formed the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) to push companies to divest from South Africa in 
protest of apartheid. Since the 1970‘s, shareholder resolutions have been filed at U.S. 
firms related to issues as wide-ranging as poison pills, golden parachutes, CEO 
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compensation, board diversity, apartheid, tobacco, nuclear power, human rights, labor 
standards, product safety, and genocide in Sudan. 
 
Since 1990, activist shareholders have also used proxy resolutions as a tool to influence 
corporate governance on climate change. This dissertation focuses on U.S. institutional 
investor activism on climate change from the early part of 2000 to 2009. To date, over 
330 climate change shareholder resolutions have been filed with U.S. firms. Ninety-five 
climate resolutions were filed during the 2010 proxy season compared to a single 
resolution filed in 1990. The dissertation includes three empirical studies that examine 
the relationship between investors and firms on climate change. The theoretical aim of 
each study is to examine how organizational identity affects climate change negotiation 
in economic settings.  
 
Before discussing the three studies, however, several policy and societal issues must be 
addressed to establish the appropriateness of using the theoretical lens of organizational 
identity to better understand investor and firm behavior around climate change. The 
section below considers how anticipation of climate legislation (Hoffman 2007a) might 
impact firm responses to climate change demands from stakeholders. Following that, I 
discuss whether firm responses to climate change can be explained as simply a reaction to 
changes in American values and/or increased consumer demand for more sustainable 
products and business practices. In describing the case study on Ford Motor Company‘s 
shareholder dialogue with religious investors on climate change, I also consider whether 
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greenwashing (i.e. decoupling environmental pledges from actual behavior) is a credible 
alternative explanation for Ford‘s behavior around climate change. 
 
ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE REGULATION  
The legislative future of climate change regulation in the United States remains highly 
uncertain, making it difficult to point to anticipation of federal regulation as the sole 
driver of firm responsiveness to stakeholder demands around climate change. While 
Hurricane Katrina and Al Gore‘s documentary An Inconvenient Truth increased the 
salience of climate change as a policy issue in 2005 – and state-level climate action in 
California and the Northeast has become increasingly aggressive – state and regional 
efforts have not yet translated into broad climate policy mandates at the federal level. 
Governments generally have two broad policy options at their disposal to reduce GHG 
emissions within or across sovereign boundaries. The first is a carbon tax, which simply 
taxes emissions from the entities that emit them. This approach tends to be favored by 
economists for its simplicity and efficiency. However, given the political unpopularity of 
taxes and the complications involved in deciding where in the value chain the tax should 
be applied to a product, cap and trade systems are generally viewed as more politically 
viable than carbon taxes among policymakers.  
 
Cap and trade systems set a limit to the number of emissions that can be emitted in a 
given time period. These emissions are tracked through a set of emission trading permits 
called credits, which are allocated to firms through an auction mechanism that requires 
companies to purchase permits or are freely distributed by the government to firms. Firms 
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are allowed to buy and sell permits to one another as needed, but the number of permits 
remains finite and decreases over time to meet increasingly ambitious emission reduction 
goals. The purported benefit of the cap and trade system is that it allows firms that can 
reduce emissions inexpensively to sell their extra permits to firms that cannot reduce 
emissions as easily.  
 
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court eased the way for cap and trade legislation by ruling 
that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) could regulate carbon dioxide 
and other GHG gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act (Massachusetts v. EPA 
2007). The 2007 ruling both established a legal precedent for regulating carbon emissions 
and spurred lawmakers to introduce climate legislation. Numerous climate change bills 
have been proposed in the U.S. Congress since 2007. During the 110
th
 Congress, there 
were no fewer than nine pieces of climate change legislation introduced. The one that 
made it farthest in the legislative process was the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security 
Act of 2007. The bill sought to reduce GHG emissions in the United States by 63 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2050 and was approved by the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works. The bill (S.3036) was debated by the full Senate in June 2008 but was 
narrowly blocked by a procedural vote.  
 
Following the presidential election of Barack Obama in 2008, U.S. Representatives 
Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced another high-profile 
climate bill called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES Act). 
Both the Waxman-Markey bill and Obama Administration proposals for a cap and trade 
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system set a long-term goal of 80 percent reductions by 2050. The U.S. House of 
Representatives passed the bill (H.R. 2454) on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219 to 212, 
although testimony during the House hearings showed an undiminished partisan split 
between the Democratic and Republican parties on both the science and solutions to 
climate change. Individuals who identify themselves as part of the Republican Party are 
still more than 30 percent more likely to believe climate change is not occurring than 
Democrats (Rabe and Borick 2010).  
 
At the time of this writing, the state of U.S. federal climate legislation is more uncertain 
than ever, although the US EPA has made a final ―endangerment finding‖ for greenhouse 
gases in December 2009, determining these gases endanger public health and welfare. In 
the U.S. Senate, a bi-partisan climate bill co-sponsored by John Kerry (D-MA), Joe 
Lieberman (I-CT), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) appeared forthcoming in early spring 
2010, but it was derailed in May 2010 following the passage of a controversial 
immigration bill in Arizona and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill off the Gulf Coast. The 
first event caused Congressional Democrats to call for federal immigration reform. In 
response, Senator Graham withdrew his support for the climate bill, saying immigration 
reform debate would ruin the chances of passing a bi-partisan energy and climate change 
bill. He also stated that the oil spill had diminished the chances of passing the climate bill 
because the proposed legislation expanded domestic off-shore drilling (Graham 2010). 
Despite Graham‘s pull-out, Kerry and Lieberman introduced the bill – entitled the 
American Power Act – on May 12, 2010. The bill proposed a 17 percent reduction in 
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U.S. carbon pollution by 2020 and over 80 percent by 2050.  The bill had not gone to a 
vote before the full Senate at the time of this writing.  
 
The international community has not reached agreement on how to address climate 
change either. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change held a 
Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen in December 2009 but failed to reach 
a binding international agreement on climate change following the expiration of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2012. At the time of this writing, the pre-cursor meeting to COP16 in 
Mexico in December 2010 was being held in Bonn, Germany.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many large U.S. firms are advocating 
through USCAP for bi-partisan climate legislation, suggesting a portion of U.S. firms are 
trying to drive climate policy forward rather than the reverse. One reasonable explanation 
for current private sector advocacy for climate legislation is that organizations do not like 
to operate under conditions of uncertainty (Thompson 1967). Of course, these firms also 
have a vested interest in getting a seat at the table when any kind of climate policy is 
created (Hoffman 2007b). At the same time, however, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‘s 
senior vice president for environment, technology and regulatory affairs – William 
Kovacs – publicly questioned the science of climate change and called for the equivalent 
Scopes Monkey Trial on climate science in August 2009. The Chamber‘s position on 
climate change quickly became a lightening rod issue among its members. Nike removed 
itself from the Chamber‘s Board in protest and PG&E and Exelon resigned their 
memberships completely to protest the Chamber‘s climate skeptic views. Despite these 
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high profile protests, the Chamber remains opposed to all climate bills that have been 
proposed so far and filed a petition against the EPA‘s endangerment finding on CO2 in 
2010.  
 
The firms that are partnering with NGOs and pushing for cap and trade legislation are not 
monolithic nor do they fall neatly down industry lines. For example, utility companies 
like Duke Energy and Constellation Energy belong to USCAP whereas Southern 
Company and Dynegy do not and have been more resistant to shareholder requests to 
address climate change. Shell Oil also participates in USCAP whereas Exxon does not. 
Exxon is a complex case and worthy of its own extensive academic study, but a few 
comments about the firm‘s changing stance on climate are worth briefly noting here. 
After decades of funding climate skeptic organizations, the company publicly stated its 
support for a carbon tax to regulate GHG emissions on its own in 2009 (Stuewer 2009). 
However, critics have argued about whether Exxon‘s advocacy for politically unpalatable 
carbon taxes is a tactic to stall regulatory progress (Gold and Talley 2009).  
 
Regardless of Exxon‘s motivations, the above discussion demonstrates that firms react in 
diverse ways to stakeholder demands to address climate change. I argue this diversity can 
be explained in part by the organizational identity of the firm and the stakeholders 
making the request. Before presenting that argument, though, I consider two other 





CITIZEN BELIEFS AND CONSUMER PRESSURE 
Due to the continued uncertainty about future U.S. climate legislation and a post-Kyoto 
international climate agreement, it is instructive to examine citizen and consumer 
pressures as possible drivers of differential firm responsiveness to climate change. Upon 
quick reflection, one might assume firms are simply reacting to changes in citizen beliefs 
and values regarding sustainability and/or an increase in consumer demand for ―green‖ or 
―sustainable‖ products. Under these scenarios, one expects that some firms are merely 
betting on sustainability as a strategy to increase their financial performance. Upon closer 
investigation, however, I find these explanations by themselves do not hold up 
empirically.  
 
Nationally representative surveys have shown that American‘s belief that climate change 
is occurring has fallen over the last several years (Pew Research Center 2009b; 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 2010; Rabe and Borick 2010). The oft-cited 
Pew survey finds that the number of Americans who believe there is solid evidence that 
climate change is occurring dropped from 71 percent in April 2008 to 57 percent in 
October 2009. Both the Pew Survey and the Muhlenberg-Michigan study (Rabe and 
Borick 2010) found the largest drop in belief among citizens who identify their political 
affiliation as Independent. The Six Americas survey (Leiserowitz et al. 2010) from the 
Yale Project on Climate Change also found that the biggest shifts occurred among the 
most alarmed and most skeptical from 2008 to 2010. The percentage of respondents 
claiming to be alarmed by climate change dropped from 18 to 10 percent and those in the 
dismissive category increased from 7 to 16 percent. Those who are cautious about the 
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evidence of climate change also increased, whereas the percentage of respondents who 
claim to be disengaged decreased from 12 to 6 percent.  
 
Even when belief in climate change was in the range of 71 to 77 percent of Americans 
between 2006 and 2008, the Pew survey found that only 47 percent of respondents 
believed climate change is caused by human activity. Given that less than half of 
Americans believe climate change is caused by human activities, it does not appear that 
the private sector has faced broad and overwhelming pressure from citizens to reduce the 
environmental footprint of their operations and products, undermining arguments that a 
radical shift in American values around sustainability is driving corporate responsiveness 
to climate change.  The Muhlenberg-Michigan survey suggests that one of the challenges 
of overcoming public inertia and climate doubt is the fact that individuals do not 
generally experience possible effects of climate change firsthand. Borick and Rabe 
(2009) find that residents in Mississippi, for example, are more likely to attribute their 
belief in climate change to increased natural disasters and storm severity than residents in 
states who do not experience hurricanes.  
 
Further, the public has recently been exposed to several highly publicized climate change 
controversies that may have heightened climate doubts among the public. The first 
occurred in November 2009 when a large number of emails and documents from the 
University of East Anglia‘s Climatic Research Unit (CRU) were leaked on the Internet. 
Dubbed ―Climategate‖ by the media, climate skeptics claimed the emails proved that 
prominent climate scientists – including Michael Mann at Pennsylvania State University 
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– had manipulated and withheld data that disproved the severity of climate change. Two 
independent reviews of the email and data in the UK – and an internal investigation at 
Pennsylvania State University (Foley, Scaroni, and Yekel 2010) – did not find evidence 
of a climate conspiracy to manipulate or delete data. Despite these findings, the incident 
gave new momentum to climate skeptics in the media (Revkin 2009a).  
 
The email scandal created such negative press for proponents of climate action that U.S. 
Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) felt it was necessary to revisit the evidence on 
climate science in the U.S. Congress. On May 6, 2010, the Energy Independence and 
Global Warming Panel held a Select Committee hearing on ―The Foundation of Climate 
Science,‖ featuring top-level American climate scientists and a well-known climate 
skeptic named Lord Christopher Walter Monckton, 3rd Viscount Monckton of Brenchley. 
Lord Monckton is a British policy consultant and former advisor to Margaret Thatcher. 
The testimony and acrimonious questioning during the hearing showed that anger and 
distrust among climate legislation proponents and climate skeptics had not abated but 
rather deepened since the previous year‘s hearings on the Waxman-Markey climate bill 
(U.S. House 2010). 
 
Following the climate email scandal, further climate skeptic fodder emerged in January 
2010 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) publicly apologized 
for inaccurate claims in the Working Group II document of the 2007 IPCC Four 
Assessment Report that the Himalayan glaciers would likely melt by 2035 (IPCC 2010). 
That same month, the current IPCC chair – Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri – was also accused 
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by a British newspaper of having a financial conflict of interest in his role as IPCC chair 
and personally profiting from climate change science (Mendick 2010). This criticism was 
quickly picked up by prominent climate skeptics (Pielke 2010). 
 
Despite the consensus view among a large majority of the scientific community that 
climate change is occurring and has accelerated due to human activities (IPCC 2007), 
these events – coupled with a severe economic recession – have not promoted an increase 
in personal actions to combat climate change by the general public. U.S. climate surveys 
show that citizens are not taking dramatic personal actions to reduce their GHG 
emissions through consumer pressure. In another Yale Project on Climate Change study 
conducted in 2008 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 2008), researchers surveyed 
a nationally representative sample of 2,164 American adults about their purchasing 
decisions as they related to climate change. Sixty-eight percent of respondents said they 
did not know which companies to reward or punish for not taking enough action on 
climate change, and 76 percent said they had not or did not know if they had punished a 
firm for not addressing climate change with their purchasing decisions. Additionally, 
many of the firms that are the most GHG emission-intensive (e.g. coal mining firms) do 
not sell their products directly to consumers. As a result, pressure to address climate 
change often originates from interest group pressure rather than direct consumer pressure.  
 
Finally, while almost two-thirds of the survey respondents said they wanted to make 
―green purchases‖ like fuel-efficient cars, they stated they could not afford to do so. 
Given the current economic crisis, this cost-constraint is not likely to recede in the short-
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term future. While it is understandable that sustainability-minded individuals who live in 
affluent, liberal communities might assume that demand for ―green products‖ and 
―sustainable production‖ is growing rapidly, the aggregate numbers do not support this 
assumption. Nor does it appear that a majority of U.S. citizens are taking political action 
to encourage elected officials to address climate change. The Yale survey found that 89 
percent of respondents have never contacted an elected official to encourage him/her to 
take action to address climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2008), although other surveys 
find support among citizens for more climate legislation at the local, state, and national 
levels (Pew Research Center 2009a; Rabe and Borick 2010). 
 
This lengthy discussion of American citizens‘ beliefs about climate change and consumer 
preferences is meant to highlight two important points. First, citizen beliefs and consumer 
preferences are not overwhelmingly driving firm behavior on climate change. If anything, 
pressure for firms to address anthropogenic climate change is decreasing. Second, and 
more importantly, this section shows that cognitive beliefs and cultural and political 
ideologies go a long way toward explaining why some Americans believe climate change 
is occurring and others do not. The choice to engage in climate mitigation and/or 
adaptation actions at the individual level is at times as much a cultural and ideological 
decision as a strategic or economic one. This dissertation turns attention away from 
individuals to explore how/whether cognitive templates and cultural beliefs – manifest in 
organizational identity – affect organizations operating in markets but engaged in 
―private politics‖ (Baron 2003) over climate change. I argue that organizational identity 
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affects how both investors and firms engage in negotiation over climate change. It is to 
this argument that I now turn attention.  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY  
The remainder of this introductory chapter outlines the three empirical studies in the 
dissertation. The studies explore how organizational identity impacts the actions investors 
and firms are willing to take on climate change issues beyond what one would expect 
based on purely rational/economic or strategic/political grounds. The studies also directly 
address the call for renewed research on the ―noun-like qualities of organizations‖ (King, 
Felin, and Whetten 2010: 290) to explain firm behavior. This dissertation takes a ―noun-
like‖ approach to organizations by treating them as social actors with their own central, 
enduring, and distinct attributes (Albert and Whetten 1985; Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 
2000). The central premise of the dissertation is that organizational identity can help us 
better understand inter-organizational outcomes of climate change conflicts and why 
organizations choose certain climate change strategies.   
 
I argue that an organization‘s identity affects its receptivity to 1) considering long versus 
short-term implications from climate change 2) its openness to engaging with 
stakeholders on climate change and 3) the actions it is willing to take to address climate 
change. In essence, identity affects the interactions and agreements an organization can 
reach with other actors on climate change in economic settings. I suggest organizational 
identity is one piece of a comprehensive model of private politics predicting the rise of 
campaigns, choice of targets, strategies chosen by activists, and negotiation outcomes 
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(Baron 2003). The empirical studies in the dissertation answer the following questions: 
 
1. How is an institutional logic maintained – and what form does it take – when its 
adherents possess diverse organizational identities? 
2. How does the social identity of shareholders and the identity orientation of a firm 
interact to facilitate shareholder resolution withdrawals on climate change? 
3. How does organizational identity affect the outcome of climate change 
shareholder resolutions?‖ 
 
Although each empirical study stands alone, there are two unifying themes running 
throughout the dissertation. The first is a substantive focus on the issue of climate change. 
The dissertation strives to understand the processes by which climate change has become 
defined as a legitimate business risk. The second is a focus on organizational identity and 
how it aids our understanding of the way particular climate change actions emerge as 
solutions to the issue rather than others, specifically in regard to shareholder activism 
tactics and firm engagement with stakeholders on the issue. The dissertation looks at the 
effect of identity at multiple stages of the private politics process.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses attention on the negotiation among institutional investors promoting 
firm-level climate change action. The study looks at how organizational identity affects 
the negotiation and maintenance of a ―sustainability logic of investing‖ and shows that 
identity can help researchers understand how diverse organizations maintain a challenger 
logic‘s stability to engage in private politics with firms. Theoretically, the aim of the 
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study is to correct for weaknesses in institutional logic research by emphasizing the logic 
work activities required to create and maintain a logic, including framing activities and 
the use of organizational identity as a ―tool kit‖ (Swidler 1986) to mitigate conflict.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 turn attention to contestation between investors and firms on climate 
change through the shareholder resolution process. Chapter 3 uses a case study on Ford 
Motor Company to create a theory of how organizational identities ―interact‖ in corporate 
governance contests to affect the outcomes of firm-shareholder dialogue on climate 
change. The theoretical aim of this chapter is to bring together disparate streams of 
organizational research on identity from the management literature (Albert and Whetten 
1985; Albert et al. 2000) and organizational ecology (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 2002; 
Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll 2007) to show that both internal 
identity attributes and the evaluation of the other party influences the outcome of private 
politics. Chapter 4 uses a dataset of all climate change resolutions filed at S&P 500 firms 
between 2002 and 2009 to test the theory developed in the Ford case study; namely, how 
the identities of two interacting organizations affects their ability to reach withdrawal 
agreements on climate resolutions. The following sections provide brief overviews of 
each empirical study.  
 
Chapter 2: Logic Work: Negotiating a Sustainability Logic of Investing 
Baron (2003) argues that a research agenda on private politics ―should predict when an 
activist group acts alone and when it joins in collective action‖ (51). Drawing on 
institutional theory and social movement research, Chapter 2 examines how institutional 
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investors with diverse organizational identities are able to engage in collective action on 
climate change despite conflicting motivations and organizational missions. Specifically, 
the chapter examines how a group of religious investors, public pension funds, 
foundations, and union organizations negotiate and maintain a ―sustainability logic of 
investing‖ by framing climate change as a financial risk and opportunity and drawing on 
organizational identity as ―tool kit‖ (Swidler 1986) in situations of disagreement. 
 
Logics are defined as ―the belief systems that furnish guide-lines for practical action‖ 
(Rao et al. 2003: 795). Research on institutional logics has proliferated in recent years 
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton 2004; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006), but much of this research has focused on competition between 
logics or shifts from one logic to another in an organizational field (Scott et al. 2000). 
Few if any studies have attended to the negotiation and maintenance activities among 
organizational actors within logics. The study in Chapter 2 shows that considering how 
organizational identity affects logic formation and maintenance corrects two major 
weaknesses in this research stream. 
 
First, some scholars have critiqued research on logic diffusion for treating logics 
exclusively as exogenous forces that act upon organizations and individuals rather than 
being socially constructed by actors themselves (Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch 
2003). Second, much of the research on institutional logics focuses on competition 
between challenger and dominant logics in organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio 
1999; Rao et al. 2003; Thornton 2004; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) but fails to attend 
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to negotiation and maintenance activities among organizational actors within logics 
(Lounsbury et al. 2003; Lounsbury 2005, 2007). There is a particular neglect of how 
challenger organizations using the same logic manage divergent motivations for action.  
 
Research on institutional logics has largely assumed that ―the identification with the 
collective is equivalent to the identification with the institutional logic prevailing in the 
collective‖ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 128). While dominant logics admittedly take on a 
level of taken-for-grantedness (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), a long tradition of social 
movement theory informs us that institutional entrepreneurs promoting any radical 
change – including challenger logics – frequently have to mobilize diverse groups in 
order to mount a credible challenge to the dominant logic. To correct for this tendency in 
the logics literature, I follow the lead of organizational scholars who have begun to 
incorporate social movement theories into their work (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Rao 
et al. 2003; Davis, Scott, and Zald 2005; Rao and Giorgi 2006; Weber, Heinze, and 
DeSoucey 2008). The study draws on social movement theories regarding collective 
action framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986) to understand the negotiation 
processes required to maintain an institutional logic among diverse organizations.  
 
The chapter calls into question the assumption of previous logics research that 
organizations have experienced ex-ante isomorphism (Mizruchi and Fein 1999) in terms 
of their motivations and that the process of creating a collective social identity is 
uncontested or unproblematic for challengers (Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002; Scully 
and Creed 2005; Weber et al. 2008). Rather than reflecting a ―truce following from past 
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struggles,‖ (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006), I argue that organizations must 
continuously negotiate and maintain an institutional logic through logic work when their 
identities are diverse. Logic work consists of two components: logic framing and logic 
maintenance (i.e. using identity as tool kit).  
 
Logic framing activities are best understood through the lens of social movement theory. 
According to Benford and Snow (2000), there are three types of collective action frames 
social movement organizations typically use: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. 
Diagnostic frames define problems, whereas prognostic frames suggest what is to be 
done about them and motivational frames tell participants why they should act (Benford 
and Snow 2000). The sustainability logic uses a common diagnostic framing around 
climate change that claims investors and firms will enjoy long-term financial 
performance gains from addressing risks and opportunities from climate change in the 
short-term. However, this frame does not mitigate the diverse moral, political, and social 
motivations of the different investors for engaging in shareholder activism.  
 
If logics are in fact more durable templates for action than collective action frames as the 
organizational literature suggests (Thornton 2004; Thornton and Ocasio 2008), 
challengers embracing a new logic must also find a way to embed rather than eliminate 
motivational and prognostic frame disagreement among organizations. I suggest that 
investors accomplish this through logic maintenance activities, specifically using 
organizational identity as a tool kit. Rather than rejecting the validity of allies‘ actions 
when they engage in more radical strategies than a focal organization is willing to take 
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itself, traditional investors draw on oppositional social identities to explain and justify 
others‘ behavior while still conserving their fiduciary identity (Kraatz and Block 2008).  
 
This identity distancing allows them to disassociate themselves from other participants in 
instances of conflict without having to abandon the sustainability logic. In the case of the 
investors in this article, I show how more traditional investors (e.g. public pension funds) 
attribute radical actions on the part of religious and labor investors to their social 
identities but invoke those same actors‘ fiduciary identities when they are pursuing 
similar strategies.  
 
Like traditional investors, religious and social investors also use identity as a tool, albeit 
in a different way. These investors are multi-vocal, meaning they possess ―the ability…to 
participate effectively in multiple kinds of ties with diverse parties‖ (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2008: 608). Their multi-vocality permits them to draw on a broader set of 
justifications for action from religious or social institutions and thus take more radical 
steps to persuade firms to act on climate change under the guise of the sustainability 
logic. The socially-motivated investors continue to take more aggressive actions against 
firms (i.e. file more stringent resolutions, engage in social investment forums) than more 
traditional institutional investors who do not view these actions as appropriate for their 
organizations. The study also shows that when religious investors can successfully justify 
new, more radical actions within the agreed-upon financial discourse of the logic, the 




According to the conventional view, logics shape individual or organizational decisions 
by influencing what problems get attended to, what solutions to problems are considered, 
what is viewed as legitimate action, and the meaning attached to those actions (Thornton 
2004). I suggest an alternative process involving logic work around framing and identity 
distancing. The study demonstrates that incorporating organizational identity 
considerations into research on institutional logics helps explain how diverse groups form 
and maintain a logic that challenges U.S. firms on climate change. The study concludes 
by considering how future research can incorporate measures of logic work to determine 
whether challenger logics that require high levels of logic work are more or less 
successful in replacing dominant logics.  
 
Chapter 3: Climate, Cars, and Catholic Nuns: Identity Interactions in Manager-
Shareholder Relationships 
Having established that identity differences among institutional investors exist and that 
these differences require logic work to maintain a sustainability logic of investing, the 
next study shifts attention to contestation between investors and firms on climate change. 
The case study analyzes how organizations‘ identities interact to foster a successful 
shareholder resolution withdrawal on climate change at Ford Motor Company. 
Specifically, the case examines how a climate resolution that went to a vote the first time 
it was filed at Ford in 2007 was successfully withdrawn in 2008 after dialogue with the 
Dominican order of nuns who filed it. The resolution filed in 2007 requested that Ford‘s 
Board of Directors publicly set quantitative goals for reducing GHG emissions from their 
products and operations. In March 2008, Ford publicly agreed to reduce GHG emissions 
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from its new vehicle fleet by at least thirty percent by 2020 and the resolution was 
withdrawn. 
 
The case shows that identity shapes economic ties between firms and activist investors. 
Actors involved in inter-organizational relationships – such as shareholder resolution 
conflicts – constantly evaluate one another‘s behavior (Goffman 1959) and use identity as 
a measure of whether another organization‘s actions are appropriate (March and Olsen 
1995). While some definitions of organizational identity emphasize internal identity 
attributes that are central, enduring, and distinctive (Albert and Whetten 1985), others, 
particularly those associated with organizational ecology, pay more attention to how 
audiences evaluate and sanction actors for violating social codes associated with their 
identity (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2007). Rather than being 
mutually exclusive, I argue both of these conceptualizations are necessary to understand 
how identity influences shareholder dialogue outcomes between firms and shareholders.   
 
I introduce the concept of ―identity interaction‖ to reflect the dual ways in which identity 
evaluation by external audiences and internal identity attributes influence inter-
organizational relationships. Identity interactions occur when one organization evaluates 
the identity of another before deciding whether and how to engage in a relationship with 
it. This evaluation is contingent, however, on the former‘s own cognitive identity 
orientation (Brickson 2005, 2007) toward stakeholders. Thus, the identity interaction 
concept is comprised of two components; the stakeholder‘s organizational identity and 
the firm‘s identity orientation. Stakeholder organizational identity refers to the ―central, 
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enduring, and distinctive‖ attributes of an organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). In the 
studies in Chapters 3 and 4, I pay particular attention to whether stakeholders‘ social 
identities are rooted in religion, finance, or special interest areas like the labor and 
environmental movement.  
 
The other component of an identity interaction is the identity orientation of firm, which 
impacts how firms evaluate the legitimacy of stakeholders‘ social identities and whether 
they want to negotiate with them. Identity orientation is defined as the ―the nature of 
assumed relations between an organization and its stakeholders—are relations 
independent, dyadically interdependent, or derived from a common group membership?‖ 
(Brickson 2005: 577). According to Brickson (2007), firms can be placed in three 
different orientation categories: individualistic, relational, or collectivistic. Organizations 
that possess each of these orientations approach their relationships with stakeholders 
differently. Whereas an ―individualistic orientation is associated with concern for one‘s 
own welfare,‖ organizations with relational orientations are ―associated with an emphasis 
on the well-being of particular relationship partners and on maintaining relationships, and 
a collectivistic orientation is associated with a concern for the welfare of the greater 
group as a whole‖ (Brickson 2005, 579). In essence, identity orientation captures how a 
firm approaches its relationships to different stakeholders. Collectivistic firms approach 
their relationships with stakeholders in an open and welcoming manner, whereas 
relational firms reserve a warm reception to certain types of stakeholders (e.g. employees 
or clients), and individualistic firms take a more hostile manner to stakeholders who 
approach them. While these are ideal-type categorizations of firms, the identity 
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orientation concept helps capture heterogeneity among firm evaluations of stakeholders 
and corrects for a tendency in organizational ecology theory on identity to assume that all 
audience members (i.e. firms) evaluate the same stakeholders in the same way (Polos et 
al. 2002).  
 
Using an inductive approach, the case study builds a theory that shows it is the 
interaction between the filer‘s socially legitimate organizational identity and Ford‘s 
collectivistic identity orientation that explains the withdrawal of the resolution. The case 
finds that structural explanations of how identity impacts inter-organizational 
relationships, such as those put forth by Padgett and Ansell (1993) and Zuckerman and 
colleagues (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003), are not sufficient to explain the 
positive reception religious investors received at Ford Motor Company. Padgett and 
Ansell (1993), for example, suggest that actors are least constrained in their actions when 
their motivations are obscured from external audiences. Given the salience (Polos et al. 
2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005) and authenticity (Peterson 1997) of her identity as a nun, 
however, Sister Pat (the nun leading the dialogue for investors) does not engage in 
―robust action‖ (Padgett and Ansell 1993) in which her motivations are unclear to the 
firms and NGOs she engages in dialogue. Her religious identity overarches all 
interpretations of her actions as a shareholder.   
 
However, rather than constraining her ability to succeed in activist shareholder activities, 
her religious identity actually broadens the degree and type of actions she can 
legitimately take in the eyes of Ford managers. The firm views her as both a shareholder 
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and religious figure who cares about the firm‘s long-term survival. Ford views religious 
investors as shareholders who cannot be stereotyped into a single category (Zuckerman 
and Kim 2003). The only way for firms to place religious investors in these multiple 
categories and still trust them, though, is for them to have a particular orientation toward 
stakeholders that views them as having a contribution to make to the firm. I argue such a 
collectivist orientation is present at Ford and it is this match – or identity interaction – 
between the firm and investor‘s identity that enables the resolution withdrawal to be 
reached. 
 
If the religious identity of investors alone was the reason Ford engaged with them and 
was able to reach a withdrawal agreement on the climate resolution, one would expect 
most other major U.S. firms to engage in dialogue with religious investors in a manner 
similar to Ford. Since other large firms do not approach their relationship with religious 
investors as proactively as Ford, we know religious identity only tells part of the story. 
There is a stark contrast in how religious investors are received at Ford compared to firms 
like Exxon, for example, where activist investors are approached with greater hostility 
and/or dismissiveness (Slater 2007).  
 
Also, it is notable that the same climate resolution was filed by the shareholders but not 
withdrawn from General Motors, creating a useful ―shadow case‖ to eliminate other 
organizational explanations for Ford‘s behavior. General Motors, while more willing to 
engage in dialogue with religious investors than Exxon, also approaches its relationship 
to them in a more arms-length (Uzzi 1996) manner than Ford. In interviews with 
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investors who engage with both firms on climate change, informants noted that Ford 
provides them the opportunity to meet with employees and managers at all levels and in 
all departments of the company whereas the breadth of interactions at GM is much 
narrower. It is notable that Ford and General Motors (pre-bankruptcy) have taken such a 
different approach to shareholders on climate change despite having virtually identical 
market identities (Zuckerman 1999) and being situated in the same geographic location 
(Davis and Greve 1997; Marquis 2003; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007; Greenwood et 
al 2010).  
 
Furthermore, if anticipation of future regulation explains Ford‘s willingness to engage 
with shareholders, one would also expect General Motors to respond to shareholders in a 
similar fashion to Ford. At the time of the resolution, both firms were subject to the same 
pressures from GHG reduction legislation in California. On July 22, 2002, California 
adopted AB 1493 (Pavley) that required passenger vehicles to reduce their GHG 
emissions by 30 percent reduction by 2016. Thirteen other states also supported the 
Pavley standard, and regulation was slated to go into effect starting with the 2009 model 
year of vehicles. However, the automotive industry sued the State of California, claiming 
that Pavley overlapped with the federal government‘s authority to set corporate average 
fuel economy (CAFÉ) gas mileage standards.  
 
A federal district court ruled in favor of California in December 2007, but the EPA under 
the Bush administration declined to grant California a waiver under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate tougher emission standards than established by federal law (the Obama 
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administration set a new federal CAFÉ standard in 2009). Despite the lawsuit and conflict 
over the Pavley standards, Ford continued to engage with investors on climate change 
resolutions, and unlike General Motors, reached a withdrawal agreement with them in 
2008. General Motors continued to receive climate resolutions from investors and was 
placed on a 2009 ―Climate Watch List‖ of firms receiving shareholder resolutions before 
the firm declared bankruptcy that summer (Ceres 2009). The comparisons with Exxon 
and General Motors strongly suggest there is something different about Ford‘s orientation 
toward stakeholders compared to other firms that contributes to the company‘s 
willingness to engage with shareholders on climate change. Ford‘s openness to engaging 
with a variety of external stakeholders is suggestive of what Brickson terms a 
collectivistic identity orientation. A collectivistic orientation means that a firm views 
itself as part of a common group membership with other stakeholders, whether that is the 
local community, the nation, or even the global community more broadly. Brickson 
(2005) says collectivistic organizations are likely to describe themselves as ―community-
oriented,‖ ―promoting a cause,‖ ―politically active,‖ or ―providing a public service‖ 
(588).  
 
The case also addresses the possibility that Ford was merely ―greenwashing‖ by setting a 
reduction target. Greenwashing refers to actions taken by a firm that seem 
environmentally-proactive on the surface but do not significantly change the firm‘s 
environmental performance. Firms are especially susceptible to engaging in such 
decoupling activities under conditions of uncertainty like those that exist around climate 
change (Meyer and Rowan 1977). A senior policy analyst at Natural Resources Defense 
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Council (NRDC) was very skeptical when he first heard about the GHG reduction target 
Ford had agreed to set from religious investors. On December 19, 2007, President George 
W. Bush had signed the Energy Independence and Security Act into law. This legislation 
required automakers to increase their fleet-wide CAFÉ to thirty-five miles per gallon by 
2020, including light trucks. The analyst immediately thought the firm was greenwashing 
by setting a target that only met what the law already required.  
 
Although the publicly stated target was almost identical to the one set forth in the new 
CAFÉ standards, the case finds that a greenwashing explanation of Ford‘s behavior is not 
sufficient by itself. When they received the initial target number from Ford, the religious 
investors requested that the company allow external environmental experts to vet the 
proposed target and weigh in on whether it was a legitimate move forward before 
withdrawing the resolution. The company agreed to let the investors contact NRDC and 
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) for their input. Sister Pat took NRDC‘s 
greenwashing concerns back to Ford, and the management team said their scenario 
analyses looked at what reduction targets the firm would need to set in order to reduce the 
auto sector‘s contribution to GHG emissions and stabilize CO2 levels at 450 parts per 
million (ppm). Ford asked Sister Pat to invite the NGO representatives to review Ford‘s 
scenario analyses and have a conversation about the assumptions Ford used to get the 
target. After reviewing the analysis, the case shows the NGOs were satisfied that Ford‘s 
analysis demonstrated ―a good-faith effort‖ to figure out what standards the firm needed 




This vignette from the case also supports Baron‘s (2003) claim that private politics can 
only work if the process is ―…an equilibrium private institution. That is, both the activist 
and the firm must continue to participate even when incidents occur that suggest the 
standard might have been violated‖ (62). In the case study, we see how Ford‘s trust in 
religious investors‘ motives enables them to engage in repeated rounds  of negotiation 
with them and how the company‘s collectivistic orientation enables the religious 
investors to keep working with Ford even when concerns over the firm‘s behavior arise. 
Religious investors had enough faith in the firm to remain in dialogue on the climate 
resolution even when it appeared the firm might be greenwashing. 
 
Chapter 4: Identity Interaction? How Organizational Identity Affects Shareholder 
Resolution Outcomes 
Although suggestive, a single case study like the one outlined above is not sufficient by 
itself to test whether a firm‘s individualistic/collectivistic orientation affects outcomes of 
firm-stakeholder interactions more generally. However, the Ford case strongly suggests 
that structurally similar firms approach stakeholders with varying cognitive orientations 
and evaluate the legitimacy of stakeholders‘ identities differently. This in turn effects 
whether a firm believes there is merit to fostering a strong relationship with any given 
stakeholder.  
 
Chapter 4 presents an empirical study that tests the effect of shareholder identity, firm 
identity orientation, and the interaction between the two on climate resolution outcomes. 
This study uses a dataset of all climate change shareholder resolutions filed at S&P 500 
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firms from 2002-2009. In addition to testing whether the identity of the shareholder – 
operationalized as religious, secular professional, and special interest – affects the 
likelihood of withdrawal, I also examine whether there is an interaction effect between 
the filer‘s identity and the identity orientation of the firm. Specifically, I test whether 
firms that are more collectivistic or individualistic in their orientation are more likely to 
reach withdrawals with specific groups of filers as opposed to firms that are less 
collectivistic or individualistic.  
 
While acknowledging that collectivistic and individualistic identity orientations are ideal 
types and recognizing that hybrids also exist, the labels provide a starting point from 
which to consider why there is variation in the approach firms take in their relationships 
with stakeholders. Individualistic organizations are primarily concerned about their own 
welfare, whereas collectivistic organizations prioritize the welfare of a larger group in 
stakeholder interactions (Brickson 2005). Hence, firms with different identity orientations 
evaluate stakeholder identities using different lenses and likely have different dialogue 
outcomes with shareholders on climate change resolutions.  
 
This study makes contributions to both the organizational identity and the business 
literature on corporate social action and stakeholder engagement. In regard to research on 
organizational identity, it is the first study that tests the explanatory power of different 
identity theories, specifically theories from traditional management literature (Albert and 
Whetten 1985; Brickson 2005, 2007; Whetten 2006) and organizational ecology (Polos et 
al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2007; Hsu 2006; Hsu, Hannan, and Kocak 
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2009). Despite the potential to inform one another, these two research streams and the 
scholars that pursue them rarely engage with one another theoretically. 
 
The study is also motivated by the lack of attention paid to stakeholder-firm interactions 
in studies of corporate responses to stakeholder demands, particularly how identity 
impacts the outcomes of these interactions. The study builds on an earlier longitudinal 
study by Eesley and Lennox (2006) that examines how stakeholder legitimacy and power 
interacts with a firm‘s power to influence the outcomes of environmental conflicts 
between firms and external stakeholders in the U.S.  However, that study focused most of 
its attention to how financial resources of firms and stakeholders interact. I take their 
findings a step further by paying attention to how identity influences firm-stakeholder 
interactions. In this way, the study answers the call by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 
(2009) for researchers to attend more to why firms pursue corporate social action rather 
than whether it enhances their financial performance (or vice versa). As Eesley and 
Lenox (2006) note, large-scale statistical analyses of ―which stakeholder influences 
matter to managers and to which stakeholders firms are likely to respond‖ are few and far 
between in the business literature (766). This study addresses those questions directly.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, the studies in this dissertation focus on how identity can improve our 
understanding of how and why investors and firms decide to address climate change 
beyond explanations that rely solely on financial, strategic, political, or greenwashing 
explanations of behavior. The dissertation strives to make both substantive and 
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theoretical contributions to organizational sociology and public policy research. On the 
theoretical side, the first study speaks to the need to conceptualize the role of identity 
differently within the institutional logics literature. Rather than assuming that adopting a 
logic means adopting a collective identity, Chapter 2 highlights how diverse identities are 
used as tools to negotiate conflict and maintain a logic‘s stability.  
 
The studies contained in the dissertation also close the divide between two areas of 
organizational identity research, namely those in the management literature that define 
identity as the central, enduring, and distinctive attributes of an organization (Albert and 
Whetten 1985) and those in organizational ecology who view identity as a way for 
audiences to evaluate whether an organization is violating the social codes associated 
with its identity (Polos et al. 2002). By introducing the concept of identity interaction, I 
suggest that both definitions are required to fully understand when firm-stakeholder 
interactions will result in successful outcomes. This research also fills a gap in 
stakeholder research within the business literature that has paid scant attention to the 
ways in which firm and stakeholder characteristics interact (Eesley and Lenox 2006).  
 
By drawing on and extending upon organizational identity research, the studies also aim 
to contribute to theories regarding ―when and where private politics arise and why some 
attempts at private politics fail and others succeed‖ (Baron 2003: 48). The studies 
represent one of the first efforts to expand models of private politics around climate 
change to include identity variables. It also meets the challenge to produce more 
problem-centered organizational research (Davis and Marquis 2005; Biggart and 
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Lutzenhiser 2007). Without understanding the drivers behind investors and firm behavior 
around climate change, one cannot identify barriers or catalysts for their engagement on 
the issue. Much of the social science and policy research on climate change has narrowed 
the focus to the relative value of different economic and technical fixes to the problem. 
While this work is valuable, it neglects deeper identity and cultural forces also at play 
that impact individual and organizational responses to climate change.  
 
Although the surveys discussed earlier in this chapter provide useful snapshots of 
individual public opinion on climate change (Pew Research Center 2009b; Leiserowitz et 
al. 2010; Rabe and Borick 2010), we actually have little understanding of what influences 
their opinions or why they change over time. At the organizational level, we have even 
less understanding of the elements that influence responses to climate change despite the 
fact that these responses have real policy implications for how climate change is 
addressed in the regulatory and legislative arenas. The conclusion chapter ends with a 
discussion of how organizational responses to climate change may influence policy and 
why a fuller understanding of drivers that lead organizations to embrace or resist climate 






Albert, S., B. Ashforth, and J. Dutton. 2000. ―Organizational Identity and Identification: 
Charting New Waters and Building New Bridges.‖ Academy of Management 
Review 25:13-17. 
 
Albert, S., and D.A. Whetten. 1985. ―Organizational Identity.‖ Research in 
Organizational Behavior 7:263-295. 
 
Baron, D.P. 2003. ―Private Politics.‖ Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
12:31-66. 
 
Benford, R.D., and D.A. Snow. 2000. ―Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment.‖ Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-639. 
 
Biggart, N.W., and L. Lutzenhiser. 2007. ―Economic Sociology and the Social Problem 
of Energy Efficiency.‖ American Behavioral Scientist 50:1070-1086. 
 
Borick, C.P., and B.G. Rabe. 2009. ―A Reason to Believe: Examining the Factors that 
Determine Individual Views on Global Warming.‖ Working Paper. 
 
Brickson, S. 2005. ―Organizational Identity Orientation: Forging a Link between 
Organizational Identity and Organizations‘ Relations with Stakeholders.‖ 
Administrative Science Quarterly 50:576-609. 
 
Brickson, S. 2007. ―Organizational Identity Orientation: The Genesis of the Role of the 
Firm and Distinct Forms of Social Value.‖ Academy of Management Review 
32:864-888. 
 
Ceres. 2009. ―Southern, Massey Energy and Chevron Among Nine 'Climate Watch' 
Companies Targeted by Investors.‖ http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1033 
(Accessed June 3, 2009). 
 
Creed, W.E.D., M.A. Scully, and J.R. Austin. 2002. ―Clothes Make the Person? The 
Tailoring of Legitimating Accounts and the Social Construction of Identity.‖ 
Organization Science 13:475-496. 
 
Davis, G.F., and H.R. Greve. 1997. ―Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes 
in the 1980s.‖ American Journal of Sociology 103:1-37. 
 
Davis, G.F., and C. Marquis. 2005. ―Prospects for Organization Theory in the Early 
Twenty-first Century: Institutional Fields and Mechanisms.‖ Organization 
Science 16:332-344. 
 
Davis, G.F., W.R. Scott, and M.N. Zald, eds. 2005. Social Movements and Organization 




DiMaggio, P.J., and W.W. Powell. 1991. ―Introduction.‖ Pp. 1-38 in The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Eesley, C., and M.J. Lenox. 2006. ―Firm Responses to Secondary Stakeholder Action.‖ 
Strategic Management Journal 27:765-781. 
 
EPA. 2009. 2009 U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report. Washington, D.C.: EPA. 
 
Foley, H.C., A.W. Scaroni, and C.A. Yekel. 2010. RA-10 Inquiry Report: Concerning the 
Allegations of Research Misconduct Against Dr. Michael E. Mann, Department of 
Meteorology, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, the Pennsylvania State 
University. State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
http://www.research.psu.edu/orp/Findings_Mann_Inquiry.pdf (Accessed May 9, 
2010). 
 
Glynn, M.A., and M. Lounsbury. 2005. ―From the Critics‘ Corner: Logic Blending, 
Discursive Change and Authenticity in a Cultural Production System.‖ Journal of 
Management Studies 42:1031-1055. 
 
Goffman, E. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Gold, Russell, and Ian Talley. 2009. ―Exxon CEO Advocates Emissions Tax.‖ wsj.com, 
January 9 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123146091530566335.html (Accessed 
May 12, 2010). 
 
Graham, L. 2010. Graham on Energy Independence. Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Senator Lindsey Graham 
http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressRelease
s&ContentRecord_id=73236907-802a-23ad-4378-793da7514eb1 (Accessed May 
8, 2010). 
 
Greenwood, R., A.M. Diaz, S.X. Li, and J.C. Lorente. 2010. ―The Multiplicity of 
Institutional Logics and the Heterogeneity of Organizational Responses.‖ 
Organization Science 21:521-539. 
 
Hannan, M.T., L. Polos, and G.R. Carroll. 2007. Logics of Organization Theory: 
Audiences, Codes, and Ecologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hoffman, A.J. 2007a. Carbon Strategies: How Leading Companies are Reducing their 
Climate Change Footprint. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Hoffman, A.J. 2007b. Regulation: If You're Not at the Table, You're on the Menu. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University http://www.erb.umich.edu/News-and-




Hsu, G. 2006. ―Jacks of All Trades and Masters of None: Audiences' Reactions to 
Spanning Genres in Feature Film Production.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 
51:420-450. 
 
Hsu, G., and M.T. Hannan. 2005. ―Identities, Genres, and Organizational Forms.‖ 
Organization Science 16:474-490. 
 
Hsu, G., M.T. Hannan, and O. Kocak. 2009. ―Multiple Category Memberships in 
Markets: An Integrative Theory and Two Empirical Tests.‖ American 
Sociological Review 74:150-169. 
 
IPCC. 2007. Fourth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (Accessed June 1, 
2009). 
 
IPCC. 2010. IPCC Statement on the Melting of Himalayan Glaciers. Geneva, 
Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/himalaya-statement-20january2010.pdf 
(Accessed May 8, 2010). 
 
King, B.G., T. Felin, and D.A. Whetten. 2010. ―Finding the Organization in 
Organizational Theory: A Meta-Theory of the Organization as Social Actor.‖ 
Organization Science 21:290-305. 
 
Kraatz, M.S., and E. Block. 2008. ―Organizational Implications of Institutional 
Pluralism.‖ in The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited by 
R. Greenwood and et al. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Leiserowitz, A., E. Maibach, and C. Roser-Renouf. 2008. Climate Change in the 
American Mind: Americans’ Climate Change Beliefs, Attitudes, Policy 




Leiserowitz, A., E. Maibach, and C. Roser-Renouf. 2010. Global Warming's Six 
Americas. Yale University and George Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale 
Project on Climate Change 
http://environment.yale.edu/uploads/SixAmericasJan2010.pdf (Accessed May 6, 
2010). 
 
Lounsbury, M. 2007. ―A Tale of Two Cities: Competing Logics and Practice Variation in 
the Professionalizing of Mutual Funds.‖ Academy of Management Journal 
50:289-307. 
 
Lounsbury, M. 2005. ―Institutional Variation in the Evolution of Social Movements: 
41 
 
Competing Logics and the Spread of Recycling Advocacy Groups.‖ in Social 
Movements and Organization Theory, edited by G.F. Davis, D. McAdam, W.R. 
Scott, and M.N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lounsbury, M., M.J. Ventresca, and P. Hirsch. 2003. ―Social Movements, Field Frames 
and Industry Emergence: a Cultural-Political Perspective on U.S. Recycling.‖ 
Socio-Economic Review 1:71-104. 
 
March, J., and J.P. Olsen. 1995. Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press. 
 
Margolis, J.D., H.A. Elfenbein, and J.P. Walsh. 2009. ―Does it Pay to be Good…and 
Does it Matter? A Meta-analysis of the Relationship between Corporate Social 
and Financial Performance.‖ Invited for Resubmission at Strategic Management 
Journal. 
 
Marquis, C. 2003. ―The Pressure of the Past: Network Imprinting in Intercorporate 
Communities.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 48:655-689. 
 
Marquis, C., M.A. Glynn, and G.F. Davis. 2007. ―Community Isomorphism and 
Corporate Social Action.‖ Academy of Management Review 32:925-945. 
 
Massachusetts v. EPA. 2007. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf (Accessed May 15, 
2010). 
 
Mendick, Robert. 2010. ―Taxpayers' Millions Paid to Indian Institute Run by UN Climate 
Chief.‖ Telegraph.co.uk, January 16 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/7005963/Taxpayers
-millions-paid-to-Indian-institute-run-by-UN-climate-chief.html (Accessed May 
8, 2010). 
 
Meyer, and G. Hammerschmid. 2006. ―Changing Institutional Logics and Executive 
Identities: A Managerial Challenge to Public Administration in Austria.‖ 
American Behavioral Scientist 49:1000-1014. 
 
Meyer, J., and B. Rowan. 1977. ―Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as 
Myth and Ceremony.‖ American Journal of Sociology 83:340-363. 
 
Mizruchi, M.S., and L.C. Fein. 1999. ―The Social Construction of Organizational 
Knowledge: A Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative 
Isomorphism.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 54:653-683. 
 
Owen-Smith, J., and W.W. Powell. 2008. ―Networks and Institutions.‖ Pp. 596-623 in 
SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited by R. Greenwood, C. 




Padgett, J.F., and C.K. Ansell. 1993. ―Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-
1434.‖ American Journal of Sociology 98:1259-1319. 
 
Peterson, R.A. 1997. Creating Country Music: Fabricating Authenticity. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2009a. Americans Favor Carbon Cap, Gays in the Military and 
Renewing U.S.-Cuba Ties. http://people-press.org/report/501/carbon-cap-gays-in-
military-us-cuba (Accessed June 2, 2009). 
 
Pew Research Center. 2009b. Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming: 
Modest Support for "Cap and Trade" Policy. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1386/cap-and-
trade-global-warming-opinion. 
 
Pielke, R. 2010. ―IPCC and Conflict of Interest: Anything Goes.‖ Roger Pielke Jr.'s Blog. 
http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/2010/01/ipcc-and-conflict-of-interest-
anything.html (Accessed May 8, 2010). 
 
Polos, L., M.T. Hannan, and G.R. Carroll. 2002. ―Foundations of a Theory of Social 
Forms.‖ Industrial Corporate Change 11:85-115. 
 
Rabe, B.G., and C.P. Borick. 2010. ―The Climate of Belief: American Public Opinion on 
Climate Change.‖ Issues in Governance Studies 31:1-15. 
 
Rao, H., and S. Giorgi. 2006. ―Code Breaking: How Entrepreneurs Exploit Cultural 
Logics to Generate Institutional Change.‖ Research in Organizational Behavior 
27:269-304. 
 
Rao, H., P. Monin, R. Durand, and E.M. Lyon. 2003. ―Institutional Change in Toque 
Ville: Nouvelle Cuisine as an Identity Movement in French Gastronomy.‖ 
American Journal of Sociology 108:795-843. 
 
Rao, H., C. Morrill, and M.N. Zald. 2000. ―Power Plays: How Social Movements and 
Collective Action Create New Organizational Forms.‖ Research in 
Organizational Behaviour 22:239-282. 
 
Reich, Robert B. 2008. ―The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility.‖ SSRN 
eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1213129 (Accessed 
May 3, 2010). 
 
Revkin, A. 2009a. ―Hacked email Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute.‖ The New York 
Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/21climate.html?_r=3 
(Accessed May 8, 2010). 
 





Rittel, W.J., and M. Webber. 1973. ―Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.‖ Policy 
Sciences 4:155-169. 
 
Scott, W.R., M. Ruef, P.J. Mendel, and C.A. Caronna. 2000. Institutional Change and 
Healthcare Organizations: From Professional Dominance to Managed Care. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Scully, M.A., and W.E.D. Creed. 2005. ―Subverting our Stories of Subversion.‖ Pp. 310-
332 in Social Movements and Organization Theory, edited by G.F. Davis, D. 
McAdam, W.R. Scott, and M.N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Slater, D. 2007. ―Public Corporations Shall Take us Seriously.‖ New York Times, August 
12. 
 
Snow, D.A., J. E. Burke Rochford, S.K. Worden, and R.D. Benford. 1986. ―Frame 
Alignment Porcesses, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.‖ 
American Sociological Review 51:464-481. 
 
Stern, Nicholas. 2006. Executive Summary: Stern Report. London: H.M. Treasury 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm (Accessed May 15, 2009). 
 
Stuewer, S.K. 2009. ―The Advantages of a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax for Emissions 
Reduction.‖ 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/news_features_20091001_interview_sstue
wer.aspx (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
 
Suddaby, R., and R. Greenwood. 2005. ―Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy.‖ 
Administrative Science Quarterly 50:35-67. 
 
Swidler, A. 1986. ―Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.‖ American Sociological 
Review 51:273-286. 
 
Talner, L. 1983. The Origins of Shareholder Activism. Washington, D.C.: Investor 
Responsibility Research Center. 
 
Thompson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Thornton, P.E. 2004. Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational 
Decisions in Higher Education Publishing. Stanford, CA: Standford Business 
Books. 
 
Thornton, P.E., and W. Ocasio. 2008. ―Institutional Logics.‖ Pp. 99-129 in SAGE 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited by R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, 




Thornton, P.E., and W. Ocasio. 1999. ―Institutional Logics and the Historical 
Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher 
Education Publishing Industry, 1958 to 1990.‖ American Journal of Sociology 
105:801-843. 
 
U.S. House. 2010. The Foundation of Climate Science. Washington, D.C. 
http://globalwarming.house.gov/pubs?id=0018 (Accessed May 6, 2010). 
 
USCAP. 2009. A Call for Action: Consensus Principles and Recommendations from the 
U.S. Climate Action Partnership. Washington, D.C.: United States Climate 
Action Partnership http://www.us-cap.org/USCAPCallForAction.pdf (Accessed 
September 15, 2009). 
 
USCAP. 2010. A Question of American Leadership. Washington, D.C.: The Washington 
Post http://www.climatead.org/ClimateAd.pdf (Accessed May 10, 2010). 
 
Uzzi, B. 1996. ―The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations.‖ American Sociological Review 61:674-698. 
 
Weber, K., K. Heinze, and M. DeSoucey. 2008. ―Forage for Thought: Mobilizing Codes 
in the Movement for Grass-fed Meat and Dairy Products.‖ Administrative Science 
Quarterly 53:529-567. 
 
Whetten, D.A. 2006. ―Albert and Whetton Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of 
Organizational Identity.‖ Journal of Management Inquiry 15:219-234. 
 
Zuckerman, E.W. 1999. ―The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the 
Illegitimacy Discount.‖ American Journal of Sociology 104:1398-1438. 
 
Zuckerman, E.W., and T.Y. Kim. 2003. ―The Critical Tradeoff: Identity Assignment and 
Box-Office Success in the Feature-Film Industry.‖ Industrial Corporate Change 
12:27-67. 
 
Zuckerman, E.W., T.Y. Kim, K. Ukanwa, and J.V. Rittmann. 2003. ―Robust Identities or 
Nonentities? Typecasting in the Feature-Film Labor Market.‖ American Journal 











The question of how organizations structure and make sense of their activities is a central 
concern in organizational research. The frameworks organizations use to accomplish 
these feats are frequently defined as ―logics.‖ Logics are defined as ―the belief systems 
that furnish guide-lines for practical action‖ (Rao et al. 2003: 795) or the ―organizing 
principles for institutionalized practices in social systems‖ (Nigam and Ocasio 2009: 1). 
Research on institutional logics has proliferated in recent years (Thornton and Ocasio 
1999; Thornton 2004; Lounsbury 2007, 2005; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006), and 
much of this work has focused on the competition between and diffusion of new logics in 
organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Scott et al. 2000; Thornton 2004; 
Kennedy and Fiss 2009; Purdy and Gray 2009).  
 
While this work has moved organizational research in important new directions, I suggest 
there are two limitations to the current approach to studying logics. The first, initially 
observed by Lounsbury et al. (2003), suggests that empirical studies of logic diffusion err 
by treating logics exclusively as exogenous forces that act upon organizations and 
individuals rather than being socially constructed by actors themselves. This argument 
reinforces a common critique of neo-institutional theory for championing isomorphism, 
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cognitive templates, and stability over agency and conflict (Greenwood and Hinings 
1996; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002). In many empirical 
studies of logics, one often conjures images of abstract cognitive templates dueling in 
space for the hearts and minds of organizational actors rather than actors enacting and 
contesting logics themselves.  
 
Fortunately, recent and successful efforts by organizational researchers to incorporate 
social movement theories of mobilization and contestation have taken considerable 
strides toward remedying these tendencies in the institutional literature (Rao, Morrill, and 
Zald 2000; Rao et al. 2003; Davis, Scott, and Zald 2005; Rao and Giorgi 2006; Weber, 
Heinze, and DeSoucey 2008). Following this research direction, I combine organizational 
theories of logics with social movement theory on framing (Benford and Snow 2000) to 
understand how a group of U.S. institutional investors negotiate divergent organizational 
identities to challenge firms to take action on climate change. While the study of investor 
activism is not new (Davis and Thompson 1994; Proffitt and Spicer 2006; Reid and 
Toffel 2009), the mechanisms that enable diverse investor organizations to collaborate 
and challenge firm environmental behavior have yet to be analyzed.  
 
The focus of the study is twofold. First, I examine how identity differences create the 
potential for conflict among investors who adopt a ―sustainability logic of investing‖ 
around climate change. The sustainability logic encompasses the belief that there are 
financial risks and opportunities related to climate change in the market, and both firms 
and investors have a duty to incorporate these considerations into their investment and 
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operational strategies. While all of the investors who engage in climate change activism 
possess professional fiduciary identities, some also possess highly salient social identities 
associated with religious institutions, the labor movement, and civil society. These 
identity differences mean that investors have an array of motivations for adopting a 
―sustainability logic‖ and view certain shareholder activities as being more or less 
appropriate to address climate change in the investment field. Ironically, though, I find 
investors use their organizational identities as a tool to resolve conflicts among 
themselves rather than escalate them. The second part of the study analyzes this process.  
 
Much of the research on institutional logics focuses on competition between challenger 
and dominant logics in organizational fields (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Rao et al. 2003; 
Thornton 2004; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) but fails to attend to negotiation and 
maintenance activities among organizational actors within logics (Lounsbury et al. 2003; 
Lounsbury 2005, 2007). There is a particular neglect of how challenger organizations 
manage divergent motivations for action. Research on institutional logics has largely 
assumed that ―the identification with the collective is equivalent to the identification with 
the institutional logic prevailing in the collective‖ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 128). 
However, it does not necessarily follow that identification with an institutional logic is 
equivalent to identifying with the collective under that logic, especially within challenger 
logics.  
 
While dominant logics admittedly take on a level of taken-for-grantedness (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991), a long tradition of social movement theory informs us that institutional 
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entrepreneurs promoting any radical change – including challenger logics – frequently 
have to mobilize diverse groups in order to mount a credible challenge to the dominant 
logic. Neo-institutionalists too often assume challengers are monolithic entities that have 
experienced ex-ante isomorphism (Mizruchi and Fein 1999; Greenwood et al. 2010) or 
that the process of creating a collective social identity is relatively uncontested or 
unproblematic for challengers (Creed et al. 2002; Scully and Creed 2005; Weber et al. 
2008). That is, challengers who embrace the same logic are assumed to embrace the same 
identity and strategies for action as well. This study offers a corrective to this view. 
 
The aim of the chapter is to outline a process-oriented conceptualization of institutional 
logics that captures the actions necessary to create and maintain a challenger logic. The 
article seeks to answer the question, ―How is an institutional logic maintained – and what 
form does it take – when its adherents are heterogeneous?‖ According to the conventional 
view, logics shape individual or organizational decisions by influencing what problems 
get attended to, what solutions to problems are considered, what is viewed as legitimate 
action, and the meaning attached to those actions (Thornton 2004). I suggest an 
alternative process. When proponents of a challenger logic are diverse, I argue they 
create a common framing of a problem but must continuously negotiate the legitimacy of 
engaging in diverse actions under the umbrella of the new logic.   
 
I introduce the term logic work to capture this process.  As the article elaborates, logic 
work consists of two components: logic framing and logic maintenance (i.e. using 
identity as tool kit). Rather than focusing exclusively on how a logic influences 
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organizational actors‘ behavior, logic work foregrounds how organizations use frames 
and organizational identity claims to create and maintain a challenger logic. The notions 
of creation and maintenance emphasize agency on the part of organizations as well as the 
importance of inter-organizational relationships for logic enactment.  
 
The empirical setting I use to illustrate how logic work operates is institutional investor 
activism around the issue of climate change. Specifically, I am interested in how a 
diverse group of investors – public pension funds, religious investors, unions, and 
foundations – create and enact a challenger sustainability logic of investing. I employ two 
key concepts – framing and organizational identity – from the social movement and 
organizational literatures to highlight how logic work holds the logic together despite 
being enacted by organizations with diverse identities and, at times, conflicting 
motivations. The first concept is that of collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986; 
Gamson and Meyer 1996; Benford and Snow 2000). One of the primary tasks challenger 
groups have is to frame an issue in a way that mobilizes new participants in order to 
mount an effective challenge to the taken-for-granted structures and practices of a 
dominant logic in the field. The framing element of logic work emphasizes the fact that 
institutional entrepreneurs must identify political opportunities in a field and create a 
consensus frame among challengers. In particular, I show how institutional entrepreneurs 
drew upon existing fiduciary frames about risk and opportunity to recruit greater numbers 




However, while frames play an important role in creating a challenger logic, framing 
alone cannot adjudicate conflicts about what constitutes appropriate action among a 
broad coalition of challengers under a logic. Different types of frames serve different 
purposes. Whereas diagnostic frames define problems, prognostic frames suggest what is 
to be done about them and motivational frames tell participants why they should act 
(Benford and Snow 2000).  If logics are in fact more durable templates for action than 
collective action frames as the organizational literature suggests (Thornton 2004; 
Thornton and Ocasio 2008), challengers embracing a new logic must find a way to embed 
rather than eliminate motivational and prognostic disagreement among organizations.  
 
I find that organizations accomplish this through logic maintenance, which involves 
using organizational identity as part of their cultural tool kit (Swidler 1986). Rather than 
rejecting the validity of allies‘ actions when they engage in more radical strategies than a 
focal organization is willing to take itself, actors draw on oppositional social identities to 
explain and justify others‘ behavior. This allows them to distance themselves from other 
participants in instances of conflict without having to abandon the challenger logic 
completely. In the case of the investors in this article, I show how more traditional 
investors (e.g. public pension funds) attribute radical actions on the part of religious and 
labor investors to their social identities but invoke those same actors‘ fiduciary identities 
when they are pursuing similar strategies. Like traditional investors, religious and social 
investors also use identity as a tool, albeit in a slightly different way. These investors are 
multi-vocal, meaning they possess ―the ability…to participate effectively in multiple 
kinds of ties with diverse parties‖ (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008: 608). Their multi-
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vocality also permits them to draw on a broader set of justifications for action from 
religious or social institutions and take more radical steps as shareholder activists to 
persuade firms to act on climate change than pension funds take.  
 
The concept of logic work enables us to see the constant dialogue and negotiation that 
occurs within a logic. By attending to the creation and maintenance work required of 
organizational actors to enact challenger logics, researchers can more carefully consider 
how the degree of logic work required by challengers impacts their probability of success 
in a competing logics scenario. If agency is to retain a place alongside cognition and 
environmental influence in neo-institutional research (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; 
Fligstein 1997; Seo and Creed 2002; Davis et al. 2005; King, Felin, and Whetten 2010), 
researchers must account for contradictions in the identities and strategies of actors who 
enact the same logic. 
 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
According to Friedland and Alford (1991), societal-level institutions encompass the 
market, state, family, democracy and religion. These institutions possess central ―logics,‖ 
which are defined as "axial principles of organization and action based on cultural 
discourses and strategic practices prevalent in different institutional or societal sectors" 
(Thornton 2004: 210). Because institutions inherently contain contradictions, though, 
multiple logics are available to individuals and organizations as they operate within them 
(Friedland and Alford 1991). Logics exist at multiple levels of analysis as well. There are 
societal-level logics for institutions like the market and state. However, the term is most 
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commonly applied at the industry or organizational field level, such as the publishing 
industry (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), accounting profession (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2005) architecture (Thornton, C. Jones, and Kury 2005), as well as fields like the arts 
(Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006) and the public sector (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005).  
These logics are sometimes referred to as ―lower-order‖ logics (Thornton 2004: 50) and 
draw from one or more higher-order societal logics. 
 
In this article, I critique two aspects of the current stream of logics research. First, in line 
with Lounsbury (Lounsbury et al. 2003; Lounsbury 2005, 2007), I argue that empirical 
studies of  logics do not sufficiently account for agency among organizational actors and 
treats logics as exogenous forces acting upon organizations. I suggest that incorporating 
framing concepts from social movement theory into a process-based understanding of 
logics is an important corrective to this problem. Second, I argue that although the 
concept of framing is necessary for a process-based understanding of logics, it is not 
sufficient by itself to explain how challenger logics are maintained over time. I suggest 
that ―logic work‖ also involves using organizational identity as a tool kit (Swidler 1986) 




Diffusion studies in both the organizations and social movement literature have been 
accused of presenting diffusion processes as ―a mindless mechanical transfer of 
information from one place to another…[with] virtually no work mentioned that 
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examines what this process might look like‖ (Hsu and Hannan 2005: 55). Whether a logic 
draws from a single sector of society like the professions (Thornton 2004), or is a hybrid 
of two logics (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006), its principles and associated actions are 
usually shown to diffuse throughout an organizational field without much negotiation 
among adopters. The use of ―competing logics‖ imagery to describe this process is 
common (Scott et al. 2000; Thornton 2004). In competing logics scenarios, there are 
dominant and challenger logics in a field, as well as dominant actors who embrace the 
former and challengers who champion the latter (McAdam and Scott 2005). Dominants 
set the rules of the game in the field, and challengers seek to change those rules by 
replacing dominant principles and actions with their own logics. There is no explicit 
mechanism for organizational actors to express voice (Hirschman 1970) within a logic 
under this view, however. Actors either accept the dominant logic or embrace a 
challenger logic. This work often falls victim to overemphasizing isomorphism over 
conflict, particularly isomorphic forces driven by legitimacy concerns (Mizruchi and Fein 
1999). 
 
This critique of logics has been most forcefully articulated in Michael Lounsbury‘s work 
on recycling logics and the mutual fund industry in the United States (Lounsbury et al. 
2003; Lounsbury 2005). Lounsbury and his colleagues examined how a technocratic 
logic of recycling, based on for-profit market principles, came to dominate a more 
holistic, community-based logic of recycling without fully replacing it. Their work 
stresses the importance of framing activities among institutional entrepreneurs in the 
emerging recycling industry and emphasizes the process of logic creation and 
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institutional change rather than treating them as end states. Unlike the conventional use of 
the logic concept, framing is treated as ―endogenous to a field of actors and is subject to 
challenge and modification‖ (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 72). Lounsbury argues that 
institutional scholars need to pay greater attention to fragmentation and contestation 
within organizational fields. He suggests that institutional diffusion cannot be understood 
without attending to ―processes of practice that spawn and are influenced by the 
heterogeneity of actors and activities that underlie apparent conformity‖ (Lounsbury 
2007: 289). His follow-up study on competing logics in the mutual fund industry also 
found that organizations maintained different logics between Boston and New York due 
to different local business cultures in the two cities. 
 
Many logic studies make sweeping theoretical assumptions about the character and 
composition of actors who enact logics, suggesting that logics ―provide individuals and 
organizations with a set of rules and conventions that provide meaning and proscribe 
certain actions‖ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 114). For them, logics also encompass 
organizational identity and prescribe specific actions based on that identity. For example, 
Thornton et al (2005) argue that when accounting was viewed as a profession under the 
fiduciary logic, organizations only engaged in activities related to standardizing and 
authenticating client financial statements. Under the corporate logic, by contrast, 
accounting was viewed as an industry and organizations focused on selling services and 
conducting mergers and acquisitions. There is an implicit assumption in these studies that 
the identity of actors and their actions under a single logic are tightly coupled, an 




Social Movement Framing 
Differences in the form and membership of challenger logics has received relatively little 
attention by organizational scholars. These differences may have important effects on the 
strength of the offense challengers can mount to a dominant institutional logic, though. 
What do field actors do when the challenger logic does not fully ―constitute the social 
identity of actors‖ enacting the logic (Rao et al. 2003: 797), especially given that 
―identity creates a set of expectations about appropriate behavior‖ (King et al. 2010: 
295)? Organizational and social movement research offer several possible outcomes to 
this scenario. One possible result is that a hybrid logic will emerge (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006).  Hybrids contain elements of two or more logics but allow actors 
to see the logic as a both/and proposition rather than forcing them to negotiate over which 
frame and attached logic will be enacted in the field. Glynn and Lounsbury‘s (2005) 
study of a hybrid market/aesthetic logic among symphony reviewers, for example, 
showed how symphony reviewers came to incorporate references to both the market (e.g. 
ticket sales) and aesthetics (e.g. performance quality) in their written reviews. These 
reviewers did not negotiate with one another about what type of references they would 
make, nor were their dual references viewed as contradictory to their role as reviewers.   
 
In cases where there is conflict among players in an organizational field, though, logic 
frames must be negotiated. Benford and Snow (2000) refer to this framing process as the 
―meaning work‖ in social movements. If challengers are not able to reconcile ideological 
differences and maintain a consistent challenger frame – or collective meaning – they 
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will be unable to mount an effective challenge to the dominant logic. This type of 
stalemate occurred between radical and mainstream anti-nuclear activist organizations in 
Austin, TX, for example, resulting in the splintering and collapse of the movement 
(Benford 1993).  
 
A less drastic possibility is that diverse groups of challengers are able to agree on how to 
define a problem but cannot reach consensus on what is to be done about it. In the case of 
Lounsbury‘s (2005) recycling advocates, those embracing the holistic, community-based 
logic continuously lamented the evolution of recycling into a ―market‖ under the 
emerging technocratic logic and worked to undermine technocratic proponents of waste-
to-energy (WTE) incineration practices by filing lawsuits against them. In this case, two 
groups of challengers who initially agreed on a common diagnostic frame that trash was a 
problem could not agree on a common motivational frame for engaging in the issue 
(profit opportunity versus community-building) or a prognostic frame regarding the most 
appropriate actions to address the problem (traditional recycling versus incineration).  
None of the outcomes listed above consider how diverse organizations might be able to 
reconcile their identity differences and maintain a consistent challenger logic without 
splintering. Although similarities between the concept of logics in the organizational 
literature and framing in social movement research have been noted (McAdam and Scott 
2005), frames are generally conceptualized as less enduring than logics, more 
contentious, and subject to greater manipulation "as a direct or indirect result of political 
action" (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 76). If logics are stickier than frames (Rao and Giorgi 
2006; Thornton and Ocasio 2008), then challengers who hope to mount a credible offense 
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against dominants in a field must find a way to maintain their logic‘s stability. Rather 
than reflecting a ―truce following from past struggles,‖ (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006: 
1002), I argue challenger logics with diverse supporters must be continuously negotiated 
through logic work. The study shows it is possible for organizations with different 
prognostic frames to mitigate their conflicts over strategy by using identity as a tool kit. I 
now turn attention to this crucial element of logic work. 
 
Identity as Tool Kit 
Logic negotiation and maintenance is made possible for organizational actors when they 
use identity as a tool kit (Swidler 1986) to manage contradictory motivations for action. 
According to Swidler, culture is a toolkit of ―symbols, stories, rituals and world-views‖ 
that actors combine ―in varying configurations to solve problems (273). I suggest that 
identity is an important tool in this box. When an organization views other logic 
participants‘ actions as inappropriate or too radical, it can distance itself from them by 
drawing on oppositional identities of its allies to explain away their behavior to relevant 
audiences. As the data in this study shows, for example, traditional investors reference 
the religious identity of faith-based investors instead of their fiduciary identity when 
disagreeing with their actions. Rather than weakening the logic or splitting the 
challengers, though, the strategic use of identity claims enables them to maintain the 
logic‘s stability. It provides organizations with a way to rationalize problematic behavior 
by other challengers without having to attack them in an overtly hostile manner or 
abandon the sustainability logic altogether. As the following sections discuss, potential 
schisms in the logic are explained away as ―identity differences,‖ and the consensus 
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frame around climate risk remains intact.  
 
While research on the intersection of identity, framing, and logics has made important 
inroads recently, the majority of this work focuses on individuals and their identities as 
chefs (Rao et al. 2003), LGBT employees (Creed et al. 2002), and ranchers (Weber et al. 
2008) rather than organizations that possess multiple or multi-vocal identities. Also, none 
of these studies focus on negotiation among actors regarding what frames to use or how 
identity conflicts are reconciled under such a logic. Whereas the studies cited above focus 
on ―identity movements‖ in which identity isomorphism among actors occurs prior to the 
study or is completed by the end of the study‘s time period, the focus here is on how 
challengers use their organizational identities as resources to mitigate ongoing internal 
conflict in their battle with a dominant societal logic (i.e. the market logic).   
 
The work cited above also places emphasis on how collective identity projects are crucial 
to building and maintaining challenger logics. Both Creed et al (2002) and Weber et al‘s 
(2008) research on LGBT employees and grass-fed beef proponents suggest that the 
social identities of the actors are in part the product of the frames used by institutional 
entrepreneurs. When organizational actors are unwilling or unable to shift their identities 
through framing, however, challengers must engage in logic work to negotiate their 
differences. As the terminology implies, logic work is not effortless for organizations. 
Social movement theorists correctly point out that ―it is easier to recruit from groups with 
similar values and ideologies than from groups with conflicting values and ideologies‖ 
(Zald 2000: 6). Institutional entrepreneurs are crucial to recruiting new challengers and 
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convincing the new and old guard to engage in logic work (Rao and Giorgi 2006), but 
challengers themselves ultimately have to do the work. Whether challenger logics that 
require a lot of work are stronger contenders against dominant logics than those with 
homogenous challengers is unclear. By understanding how the logic work process 
functions, though, researchers can get closer to determining the conditions under which 
challenger logics will require work and whether they are more or less successful in 
competing logics scenarios. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Setting 
In the introductory chapter to their edited volume on organizational and social movement 
research, McAdam and Scott (2005) propose a common analytical framework for 
researchers working at the intersection of organizations and movements. This framework 
includes using the organizational field as the unit of analysis, accounting for dominant 
and challenger actors, the governance units in operation, the wider social environment, 
and the institutional logics within the field. I follow this guide to describe the empirical 
setting for my study.  
 
For the study, I focus my attention on the investment field. The field consists of 
institutional investors, financial services firms, investment research firms, securities 
analysts, professional associations, and publicly traded U.S. firms. Similar to 
organizational research that focuses on a specific issue to understand organizational 
behavior (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Hoffman and Ventresca 1999; Suddaby and 
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Greenwood 2005), I am interested in how organizations handle the issue of climate 
change in an investment context. Contestation over strategies to address climate change – 
and business sustainability more generally – has been incredibly robust over the last two 
decades. With the absence of federal government regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in the United States, shareholders and NGOs largely turned to ―private 
politics‖ (Baron 2003) to influence firm behavior on climate change.  Private politics is 
defined as ―situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on law or 
government‖ (Baron 2003: 31). In this study, it involves investors working within the 
corporate governance system to engage firms through shareholder activism and the 
shareholder dialogue process.  
 
My analysis focuses on the ―field segment‖ (Washington and Ventresca 2004) of 
institutional investors engaged in climate change shareholder activism. As I discuss 
below, these challengers embrace a sustainability logic of investing that encompasses a 
belief that there are business risks and opportunities from climate change. Shareholder 
activism on climate change typically involves filing proxy resolutions with firms asking 
them to disclose their risks from climate change through sustainability reports. More 
recently, shareholders have also requested voluntary GHG reduction targets from firms. 
Any shareholder holding at least $2,000 of stock for one year in a publicly traded U.S. 
company has the legal right to file a shareholder resolution with that firm. Shareholder 
resolutions are non-binding advisory proposals asking the company to take a given action 
(e.g. separate C.E.O. and chairman roles, report on GHG emissions). The shareholder 
activities surrounding climate change and corporate behavior highlight competing logics 
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about investment and the materiality of environmental issues to corporate performance. 
In the case of corporate governance, an issue is ―material‖ if knowledge about it would 
likely impact investment or proxy voting decisions by shareholders. Challengers argue 
climate change is a material risk for firms, which requires managers to report these risks 
to shareholders in their annual reports under U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules 
 
The setting is ideal to study logic work given the diverse organizational identities of 
investors involved: public pension funds, state treasurers, comptrollers, religious and 
labor pension funds, socially responsible investment (SRI) firms, and foundations. These 
organizations all operate as fiduciaries, but despite their role similarity, they draw their 
missions and motivations for shareholder activism from different societal institutions 
(e.g. religion, the state, market, democracy). Two umbrella organizations coordinate 
institutional investor action on climate change, the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR) and the non-governmental organization Ceres‘ Investor Network 
on Climate Risk (INCR). These organizations and their institutional investor members 
interact frequently through meetings, conference calls, and shareholder dialogue with 
firms. ICCR is a coalition organization of 275 faith-based institutional investors, 
including denominations, religious communities, pension funds, healthcare corporations, 
foundations, asset management companies, colleges, and dioceses. ICCR was founded in 
1971 by a group of predominately Protestant church denominations to promote 
divestment from companies who had economic ties to South Africa during apartheid. The 




INCR is a network of institutional investors that considers financial risks and 
opportunities related to climate change. INCR members include public pension funds, 
state treasurers, foundations, faith investors, unions, and socially responsible investment 
(SRI) firms. While ICCR is an INCR member, most INCR public pension funds and 
foundations are not affiliate members of ICCR. Unions and SRI firms tend to be 
members of both organizations. The public pension fund members of INCR come from 
states with varying levels of political interest in climate change. Pension funds with long 
histories of shareholder activism (e.g. the California Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) and New York City pension funds) are INCR members, but so too are 
fiduciaries in states such as Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, Michigan, North 
Carolina, Maine, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. INCR member 
organizations currently manage nearly $10 trillion in assets, which represents over a 
quarter of all institutional investor assets in the United States (Conference Board 2008). 
 
Given the differences in size and type of challenger investors (discussed below), one may 
question whether they represent a truly distinct field segment in the investment industry. 
It is important to note that despite their differences, the actions all challenger investors 
take on climate change fall outside the norm of mainstream investor activity, particularly 
compared to mainstream mutual funds. Mutual funds almost never vote in favor of 
climate resolutions (Cogan 2006) despite an increasing number of abstentions on those 




The institutional investors that belong to ICCR and INCR collaborate with one another 
on an ongoing basis. Shareholders can only file one resolution at a firm on the same topic 
each year, so shareholders interested in climate change have to communicate with one 
another to ensure they are not duplicating resolutions and that the resolution ultimately 
filed is the one best positioned to withstand scrutiny by the SEC if challenged by the 
firm. The investors meet frequently at conferences and coordinate resolution filing 
through regular conference calls. Collaboration also occurs when one investor seeks out 
other investors who own shares in a company and asks them to write a letter of support or 
file a resolution at that firm. In other cases, small investors, Ceres, or ICCR will do 
background research on firms and then ask for support from large pension funds.  
 
Field Logics 
Before proceeding, it is also necessary to sketch out the dominant and challenger logics 
in the investment field. There are three identifiable logics in the field: the market logic 
and two challenger logics I label the social responsibility and sustainability logics. The 
dominant market logic has existed since the 1970‘s, emerging with the rise of agency 
theory and the shareholder conception of value (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). It operates under the assumption that environmental and social 
governance issues do not have a material impact on firm performance. This logic is also 
consistent with neo-classical economic theory (Zajac and Westphal 2004; Khurana 2007). 
The market logic suggests that institutional investors should exercise the ―Wall Street 
Rule‖ and exit (Hirschman 1970) if they are unhappy with management actions. Under 
this logic, investor organizations that adhere to the market logic will almost always vote 
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no with management on social and environmental shareholder resolutions.  
 
Under the market logic, investment decisions are value-neutral and market interventions 
based on beliefs influenced by the state, religion, or family are said to cause economic 
distortions. Increasing shareholder value is the exclusive goal of actors under this logic. 
Lydenberg (2007) labels these investors ―rational actors‖ and notes that they are the norm 
in the current investment environment. Whether firms view climate change as a material 
financial concern will likely shift if the United States enacts federal climate legislation, 
but at the time of my data collection, the market logic remained dominant. 
 
The challenger logic that has historically battled the market logic is the social 
responsibility logic. It emphasizes firms‘ social responsibility to external stakeholders 
over profit maximization. The goal of this logic is to create social change through 
investing, and it draws heavily in motivation from the institutions of religion and 
democracy, with a particular emphasis on social justice and morality. The responsibility 
logic emerged out of the South Africa divestment movement in the early 1970‘s. The 
social responsibility logic is closely associated with socially responsible investing (SRI), 
which has been historically defined as ―the incorporation of the investor‘s social or 
ethical criteria in the investment decision-making process‖ (Kinder 2005: 4). The types of 
organizations most closely associated with the responsibility logic include faith-based 
investors (e.g. church denominations and orders of Catholic nuns) as well as a few high 




Finally, the sustainability logic is a relatively new logic of investing. As noted in the 
introduction, it captures the belief that there are financial risks and opportunities related 
to climate change in the market, and both firms and investors have a duty to incorporate 
these considerations into their investment and operational strategies. It emerged in the 
late 1990‘s as more mainstream investors began paying attention to financial risks around 
environmental and social governance (Kinder 2005). The entry of large public pension 
funds into shareholder engagement on corporate governance issues in the late 1990‘s – 
and the founding of the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) in 2003 – increased 
the number of investor organizations espousing the sustainability logic. This logic largely 
replaced the social responsibility logic among all investors on climate change issues. By 
2005, the World Economic Forum (WEF) went so far as to drop the word ―social‖ from 
its definition of responsible investing. The new definition stated that ―responsible 
investing is most commonly understood to mean investing in a manner that takes into 
account the impact of investments on wider society and the natural environment, both 
today and in the future‖ (quoted in Kinder 2005: 34). 
 
This new definition highlights some of the ambiguity present in the sustainability logic. 
The logic encompasses the idea that environmental and social governance issues have 
financial implications for companies over a long-term time horizon. Under this logic, 
challengers argue that firms face physical, regulatory, legal, and reputational risks from 
climate change (Ceres 2007)  as well as investment opportunities. These opportunities 
include investing in clean technology and companies that are forward-thinking on climate 
change impacts. Moral and social motivations are not used to legitimate the sustainability 
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logic, and purposely so. However, the sustainability logic has drawn many supporters 
from the social responsibility logic (e.g. religious investors), which has necessitated 
negotiation among the ―old guard‖ and ―new guard‖ on responsible investing. This 
negotiation is the focus of the remainder of the article. Contrary to the idea that 
―proponents of losing frames can exit, migrate, or convert to the ascendant frame‖ (Rao 
1998: 912), I find that the ―old guard‘s‖ multi-vocality enables them to embrace the 
sustainability logic while still using strategies of action learned under the SRI logic.   
 
Methods 
The study is based on four months of participant-observation at a leading challenger 
organization in New York City – the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR) – and thirty-two semi-structured interviews with professionals representing 
organizations in the investment field. During the fieldwork period from September to 
December 2007, I shadowed ICCR‘s Program Director on Energy and Environment on 
all of the organization‘s climate-related shareholder activities and was given full access to 
the organization‘s work activities on climate change issues. I was permitted to sit in on 
conference calls between investor organizations related to climate change strategic 
planning, shareholder dialogues with firms and investors, conference sessions on climate 
change and investing, and staff meetings.  
 
My duties also included doing background research on upcoming shareholder resolutions 
and climate-related issues of interest to ICCR member organizations. This permitted me 
to interact at regular intervals with religious investor organizations affiliated with ICCR 
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and ask informal questions about collaboration among investors, ICCR, and Ceres. 
Finally, I held weekly meetings with the Energy and Environment Program Director. 
During these interactions, I was able to inquire about collaboration benefits and 
challenges, upcoming climate issues, progress on shareholder campaigns, and 
organizational dynamics driving investor strategies. These interactions enabled me test 
and clarify my own observations against my informants‘ understanding of events.  
 
In addition to my participant-observation, I conducted thirty-two semi-structured 
interviews with investment professionals over a ten-month period from May 2007 to 
February 2008. Eighteen of the informants interviewed represent institutional investor 
organizations, including: public pension funds, state treasurers and comptroller offices, 
faith investors, unions, and foundations. The informants are all experts on their 
organization‘s proxy voting policies, and most serve in the roles of corporate governance 
officers, deputy treasurers, or shareholder engagement directors. All of the organizations 
except four are participants in climate change investor activity. The minimum level of 
participation is defined as being an INCR member, which does not require any formal 
commitment but signals support for greater investor attention to climate risk. I also 
interviewed four additional corporate governance analysts at public pension and religious 
funds that do not engage in shareholder activism on climate change.  
 
I used theoretical sampling (Charmaz 2006) to maximize the variation among the 
organizations I selected based on size, identity, and length of time participating in 
shareholder engagement. Three organizations managed over $100 billion in assets, eleven 
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managed between $1 and $100 billion, and four managed less than $1 billion. Within the 
faith-based and public pension fund categories, I interviewed a mix of small and large 
investors. I also interviewed three employees at ICCR and five employees at Ceres who 
manage climate change shareholder engagement. The interview data was coded using the 
qualitative software HyperRESEARCH 2.8. Coding categories were developed around 
the concepts of motivation for getting involved, collaboration with other investors, stance 
toward firms, and engagement strategies with firms. After identifying identity and 
framing as key constructs in the data, I moved back and forth between the data and the 
social movement and organizational literature to piece together how the two concepts 




The catalysts behind new ideas in organizational fields are frequently institutional 
entrepreneurs (Fligstein 1997; Rao and Giorgi 2006) or elite cultural brokers (Weber et 
al. 2008) who recognize political opportunities (McCarthy and Zald 1977) to promote 
alternatives to dominant ideas and practices. If they recruit enough supporters, these 
alternatives can become challenger logics in organizational fields. Similar to the elite 
French chefs who were inspired by the social unrest of May 1968 to break with classical 
cuisine and articulate a nouvelle alternative (Rao et al. 2003), institutional entrepreneurs 
in the investment field were able to capitalize on several societal punctuating events 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993) to create a sustainability logic of investing. Following the 
Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, a group of investors formed the nonprofit organization Ceres 
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and began working on business sustainability issues through corporate engagement with 
U.S. firms. These early efforts involved engaging with companies and encouraging them 
to adopt environmental principles (Hoffman 1996). Throughout the 1990‘s, Ceres 
continued engagement with companies while ICCR members filed shareholder 
resolutions on climate change. The two organizations have consistently collaborated with 
one another, and several ICCR members have served on the Ceres Board of Directors. 
One of ICCR‘s top environmental staff members left to work at Ceres in 1999 to further 
support the Ceres‘ environmental engagement with firms as well.  
 
In early 2001, the Ceres‘ Board of Directors decided that climate change would become 
the organization‘s top priority and agreed that framing climate change as a business risk 
was likely to attract greater numbers of larger, more traditional institutional investors. 
Their goal was to move away from the SRI logic of investing that stressed moral and 
social obligations of firms and toward a sustainability logic that stressed the business 
risks firms faced by neglecting climate-related issues. As one Ceres staff member put it, 
―We realized that a mainstream coalition was needed, not just religious 
investors and socially responsible investors that you might expect would be 
concerned about a social issue. And so, yeah, the idea was to take it out of the 
social box, which was where investors had put climate change, and put it in 
the economic or financial categories that they thought were mainstream.‖  
 
Ceres staff engaged in what social movement theorists call frame transformation, or 
―changing old understandings and meanings and generating new ones‖ (Benford and 
Snow 2000: 625). Ironically, the Enron scandal – and the subsequent loss of confidence 
in the American corporate governance system – occurred a few months after Ceres 
decided to adopt a risk and opportunity frame for climate change. Staff members at Ceres 
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attribute the collapse of Enron as opening up a political opportunity (McAdam 1996) for 
establishing and attracting more investors to the new sustainability logic. Following 
Enron, Ceres decided that ―the linkage to the corporate governance movement was 
critical‖ (Ceres staff member). The organization produced its first climate risk report in 
2002, in which they argued that corporate boards that do not force management to assess 
the firm‘s financial risks to climate change are failing in their duty to inform investors of 
their exposure to material risks.  
 
Ceres continued to articulate this new frame around climate risk. In January 2003, Ceres 
partnered with the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and invited a number of public pension 
funds that had previously showed interest in climate change to a consultation meeting on 
corporate governance and sustainability at the Rockefeller Pocantico Convention Center 
in New York. During the meeting, Ceres was able to test the frame resonance of climate 
risk to see whether it was credible and salient to potential participant investors (Snow and 
Benford 1988). The feedback Ceres received was favorable, and in the fall of 2003, Ceres 
partnered with the United Nations to host the first annual Investor Summit on Climate 
Risk at the United Nations. At this meeting, the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(INCR) was established by ten institutional investors representing over $600 billion in 
assets. Today, INCR‘s member investors number over 90 and represent nearly $10 
trillion in assets. 
 
Although not discussed in detail here, a number of other punctuating events also provided 
opportunities for sustainability logic entrepreneurs. ICCR‘s Executive Director pointed to 
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Swiss Re‘s analysis of climate change as an insurance risk as a significant turning point 
in the investment community. Other notable events include the destruction of Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, the release of Al Gore‘s documentary An Inconvenient 
Truth, and the publication of the British Treasury‘s Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change the same year. As one ICCR staff member noted, these events helped 
investors see it is better ―to act now because it will cost you less in the future.‖  
 
Logic Framing 
When building INCR, Ceres staff consciously decided to deemphasize social motivations 
for addressing climate change in investment portfolios. The social and moral frames 
under the responsibility logic of investing were replaced with a business risk frame on 
climate change. Reflecting on the social/moral origins of shareholder activism on climate 
change, a Ceres staff member said: 
―We flipped it around, That was the crucial thing…ten years ago, twenty 
years ago, [institutional investors] would‘ve said my fiduciary duty prevents 
me from addressing this. So now it‘s my fiduciary duty requires me to 
address it‖ (Ceres staff member). 
 
Traditionally, fiduciary duty implies that trustees must eschew any concerns over broad 
stakeholder issues. Fiduciaries are bound to a duty of loyalty and cannot address issues 
without demonstrating the financial implications for their beneficiaries. The diagnostic 
framing used by institutional entrepreneurs promoting the sustainability logic is a good 
example of logic appropriation, where outsiders exploit a pre-existing logic in the 
societal system (Rao and Giorgi 2006) to challenge the dominant logic. In this case, 
challengers appropriated well-established codes of fiduciary duty, risk exposure, and 
long-term financial performance from the investment field to create a new sustainability 
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logic of investing. This frame was well-accepted by mobilized public pension funds that 
had little prior experience with climate change issues or shareholder activism more 
generally. It was also quickly and easily adopted by SRI mutual funds that were very 
comfortable with the language of finance. 
 
According to Rao and Giorgi (2006), logic appropriation downplays conflict and 
controversy in order to make challenger demands appear more mainstream and rational to 
insiders. Ceres was correct in their belief that mainstream institutional investors prioritize 
returns and governance issues first and explicitly reject the idea that they are socially 
motivated or ―social investors.‖ This colorful quote from a long-time public pension fund 
CEO illustrates these dual principles for deciding whether to get involved in climate 
change investor activities:  
―And back to climate risk, you know, the issue for us…we have to square that 
with the fiduciary duty, and the notion is, ok we're polluting the atmosphere, 
what does that mean to our portfolio…we're not statutorily or fiducially charged 
with saving the earth.‖  
 
 
As Whetten (2006) notes, these types of "identity-based arguments are characterized by 
an imperative tone, associated with commonly understood categorical standards, and put 
forth as truth claims, on a par with moral obligations" (224). But although fiduciary duty 
was initially a barrier to recruiting investors to the sustainability logic, the new framing 
began attracting new mainstream investors interested in staying ahead of investment 
trends. While traditional fiduciaries may not be completely sure about the magnitude of 
climate risk, many desire to stay on top of new investment issues regardless of their 
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connection to environmental issues. A public fund manager whose organization had only 
recently considered climate risk put it this way:  
―So you always are saying, ok, is this real? Because there is a history of weather 
that we don't really understand. But you have to pay attention. You…cannot not 
pay attention because of the risk. The risk associated with it is that you're going 
to miss something that's right in front of you, and isn't that what trends are 
anyway? At what point do you pay attention to a trend?‖  
 
 
In order to successfully accomplish the reframing of climate change as a business risk 
issue, though, new and old participants in investor activism on climate change had to 
achieve consensus on a diagnostic frame for the sustainability logic. Early and late 
adopters of organizational practices often have very different motivations for action 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983), and this was especially true among investors and 
entrepreneurs addressing climate change in the investment field. Prior to the 
establishment of INCR in 2003, almost all shareholder activism on climate change was 
led by religious investors through ICCR. Although ICCR members are all institutional 
investors, the organization is motivated by social change in addition to financial goals, as 
evidenced in its mission statement: ―Through the lens of faith, ICCR builds a more just 
and sustainable world by integrating social values into corporate and investor actions‖ 
(www.iccr.org). While ICCR and Ceres were coordinating with one another on climate 
change issues as early as the late 1990‘s, ICCR members‘ standing as investors allowed 
them to file resolutions at firms, something Ceres could not do as a nonprofit 
organization.  
 
One public pension fund in the Northeast that was an early mover on climate change 
referred to ICCR as their ―aunts and uncles‖ in the shareholder activism space, since 
74 
 
ICCR has been filing social and environmental resolutions with companies since the 
1970‘s. A consequence of this institutional history was that ICCR members had to decide 
whether they were comfortable with a more explicitly financial framing of climate 
change despite their social motivations. The religious investors I interviewed all 
emphasized social responsibility as a primary driver for their organization‘s work. As one 
shareholder activist nun put it:   
―I would say that one of things that probably is extremely important is that this 
earth has been given to us by our God, and we need to do all that we can to 
protect it and make sure that it is passed on to future generations so that they 
have the same blessings that we've enjoyed…the other thing would be our 
concern for people and the fact that so many of the environmental issues also 




Religious investors have largely moved away from using moral or social justice language 
in their engagements with firms on climate change, however. In this way, diagnostic 
frame consensus has been reached between faith investors and more recent entrants to 
climate change investment issues. Despite their use of financial language, though, the 
moral and social motivations under-girding religious investors‘ activism have not 
disappeared, nor are they invisible to other investors and firms. Although most Catholic 
nuns no longer wear habits, for example, their faith identity remains salient and resonant 
(Baron 2004) to companies and other investors by how they are addressed (i.e. as 
―Sister‖) and the denominations they represent. 
 
Sister Patricia Daly, one of the most well-known shareholder activists on climate change, 
speaks frankly about how balancing moral and financial risk frames works among faith 
investors. While she acknowledges that her organization has a stake in the financial 
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performance of companies because part of their retirement money is invested in them, she 
freely admits, ―In any conversation with a company…it‘s clear that I‘m there because of 
a faith commitment‖ (quoted in Slater 2007). Despite using financial language, religious 
investors‘ moral and social foundations remain salient to targeted companies (Baron 
2004). Unlike public pension funds or mutual funds, they are always viewed as both 
investors/fiduciaries and faith-based stakeholders in their work.  
 
Religious investors acknowledge that a tension exists between their desire to be taken 
seriously by companies and their desire to stay true to their moral motivations for getting 
involved in issues. Sister Pat addressed this tension explicitly during Exxon‘s 2007 
annual meeting. Having filed climate resolutions at Exxon for decades - with a focus on 
the financial risks facing the firm if it ignores the issue - Sister Pat was advised to call 
upon her faith identity more explicitly:  
―There was a gentleman, a retired man, who followed me out of the Exxon 
Mobil meeting last year. He said, ‗You know, Sister, I‘ve been listening to 
you for a long time. We get the science, and we get the investment piece. 
You should be talking about their moral responsibility…I lost sleep over that 
comment,‖ she continued. ―I mean, I‘m an investor. I know I get play 
because I‘m this nun, and there‘s a lot of intrigue around that, but I‘m no 
more interesting and far less qualified than a lot of other people I work with. 
And you know, I don‘t play the God card. But basically, he was saying, ‗You 
should play the God card‘‖ (quoted in Slater, August 12, 2007). 
 
 
Faith investors worry that using moral and social language with companies on climate 
change is potentially damaging to their legitimacy, though. ICCR‘s Executive Director 
believes that requests for faith investors to ―play the God card‖ are, in her view, ―an 
interesting ploy used by the powerful to manipulate the people whose power they actually 
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don‘t respect.‖ She thinks calls for moral argumentation are often disingenuous and 
meant to weaken faith investors‘ arguments. To her, it‘s like saying: 
―Gee, if you people were really so religious you would use your faith more 
often and stop trying to create these materiality arguments. I think that‘s utter 
poppy-cock. It‘s like the interdependence argument, you know, if we can 
make the materiality argument then let‘s do it. Let‘s use everything in our 
toolbox. Because at the end of the day, I think we‘re on the side of justice and 
sustainability for heaven‘s sake. And so whatever tools we‘ve got, let‘s use 
them and let‘s not be uncomfortable or say that one is a better tool than the 
other, let‘s just use the tools in appropriate ways, you know.‖  
 
 
For religious investors then, the sustainability logic‘s frame of climate risk is expedient 
and sufficient – if not necessary – for their dialogues with firms and other investors. Faith 
investors know their religious identity can threaten the legitimacy of their actions and that 
they are able to garner greater support by making a traditional investment case for climate 
risk. Hence, they accept financial language as the default vocabulary in the sustainability 
logic because it permits them to engage with companies from a more powerful position as 
investors.  
 
The perception of religious investors working on climate change has also changed among 
traditional investors since the sustainability frame emerged. While religious shareholder 
activists were historically viewed as gadflies among firms and their fiduciary peers 
(Talner 1983), their actions have been reinterpreted as complementary to traditional 
notions of fiduciary duty over the past two decades. The framing of climate change as a 
business risk is palatable to investors new to shareholder activism. Discussing this 
perception transition, a senior manager at a public pension fund in the Midwest noted 
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how religious investors gained credibility from their prescience on corporate governance 
issues: 
―I remember in 1995, the whole proxy voting issues amounted to crazy nuns 
showing up at shareholder meetings, raising hell, and everybody pointing at 
the crazy nuns. And frankly proxy voting was left to the kooks…then the 
market turns over and a lot of investors, institutional investors, pension fund 
trustees, all of a sudden realized that that's right. They're losing their shirts 
here in 2001, 2002 - and you realized that all these concerns about corporate 
governance, about corporate greed, about out of control boards, about insider 
trading, about related party transactions, about conflicted auditors, there's a 
materiality to it.‖ 
 
 
One additional advantage to of the sustainability logic over the socially responsible logic 
is that the sustainability logic draws on the common professional identity of all investors 
in the field. Rather than drawing on their social identities, the challenger organizations 
can draw on their professional investor identities to frame climate change as a business 
risk. The first obstacle any institutional entrepreneurs faces is recruiting enough allies to 
mount an effective challenge to the dominant logic in a field. Drawing on the common 
professional identity of investors – and the frames and codes associated with  that identity 
– was how institutional entrepreneurs recruited a critical mass of investors to their 
challenger sustainability logic.  
 
The sustainability logic frame is not radical in the sense that it does not question the 
legitimacy of the capitalist system or the right of firms to do business, but tailoring a 
frame to fit within a dominant institution (e.g. the capitalist market) is a common 
technique used by institutional entrepreneurs to gain legitimacy (Rao and Giorgi 2006). 
In Scully and Creed‘s (2005) research on LGBT employees seeking equal opportunity in 
the workplace, for example, employees employed a ―good for business‖ frame rather than 
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focusing solely on a civil rights frame. The authors note that this strategy can be quite 
effective in making the challenger claims appear more legitimate but acknowledge that 
such framing techniques also ―put limits on how strongly activists can state a social 
justice agenda and how far they can push for radical change‖ (Scully and Creed 2005: 
321). Drawing on an insider identity and not making explicit social goals beyond 
financial gains carries the risk of co-optation. The next section turns attention to how 
religious investors use organizational identity as a tool to avoid this fate and how their 
more mainstream counterparts used identity distancing techniques when they cannot 
endorse specific actions taken by religious investors.   
 
Logic Maintenance (Identity as Tool Kit) 
I now examine how traditional and religious investors use their organizational identities 
as tools (Swidler 1986) to maintain the sustainability logic of investing when conflict 
over strategies occur. Each uses identity differently. Whereas religious investors take 
advantage of their multi-vocal identities when they need to justify taking more aggressive 
actions against firms than traditional investors will take, traditional investors engage in 
identity distancing discourse when they view religious or labor investors as ―going too 
far‖ in their shareholder activism tactics.  
 
While a large part of logic work involves finding the sufficient rather than necessary 
frame for recruiting and retaining participants, actors must also stay vigilant in order to 
avoid reducing a logic‘s frame to a ―lowest common denominator‖ of agreement that 
does not represent a true challenge to the dominant logic. Challengers like religious and 
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labor investors – who draw their organizational identities from institutions like religion 
and democracy as well as the market – are especially attuned to these risks. In a recent 
study on the institutionalization of sustainability reporting, Etzion and Ferraro (2010) find 
that advocates of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting mechanism moved 
away from making the analogy between financial reporting and sustainability reporting as 
the reporting practice matured. Once firms began issuing sustainability reports regularly, 
activists started emphasizing differences in sustainability and financial reporting to 
pressure firms to improve the content and accessibility of firm reports to a wider range of 
stakeholders. They did not want firms to use financial jargon to co-opt the reporting 
process into a greenwashing ploy. 
 
In the case of the sustainability logic, religious and labor investors guard against firm co-
optation by relying on their social rather than investor identities to push companies to 
take more aggressive sustainability actions. Unlike new investors to the sustainability 
logic who draw their organizational identity solely from the investment field, these 
investors are multi-vocal, meaning they interact with more diverse groups of 
organizations and individuals than traditional investors and have more varied templates 
for action to draw upon when engaging in shareholder activism. Being multi-vocal 
facilitated religious investors‘ ability to switch frames more easily from the SRI to 
sustainability logic, but it also provides them with greater impetus to take more radical 





Drawing on long traditions of social justice protest in the faith community, for example, 
ICCR‘s always-present religious identity provides its members with the permission space 
to file new climate resolutions that challenge the boundaries of acceptability in the eyes 
of the SEC, proxy research firms, and even other investors. The 2007 proxy resolutions 
on GHG reduction targets are illustrative of this strategy. Historically, climate resolutions 
only asked companies to report on their GHG emissions and business risks from climate 
change. More companies were agreeing to write sustainability reports, but shareholders 
had not asked firms to set specific GHG reduction targets. In my interviews, many ICCR 
members recalled that as Ceres and INCR‘s involvement on climate change deepened 
over time, ICCR began asking itself, ―Do we call it a day on climate risk disclosure?‖ 
since so many other investors are working on the issue now (interview with ICCR 
member). At ICCR‘s 2006 annual meeting, members reflected on their religious identity 
and decided ICCR could remain relevant on climate change only by operating as the 
―prophetic voice‖ in the investment community. For them, this meant writing new, more 
demanding resolutions.  
 
In 2007, ICCR members filed new resolutions requesting that companies set voluntary 
GHG reduction targets. These resolutions were viewed as ―an experiment‖ to see whether 
ICCR could push the climate change agenda further. ICCR believed that ―reduction 
resolutions would not be filed by big public pension funds‖ because of their mainstream 
investor identities (interview with ICCR staff). While ICCR members craft climate 
change resolutions with a mind to whether public pension funds and proxy research firms 
will support them, staff members noted that in some cases they disregard anticipated 
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support if they believe they have an important claim to make. While challengers have 
reached consensus on the market language they use when invoking the sustainability 
logic, faith investors are always driven by their religious foundations to challenge the 
boundaries of logic-appropriate action. ICCR‘s Executive Director makes explicit these 
drivers: 
―ICCR members are guided by the prophetic voice of faith--and I don't use that 
expression in italics at all, I sincerely mean that when you look at corporate 
behavior through eyes that are guided first by notions of justice and 
sustainability, you see things differently. I'm not saying you see them better or 
worse, just differently than looking through the lens of mere wealth 
creation…for example, ICCR investors filed the first resolutions on global 
warming back in the early 1990s, in the day when major policy wonks still 
weren't absolutely convinced that climate change was happening.‖  
 
By filing more demanding climate resolutions, faith investors aimed to push the 
sustainability logic‘s boundary of acceptable action while still using the frame of 
financial risk. This strategy aimed to expand the repertoire of appropriate action under the 
sustainability logic, and it worked. A Ceres staff member acknowledged religious 
investors‘ efficacy by saying:  
―[Faith investors] are often pushing the edges of what will be supported by 
proxy advisers and what can be, you know, an economic argument. But this 
past year they didn't push so far that it was out of bounds. So setting targets, 
asking companies to set targets, went beyond disclosure. It was unclear 
whether it was going to get three percent or get kicked out by the SEC or 
what would happen. And I think they hit the sweet spot with it, where they 
were able to advance their cause and also get major, heavy, big support.‖ 
 
 
The support they received included yes votes from other large institutional investors and 
yes vote recommendations from some of the proxy research firms. Public pension funds 
with previous experience in shareholder activism also supported the resolutions, as they 
themselves experiment with new types of resolutions and send representatives to speak at 
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annual meetings. For some of the more traditional institutional investors, the new 
resolutions posed a greater challenge, however. At the time, some viewed filing 
resolutions and speaking at annual meetings as less important than taking more 
incremental and internal actions, such as updating their funds‘ proxy voting guidelines on 
climate risk. Some noted they are voting for more resolutions than in the past, but several 
used identity distancing discourse to disassociate themselves from seemingly more 
radical institutional investors even though they vote in favor of many of their resolutions. 
Despite having new proxy voting guidelines in place on climate change, one pension fund 
manager emphasized that they ―are not a CalPERS or Connecticut‖ (interview with 
corporate governance analyst) and do not view themselves as similar to even other public 
pension funds that have longer histories of shareholder activism. 
 
Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest that ―changes may be more readily accepted when they 
are framed in a way that allows people to conserve their own sense of personal and 
organizational identity‖ (42), or what they label ―identity conservation.‖ When traditional 
investors feel threatened by their association with more activist investors, they take pains 
to draw on their identity to distance themselves from ICCR investors. They are intent to 
avoid confusing their organizations‘ fiduciary identities with the moral and social 
motivations of religious investors. One manager at a foundation active on climate change 
issues was quick to point out that their organization views itself as a ―responsible 
investor‖ but not a ―socially responsible investor.‖ The following quote from a corporate 
governance director at a public pension fund in a state in the Southeast is also illustrative 
of how identity is employed as a distancing tool:    
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―Our fund is fairly conservative and we are doing very well. We are 
consistently [top] ranked in the country in funding status. And so what we do 
is all based on the bottom line, honestly. It's long-term profitability, long-
term sustainability, and a conservative approach to make sure our retirees are 
always well-funded. What we see are people who look at it from the social 
side and want us to do more, so we kind of have to explain that really we are 
not social investors. We will never be social investors.‖ 
 
 
As a result of these concerns about seeming socially or morally motivated, some of the 
traditional investors initially withheld their support for the 2007 reduction resolutions. A 
corporate governance officer at another public pension fund in the Southeast said their 
organization will not support resolutions that ask companies to ―reduce emissions by, you 
know, exactly fifteen percent in the next two years… [because] we're not in the business 
of telling companies how to run their business.‖ Implied in this statement, and confirmed 
in a follow-up question to the informant, is a desire to distinguish the public pension 
fund‘s climate activism as purely financially motivated compared to religious investors 
who this informant believes have additional social motivations for tackling the issue. 
Despite their inability to support certain actions taken by one another, though, traditional 
and religious investors‘ stance toward one another is not hostile. It more closely 
resembles the push and pull among autonomous allies, evidenced by this quote from a 
corporate governance officer at a mid-size public pension fund: 
―If it's something where we're they‘re looking at it from a different angle that 
we can't support them, then we won't support it and we won't work with them 
on it. But for the most part, we use the same kind of techniques and the 
shareholder proposals are still going to be very similar. So yeah, we're able to 
work together very well.‖  
 
 
Also, challengers who support the sustainability logic but draw their identity from the 
market rather than religion or democracy do not reject outright increasingly demanding 
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resolutions drafted by religious investors. Some encourage them to frame climate change 
in fiduciary terms so they can support their actions. During my fieldwork, I saw many 
instances where mainstream institutional investors offered behind-the-scenes suggestions 
to religious and social investors about how to adjust resolution language so they could 
support them. As a newly hired corporate analyst at a traditional fund noted: 
―One thing that I found really interesting once I'd taken on this role is how 
productive it is to talk to other investors about what types of things we can 
support and what we can't, and sometimes how nuanced it is, and about how 
much interpretation can come in. For example, we won‘t support a resolution 
that we see as overly prescriptive to the Board or management. Sometimes 
they're very happy to use language that fits more with our approach if it 
means we're going to support it. It doesn't actually change the drive or the 
content. But it slightly changes the style of the approach, which can affect 
how people read it…‖ 
 
 
Alternatively, if shareholders are not willing to change the language of the resolutions, 
traditional investors increasingly abstain on climate resolutions where they agree with the 
intent of the request but not the language. According to an informant at the largest 
investor organization I interviewed (almost $400 billion in assets), their organization uses 
this tactic frequently to signal to management they need to pay more attention to the issue 
without overstepping what the organization feels is its responsibility to investors as their 
fiduciary. Further, the increasing amount of support for voluntary GHG reduction 
resolutions over time – and decreasing amount of direct investor opposition (evidenced 
by more abstentions) – suggests that social investors have been able to shift their framing 
enough to reassure greater numbers of investors that their fiduciary identity will be 
preserved if they vote for these resolutions (Berridge and Cook 2009). Rather than asking 
traditional investors to adopt a new identity, religious investors work within the logic‘s 
frame of climate risk to test whether they can expand the repertoire of unanimously 
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accepted strategies of action under the logic.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Although empirical research on logics has been mounting since the publication of 
Friedland and Alford‘s (1991) seminal work, theorizing efforts regarding the form and 
membership of logics have been less fruitful. The overwhelming majority of research on 
logics relies on a conceptualization that fails to account for diverse organizational 
identities among logic adopters (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 2008; Thornton 2004; 
Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). This study represents an initial effort to move away from 
conceptualizing logics as the end result of ex-ante negotiation. Rather, the idea of logic 
work suggests that organizations must agree upon a diagnostic frame for action and uses 
their organizational identities as tools to either justify taking more aggressive actions 
under the guise of the sustainability logic or distance themselves from actors who take 
more radical action. Following calls to incorporate social movement theory more 
explicitly into organizational research (Rao, Davis, and Ward 2000; Rao et al. 2003; 
David, Bloom, and Hillman 2007; Weber et al. 2008), logic work captures the framing 
and negotiation activities undertaken by challengers to mount their offense against a 
dominant field logic as well as the maintenance activities they engage in to maintain the 
logic‘s stability. 
 
The study analyzes two crucial elements of logic work. The first activity is negotiating a 
common diagnostic frame (Benford and Snow 2000) to justify why challenger 
organizations are promoting a new logic and taking action. In the case of institutional 
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investors who embrace the sustainability logic, the frame chosen is a financial one that all 
investors can agree upon. Under the ―sustainability logic of investing,‖ investors believe 
that climate change presents financial risks and opportunities to firms and frame the 
issues as primarily a financial problem. This framing is adopted by even the most radical 
of investors who have adopted the ―sustainability logic,‖ namely religious and labor 
shareholder activists. While this framing does not capture their social and moral 
motivations for engaging firms on climate change, they find it a sufficient and useful 
frame to mobilize greater numbers of investors on the issue.  
 
Motivational differences among the investors under the ―sustainability logic‖ must be 
continuously managed and reconciled to hold the logic together, though. I find that the 
second and most important element of logic work is the way in which organizations use 
their own and other investors‘ identities as tool kits (Swidler 1986) to either distance 
themselves or draw nearer to other challenger organizations. Both more radical and 
traditional investor use identities as tools. In order for identity to be used as a tool, 
though, at least one set of challenger organizations has to be multi-vocal; that is, possess 
many ties with diverse parties (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008). Among adherents to the 
―sustainability logic of investing,‖ religious investors are the multi-vocal actors who 
enable the logic to hold together. These investors draw on their social rather than their 
investor identities to justify taking new, more radical actions under the sustainability 




When religious and union investors take action that is deemed too radical by more 
traditional investors, though, the latter also uses identity as a tool to distance themselves 
from religious investors. This is a tactic used most frequently by public pension funds 
new to investor activism, in which they emphasize their fiduciary duty to explain why 
they are not endorsing certain actions by more socially or morally motivated investors. 
The sustainability logic does not fall apart in these instances, however. Rather, this 
identity distancing is more of signaling mechanism among the different challenger 
organizations about whether they are in agreement that a particular action falls within the 
confines of the sustainability logic. Often, by reframing a new action in financial rather 
than social terms – as in the case of the new GHG reduction resolutions – religious and 
union investors are able to expand the actions deemed appropriate under the sustainability 
logic by all organizations. In cases where agreement is not possible, using identity as tool 
kit enables the organizations to manage conflict without directly abandoning the logic 




As Khurana (2007) has observed, ―much less is known about the origins and 
development of new institutions, institutional logics, forms, and behaviors‖ (14) than 
competition between and diffusion of them. This begs the question, ―What is the 
significance of the origins, development and form of new logics for organizational 
theory?‖ I suggest that the degree to which challengers are hetero- or homogenous 
influences the amount of logic work required to create and maintain a challenger logic. 
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Logics do not appear out of thin air. They are socially constructed cognitive templates for 
action, and the ways in which they are negotiated and maintained has been previously 
under-theorized. This study uncovers the framing and identity work necessary to create 
and maintain a logic when organizations adopting it have diverse motivations and goals. 
In particular, the study highlights the important role identity plays as a tool to manage 
conflict among challengers. Managing conflict requires resources and energy on the part 
of organizations, however, and it is unclear what this work ―costs‖ challengers or how it 
influences a challenger logic‘s probability of replacing a dominant logic in a competing 
logics scenario.  
 
One fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine whether competing logics 
outcomes differ when the competition is between a logic embraced by a diverse set of 
organizations and one with homogenous actors. More specifically, does the effort 
required by logic work weaken a challenger logic‘s ability to overpower dominants in an 
organizational field? Another interesting direction would be to examine the conditions 
under which logic work activities like framing and maintenance (i.e. using identity as tool 
kit) becomes easier or more difficult for challengers over time. Is there a tipping point 
where framing and/or identity distancing are no longer necessary for organizations under 
a logic or is negotiation and maintenance necessary until a challenger logic defeats the 
dominant logic in a field?  
 
Proponents of the institutional logics concept argue that logics are more durable 
templates for action than collective action frames (Thornton 2004; Thornton and Ocasio 
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2008), but it does not necessarily follow that negotiation among adopters is absent. While 
this study challenges the notion that a collective organizational identity is always present 
within a logic, it still champions the foundational purpose of the logic concept; to 
conceptually bridge macro and micro processes in organizational theory (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008: 105). Parsing out the type and amount of logic work challengers must 
engage to manage differences among their organizational identities will bring researchers 
one step closer to understanding how logics remain stable and what features make logics 
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Economic sociologists argue that social ties matter in economic relationships, and a rich 
literature has examined the effect of patterns of embedded ties on behavior and economic 
outcomes for both individuals and organizations (Granovetter 1985; Baker 1990; Davis 
1991; Mizruchi 1992; Burt 1992; Podolny and Baron 1997; Owen-Smith and Powell 
2004). I adopt Zukin and DiMaggio‘s (1990) broad definition of embeddedness, which 
they characterize as "the contingent nature of economic action with respect to cognition, 
culture, social structure, and political institutions" (15). While a wide body of 
sociological research has explored the ways in which the structure of relations affects 
economic outcomes, some in the field have voiced a need to move this research agenda in 
a direction that more fully incorporates cultural and cognitive approaches to 
embeddedness.  
 
In particular, Krippner (2001) and Krippner and Alvarez (2007) have argued that taking 
an exclusively structural approach to embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) reinforces rather 
than weakens the strict separation of the economy and other institutions of social life. 
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They claim it is important to retain a Polanyian approach to embeddedness that focuses 
on how the economic and social are mutually constitutive. They criticize harder network 
approaches for ―[stripping] out social content from structural relations, resulting in a 
conception of the market that is nearly as abstract as the absolutized market of economic 
theory" (Krippner and Alvarez 2007: 231). While strongly worded, this critique is a good 
reminder that economic relationships are social relationships. It points to opportunities to 
push the embeddedness concept further with a greater focus on the cultural/cognitive 
foundations of economic ties.  
 
In a recent review article, Beamish (2007) has also noted the need for greater synthesis of 
cultural and structural accounts of economic action in economic sociology (although see 
Zelizer 1994, 2005). Drawing on this observation, I argue that empirical studies of 
embeddedness must take a closer look at the content of economic ties to understand how 
the social creates particular outcomes and decisions in economic settings. I propose that 
examining how organizational identity affects inter-organizational relationships is one 
way to gain traction in this effort. ―Identities situate the organization, group, and person‖ 
(Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 2000: 13), making them a useful vehicle to see how social 
beliefs about identities and cognitive templates for identity evaluation affect relational 
ties between actors. Identity is embedded in economic ties, as actors involved in inter-
organizational relationships constantly evaluate one another‘s behavior (Goffman 1959). 
Often, they use identity as a measure of whether another organization‘s actions are 
appropriate (March and Olsen 1995).  How a focal organization approaches its 
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relationships to stakeholders is also affected by its own central, enduring, and distinctive 
identity attributes (Albert and Whetten 1985). 
 
While some definitions of organizational identity emphasize internal identity attributes 
(Albert and Whetten 1985), others, particularly those associated with organizational 
ecology, pay more attention to the way in which audiences evaluate and sanction actors 
for violating social codes associated with their identity (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 2002; 
Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll 2007). Rather than being mutually 
exclusive, I argue both of these conceptualizations are necessary to understand how 
identity influences relationships between two organizations. I introduce the concept 
―identity interaction‖ to reflect the dual ways in which identity evaluation by external 
audiences and internal identity attributes influence inter-organizational relationships. 
Identity interactions occur when one organization evaluates the identity of another before 
deciding whether and how to engage in a relationship with it. This evaluation is 
contingent, however, on the former‘s own cognitive identity orientation (Brickson 2005, 
2007) toward stakeholders. As King et al (2010) have argued, an organization is often 
―driven by a particular identity claim‖ (296) in interactions with other actors. Thus, the 
identity interaction concept is comprised of two components that interact with one 
another in firm-stakeholders negotiations; the stakeholder‘s organizational identity and 
the firm‘s identity orientation.  
 
Stakeholder organizational identity refers to the ―central, enduring, and distinctive‖ 
attributes of an organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). The other component of identity 
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interactions is the identity orientation of firm, which captures how firms evaluate the 
legitimacy of stakeholders‘ social identities and whether they want to negotiate with 
them. Brickson (2005) defines identity orientation as ―the nature of assumed relations 
between an organization and its stakeholders—are relations independent, dyadically 
interdependent, or derived from a common group membership?‖ (577). Under this 
framework, firms can be placed in three different orientation categories: individualistic, 
relational, or collectivistic.  
 
Collectivistic firms approach their relationships with all stakeholders in an open and 
generally welcoming manner, because they view themselves as being part of a larger 
societal collective. Relational firms, on the other hand, reserve a warm reception to 
certain types of stakeholders (e.g. employees or clients) to whom they have a deep 
commitment that goes beyond profit motives alone. Finally, individualistic firms see 
themselves as set apart from others and are solely focused on the organization‘s success, 
so they tend to take a more hostile manner to stakeholders who approach them. While 
these are ideal-type categorizations of firms, the identity orientation concept helps 
capture heterogeneity among firm evaluations of stakeholders and corrects for a tendency 
in organizational ecology theory on identity to assume that all audience members (i.e. 
firms) evaluate the same stakeholders in the same way (Polos et al. 2002).  
 
The relationship between shareholders and managers in a corporate governance setting 
provides an ideal site to theorize about how identity interactions influence economic ties. 
Conflicts over climate change between firms and shareholders are an example of ―private 
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politics,‖ which encompass ―situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on 
law or government‖ (Baron 2003: 31). Since the firm is under no regulatory obligation to 
mitigate its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, these conflicts enable us to see how other 
influences drive firm responses to climate change requests. Rather than exiting when 
unsatisfied with management at publicly traded firms, activist investors exercise voice 
(Hirschman 1970) by filing shareholder resolutions related to corporate governance, 
social, or environmental issues to signal their disapproval. Under Rule 14-a-8 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, any shareholder owning at least $2,000 of stock in 
a company has the right to file an advisory shareholder resolution at publicly-traded U.S. 
firms. These resolutions typically advise managers on corporate governance issues like 
CEO pay, social issues like human rights and supplier standards, or environmental issues 
like sustainability reporting.  
 
By law, a company is required to put resolutions to an advisory vote by all shareholders 
in its annual proxy statement. However, top managers have discretion regarding whether 
to also engage in closed-door, behind-the-scenes dialogue with shareholders to try to 
negotiate a withdrawal agreement. Some firms choose to engage with shareholders, some 
ignore requests for dialogue completely, and others speak with shareholders but do not 
agree to negotiate a withdrawal on the issue contained in the resolution. I suggest that 
identity interactions help us account for heterogeneous evaluation of investors – and 




Regardless of whether a resolution is withdrawn through dialogue or not, the shareholder 
resolution process requires repeated interactions between firm managers and 
shareholders. Many resolution proponents file the same or multiple resolutions with firms 
for many years. This provides a good setting to consider how social identity is embedded 
in economic relationships between managers and shareholders, a relationship economic 
sociologists suggest is too often characterized as being instrumental and arms-length in 
nature (Uzzi 1996). Further, the topics of most shareholder resolutions involve ―novel, 
controversial, consequential strategic choices‖ (Whetten 2006) for firms, providing a 
setting where identity-referencing discourse is likely to be observed (Whetten 2006). 
 
The case study focuses on a two-year shareholder dialogue on climate change between 
Ford Motor Company and a group of small investors. The case seeks to understand how 
the social identity of the shareholders filing the resolution and the identity orientation of 
the firm facilitated ongoing dialogue between the two parties despite the lack of a legal 
mandate to do so. In essence, the case presents a theory of how the identity interaction 
between the filer‘s identity and firm‘s orientation enabled a successful shareholder 
dialogue outcome. Specifically, the case examines how a climate resolution that went to a 
vote the first time it was filed at Ford in 2007 was successfully withdrawn a year later 
after ongoing dialogue with the Dominican order of nuns who filed it. The resolution 
filed in 2007 requested that Ford‘s Board of Directors voluntarily set quantitative goals 
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from their products and operations. In 
March 2008, Ford agreed to publicly commit to reducing GHG emissions from its new 




The resolution – also filed at General Motors – was the first time shareholders had asked 
companies to publicly set voluntary GHG reduction targets rather than just disclosing 
emissions data. New, more stringent resolutions often take many years of dialogue before 
a withdrawal is negotiated between firms and shareholders, and some resolutions are 
never withdrawn. The same religious investors in this case, for example, spent a decade 
filing resolutions with General Electric regarding PCB contamination of the Hudson 
River before a withdrawal was reached. Similarly, religious and other activist investors 
have not had the same success in negotiating climate change resolutions with firms like 
General Motors and ExxonMobil.  
 
As recent work in organizational ecology has acknowledged, one of the most pressing 
needs in identity research is to ―consider heterogeneity within an audience‖ (Hsu, 
Hannan, and Kocak 2009: 167) and understand the drivers behind their differential 
evaluations of a single actor – shareholders in this case. While other studies of 
shareholder activism have taken a descriptive (Hoffman 1996; Proffitt and Spicer 2006) 
or social movement approach (Reid and Toffel 2009), this case represents a first effort at 
theorizing the influence identity plays in differential evaluations of stakeholders and 
shareholder activists by U.S. firms. Importantly, the case does not attempt to determine 
whether Ford would have set GHG reduction targets without engaging with investors. 
Rather, the primary focus is on how the identities of the two organizations has led the 
firm to engage in a long-term dialogue process with religious investors and ultimately 




The first half of the case focuses on the social identity of the religious investors who filed 
the resolution. The case shows how the religious identity of the shareholders impacted the 
way Ford managers viewed the filer‘s legitimacy and facilitated the firm‘s ability to 
engage in dialogue and reach a withdrawal agreement with them. Managers‘ social 
understanding and trust in professional religious figures permitted them to interpret and 
evaluate the religious investors‘ actions differently than radical environmental NGOs and 
other activist investors. The reason Ford evaluates religious investors as legitimate actors 
– and other firms do not – is taken up in the second half of the case. I argue that Ford‘s 
collectivistic identity orientation, or the firm‘s assumptions about how it interacts with its 
stakeholders (Brickson 2005: 577), influenced its view that shareholder activism on the 
part of faith investors is legitimate.  
 
As noted above, collectivistic firms view themselves as part of a larger community, and 
as a result, they are more open to engaging with a large number of diverse stakeholders 
on a variety of issues. As the case discusses, Ford acts on its collectivistic orientation by 
allowing managers to engage with a wide variety of stakeholders on climate change, 
including groups as far-ranging as religious shareholder activists to hostile environmental 
NGOs. I argue that this openness facilitates a more fine-grained evaluation of 
stakeholders by the firm. Whereas both religious investors and NGOs want Ford to 
address climate change, the legitimacy of religious investors‘ social identity makes the 
firm more likely to engage with them to find agreement on climate change. The firm‘s 
orientation interacts with the shareholder‘s identity to produce a successful dialogue 
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outcome. I also use religious investors‘ lack of dialogue success on climate change at 
other firms as a comparison to Ford. In line with Brickson (2005, 2007), I suggest that 
individualistic firms are less likely to meet demands from any stakeholder group, and as a 
result, the social identity of religious investors does not provide them additional leverage 
at these firms. I conclude the case with a discussion of how the identity interaction 
concept opens up fruitful avenues for future research on organizational identity and 
economic relationships. 
 
The study addresses several theoretical issues in organizational and economic sociology. 
In regard to embeddedness, analyzing the relationship between top managers and 
shareholders at a single firm helps improve our understanding of how cognitive templates 
regarding identity and approach to stakeholders (i.e. identity interactions) impact the 
relational ties between shareholders and managers and ultimately firm strategies. 
Although economic sociologists have not wholly neglected the identity concept, their 
treatment of it typically follows a more structural approach. The most widely-cited 
example is Padgett and Ansell‘s (1993) finding that actors are least constrained in their 
actions when their identity and motivations are obscured from external audiences by 
keeping their network ties separate. At the organizational level, Rao, Davis, and Ward 
(2000) also focus on how network ties affect organizational decisions aimed at enhancing 
identity evaluation by others. The article also considers why these conceptions of identity 




Further, the case demonstrates how different strands of identity research, specifically 
those in the traditional management literature (Albert and Whetten 1985; Brickson 2005, 
2007; Whetten 2006) and organizational ecology (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 
2005; Hannan et al. 2007; Hsu 2006; Hsu et al. 2009) are complementary rather than 
competing or mutually exclusive. I argue that ties between firms and stakeholders are 
influenced by both internal identity attributes and evaluations of other organizations‘ 
identities. Finally, the case demonstrates the utility of employing identity concepts to 
better understand manager-shareholder relationships. I addresses why alternative 
explanations for Ford‘s actions – such as such as those based on investor size (see 
Mizruchi 2004 for a review), a firm‘s geographic location (Davis and Greve 1997; 
Marquis 2003; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis 2007), anticipation of future regulation 
(Hoffman 2007) and greenwashing (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Lyon and Kim 2006) – are 
insufficient to understand why some large firms engage in dialogue with the same small 
shareholders over time on social and environmental issues. I posit that the mechanism 
fostering close relationships between managers and shareholders is the ―identity 
interaction‖ between the shareholders‘ religious identity and the firm‘s collectivistic 
orientation. Ultimately, paying closer attention to how identity affects the content of 
relationships between managers and shareholders will help researchers more fruitfully 
synthesize theories of cultural and structural embeddedness, an effort which continues to 
challenge the discipline (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Beamish 2007; Krippner and 





The identity interaction concept I introduce in this study aims to solve two problems 
related to identity and economic ties. First, as the case shows, it overcomes a tendency in 
the embeddedness literature to conceptualize identity in purely structural terms (Padgett 
and Ansell 1993; Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 2003). Identity interactions capture 
cultural and cognitive identity influences on the outcomes of economic ties that 
embeddedness theory typically neglects. Second, I aim to show that definitions of 
organizational identity that emphasize central, enduring, and distinctive traits (Albert and 
Whetten 1985) versus those in organizational ecology that emphasize external evaluation 
of identity (Polos et al. 2002; Hannan et al. 2007) work together to create particular 
outcomes in firm-shareholder dialogues. Just as network theorists argue that social and 
economic action cannot be understood without attending to ties between actors, 
organizational identity is not a very useful concept unless it applies to relationships with 
other actors (Scott and Lane 2000; Brickson and Lemmon 2009). In the following 
sections, I turn attention to the two central elements of identity interactions: 
organizational identity and identity orientations (Brickson 2005, 2007). 
 
Conceptualizing Identity  
There is a long tradition of research on organizational identity in the management 
literature (Albert and Whetten 1985; Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Elsbach and Kramer 
1996; Albert et al. 2000; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000; Pratt and Foreman 2000; Scott 
and Lane 2000; Corley and Gioia 2004), but in recent years, organizational identity has 
become implicated in a debate over whether it should be defined as a set of an internal 
attributes (Albert and Whetten 1985; Whetten 2006) or as an evaluation measure used by 
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audiences to sanction identity violations (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; 
Hannan et al. 2007). This divide emerged with the new focus on identity by 
organizational ecologists (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Polos et al. 2002; Baron 2004; 
Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2007). Whereas the classical definition of identity in 
the organizational literature defines it as the ―central, enduring, and distinctive‖ elements 
of an organization (Albert and Whetten 1985; Whetten 2006), ecologists conceptualize 
identity as "social codes" which are evaluated by audiences (Polos et al. 2002). The 
former places the locus of identity internally whereas ecologists focus primarily on 
external audience evaluations of populations of individuals or organizations. Audiences 
are said to be comprised of ―collections of agents with an interest in a domain and control 
over material and symbolic resources that affect the success and failure of the claimants 
in the domain‖ (Hsu and Hannan 2005: 476). In this case, the relevant audience is a large, 
publicly traded U.S. firm. 
 
Although ecologists argue their definition of identity allows for internal and external 
audience evaluation of the focal organization (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005), 
most of the empirical studies in this line of research have almost exclusively focused on 
external audience evaluations. At the individual level, these include casting directors‘ 
evaluations of actors (Soule 1997) and social worker assessments of welfare recipients 
(Mohr 1994). At the organizational level, there are studies of film critics‘ reviews of 
movies (Hsu and Podolny 2005; Hsu 2006; Hsu et al. 2009), buyer ratings of eBay sellers 
(Hsu et al. 2009), security analysts‘ rating of firms (Zuckerman 1999), and eco-tourism 
agencies‘ rating of operators (Hannan et al. 2007). Hsu and Hannan (2005) go so far as to 
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argue that ―empirical research that gauges identity by listing stable features fails to 
recognize that ownership of an organization‘s identity resides within an organization‘s 
audience rather than within the organization itself‖ (476).  
 
One notable exception to the emphasis on external audiences in this research stream is 
Baron, Hannan, and Burton‘s (2001) study of employee turnover in the high-technology 
sector. They found that changes in firm employment models led to higher turnover rates 
among employees (i.e. the internal audience) and resulted in lower firm performance. 
However, their data sample consists of very young high-tech firms, which precludes 
those organizations from having many enduring identity traits. Further, they place greater 
focus on the blueprints or ―logics‖ of the employment relationship rather than 
organizational identity. 
 
The emphasis on external evaluation of identity makes sense given the research questions 
and methodological approach of this stream of research. Rather than replacing Albert and 
Whetten‘s (1985) definition of identity, though, I suggest the ecology definition simply 
extends the usefulness of the identity concept by adding an evaluative component to it. 
Both internal identity attributes and the way audiences evaluate an organization‘s 
conformity to social codes associated with that identity open up new ways to study how 
identity affects inter-organizational relationships. It is also an overstatement by ecologists 
to say that traditional organizational scholars have completely ignored identity evaluation 
or the implications of identity on decision outcomes within organizations. Dutton and 
Dukerich‘s (1991) seminal article on the Port Authority‘s response to homelessness, for 
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example, demonstrated how an organization‘s view of itself – and how it believes others 
view it – affects its decisions when reacting to a contentious issue brought to it by 
external audiences. However, this view attends more to concerns regarding the 
organizational image an organization portrays to outsiders rather than how audiences 
make evaluations of other organizations. The value of the identity interaction concept I 
introduce in this case is that it includes both internal and external identity forces at work 
in inter-organizational relationships. 
 
Ecologists acknowledge that we still ―have much to learn about the activities and social 
conditions that allow for particular properties of identity to become recognized and coded 
by audiences‖ (Hsu and Hannan 2005: 487) as well as ―differences in the way audience 
members react to and discipline producers‖ (Hsu 2006: 446). Neither traditional 
organizational research nor identity research by ecologists has fully addressed these 
questions, a gap this article begins to fill. For the purposes of embeddedness research in 
particular, I believe the interaction between both attribute and evaluative dimensions of 
identity are needed to understand relationships between two organizations. Identity 
attributes are the central, enduring, and distinctive elements of an organization whereas 
the evaluative dimensions of identity are the social codes against which an entity is 
judged by others.  
 
This does raise the question, though, of ―whose point of view should be considered when 
measuring identity‖ (Hsu and Hannan 2005, 483). I suggest the vantage point we should 
use to understand identity interactions depends largely on which organization is asking 
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the other for an audience in a given context. In cases of private politics (Baron 2003) 
where one organization seeks to change the behavior of another, the identity focus will 
necessarily be on how the latter evaluates the former (Polos et al. 2002), whereas core 
identity attributes (including identity orientation) of the evaluating organization will 
likely affect how it reacts to the initiating organization. 
 
The next logical question is, ―What precisely do audiences evaluate?‖ I suggest that 
determining whether an entity is violating social codes is tantamount to making a 
legitimacy evaluation. The importance of legitimacy for organizational success and 
survival is well-established in the organizational literature (Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995), 
and legitimacy is defined here as the ―perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995: 574). Certainly the individual or 
organizational actor being evaluated can take strategic actions to conform more closely to 
the social codes ascribed to it by external evaluators, but the degree to which the 
organization will be willing or able to change its strategies and actions to comply with 
social codes is contingent upon its own internal identity attributes. Thus, invoking 
language from institutional theory, coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
may be blunted by core identity attributes.  
 
Identity Orientations 
The second element of an identity interaction is the firm‘s identity orientation (Brickson 
2005, 2007). I contend that internal identity attributes of the firm influence its evaluation 
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of other organizations, because these attributes serve as cognitive templates to evaluate 
whether and how to engage in relationships with stakeholders. To reflect different ways 
firms conceptualize their relationships with stakeholders, I employ Shelley Brickson‘s 
(Brickson 2005, 2007) concept of identity orientation. As noted in the definition provided 
in the introduction, identity orientation captures how a firm approaches its relationships 
to different stakeholders. This idea draws on the business stakeholder literature claim that 
understanding the firm requires understanding its relations with internal and external 
stakeholders (Freeman 1984). According to Brickson (2007), firms can be placed in three 
different orientation categories: individualistic, relational, or collectivistic. While 
acknowledging they are ideal types and recognizing hybrids also exist, the labels provide 
a starting point to consider variation in the approach firms take in their relationships with 
stakeholders. 
  
Individualistic organizations are primarily concerned about their own welfare, whereas 
relational organizations care mostly about dyadic relationships with partners, and 
collectivistic organizations prioritize the welfare of a larger group in stakeholder 
interactions. Brickson suggests that identity orientation is visible in identity statements 
made by organization members. For example, firm characterizations like ―‗the top 
performer in the industry‘ (individualistic), ‗accommodating and loyal to partners‘ 
(relational), and ‗promoting the ecological sustainability of the earth‘ (collectivistic) [all] 
reveal a different assumed nature of relations with stakeholders‖ (Brickson 2007: 577). 
These ideal types are drawn from the social psychology literature on how ―other-
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regarding‖ individuals are (Brewer and Gardner 1996), and the orientations are assumed 
to impact relational patterns between an actor and others.  
 
In the case of individualistic organizations then, one would predict reticence to engage in 
relationships with stakeholders unless they serve a purely instrumental purpose (e.g. 
supplier who gives the best price). Relational firms, on the other hand, view relationships 
with valued stakeholder groups (e.g. employees or clients) as more than just means-end 
interactions and expend effort to nurture them beyond what one would expect from a neo-
classical economic perspective. Finally, collectivistic organizations are the most likely of 
the three types to work with large numbers of diverse stakeholder groups toward common 
goals that may or may not be related to the organization‘s bottom line but that benefit 
society.   
 
Identity Interaction 
Combining internal and evaluative conceptualizations of identity enables us to see how 
―identity interactions‖ work. It is a concept that brings the process of how firms relate to 
stakeholders in differential ways based on identity into the foreground. Figure 3.1 
sketches this process. Organizations receiving requests from another organization – as in 
the case of shareholder dialogue requests – evaluate the social codes of the other party 
through the filter of their identity orientation, a cognitive template that is shaped by the 
central identity attributes the organization possesses. A firm‘s identity orientation thus 
influences whether it views an alter as a legitimate actor or not, and this in turn impacts 
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whether the interaction between the two organizations will lead to a positive or negative 
outcome.  
 
Organizations that possess different identity orientations (e.g. individualistic versus 
collectivistic) are likely to evaluate the legitimacy of the same alter differently, a theory 
supported by the empirical findings in this case. As the case shows, a firm with a 
collectivistic orientation evaluates the legitimacy of religious investors more positively 
than those with other social identities (e.g. labor, NGO, political), although the firm will 
engage in dialogue with all stakeholders. The identity interaction concept also accounts 
for the fact that these interactions are a process rather than a one-shot game. In repeated 
interactions, such as those between firms and shareholder activists filing resolutions for 
multiple years, previous interactions provide a feedback loop to the social code 
evaluation. Baron (2003) argues that private politics must become an ―equilibrium private 
institution‖ (62) to succeed, meaning ―both the activist and the firm must continue to 
participate even when incidents occur that suggest the standard might have been violated‖ 
(Baron 2003: 62). As the case demonstrates, Ford‘s identity orientation and the religious 
investors‘ identities helped maintain their shareholder dialogue even when Ford‘s 
proposed climate actions were questioned by external environmental NGOs. Further, 
Ford‘s previous interactions with religious investors helped build additional trust and 
influenced the firm‘s decision to let religious investors verify if Ford‘s proposed climate 




My conceptualization of identity‘s role in economic relationships differs significantly 
from the embeddedness literature that relies on a more structural treatment of the concept 
(Padgett and Ansell 1993; Zuckerman 1999; Rao et al. 2000). Rao, Davis and Ward 
(2000), for example, claim that an organization‘s social identity is a function of the 
formal and informal social groups to which it belongs. In their study of defection of 
NASDAQ firms to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the authors found that ties to 
members of the in-group (NASDAQ) discouraged defection to the NYSE (i.e. a new 
social identity), while ties to the out-group increased defection. Whereas they suggest that 
identity is shaped through social interactions, I argue that organizational identity also 
shapes interactions. Further, the relationship between Ford and religious shareholders 
cannot be fully explained by the structural research on identity in economic sociology, 
such as the work by Padgett and Ansell (1993) and Zuckerman and colleagues 
(Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman and Kim 2003; Zuckerman et al. 2003; Hsu et al. 2009). 
Unlike Padgett and Ansell‘s finding that actors who manipulate their social ties to 
obscure their motivations and identity are best able to engage in ―robust action‖ and 
achieve their goals, the case shows the filers‘ religious identity and moral motivations are 
highly salient and resonant to firm managers.  
 
Additionally, their salient religious identity helps them avoid being grouped with 
organizations that receive negative evaluations from firms, such as individual shareholder 
activists and radical NGOs. Since religious investors‘ actions suggest they are 
sympathetic to or belong with some of the same identity categories as these groups (i.e. 
radical investors, environmental activists), one might also expect them to suffer negative 
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evaluations at Ford either because of their (illegitimate) shareholder activities or because 
of their multiple identities. Zuckerman and others (Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al. 
2003; Hsu et al. 2009) have found that belonging to multiple identity categories can have 
negative consequences for individuals and organizations. Their findings do not conform 
to the outcomes in this case, however. Rather, the investors‘ overarching religious 
identity enables them avoid the fate of actors who belong to so many categories that 
audiences cannot associate them with a clear identity. I suggest a process-based 
alternative to these structural explanations – based on the identity interaction between 
Ford‘s collectivistic orientation and shareholders‘ socially legitimate religious identity – 
to account for the successful shareholder dialogue at the firm.    
 
THE CASE 
On December 6, 2006, a letter arrived on Jerome Zaremba‘s desk at the General 
Counsel‘s Office of Ford World Headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan. It was addressed 
from Sister Patricia Daly of the Sisters of St. Dominic in Caldwell, New Jersey. The letter 
opened with a note of congratulations to the company for its leadership on a recent 
initiative by several automakers to improve supply chain workplace conditions. She noted 
her feeling ―that this initiative would not have happened without the work of Ford.‖  
 
The letter went on to inform the company that as beneficial owners of 174 shares of Ford 
stock, the Sisters planned to file a shareholder resolution asking the company to ―publicly 
adopt quantitative goals, based on current and emerging technologies, for reducing total 
greenhouse gas emissions from the company‘s products and operations.‖ The resolution 
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further requested that Ford provide a report to shareholders on how the company planned 
to achieve this goal. The Sisters were also joined by the State of Connecticut Retirement 
Plans and Trust Funds, the Congregation of the Passion, Christian Brothers Investment 
Services, and the Sisters of Saint Joseph as co-filers on the resolution. 
 
Mr. Zaremba was not especially surprised to receive the letter. ―Sister Pat,‖ a well-known 
shareholder activist and Dominican nun, had been filing climate resolutions with her 
religious order at Ford Motor Company since 1991 in collaboration with the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). The religious co-filers on the resolution were 
also ICCR members, and many of them also had a long history of shareholder 
engagement with Ford on social and environmental governance issues. ICCR is a 
coalition organization of 275 faith-based institutional investors, including religious 
denominations, religious communities, pension funds, healthcare corporations, 
foundations, asset management companies, colleges, and dioceses. Between 1991 and 
2009, ICCR members filed fourteen climate change resolutions at Ford. Eight of those 
resolutions were withdrawn after dialogue between the shareholders and the company. In 
addition, between 1972 and 2010, ICCR member organizations filed twenty-one 
additional resolutions at Ford on issues related to human rights, HIV reporting, the 
MacBride Principles, and the firm‘s political contributions.  
 
Before the company‘s financial troubles curtailed employee travel, Ford managers held 
quarterly dialogue meetings with ICCR members on a broad swath of social and 
environmental issues related to the company and its operations. This multi-issue approach 
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has been used by ICCR with a few large companies, and through the course of additional 
fieldwork observing activist investors, I discovered most U.S. firms that frequently 
receive shareholder resolutions from religious investors generally associate those 
resolutions with ICCR (as opposed to one religious investor working in isolation). ICCR 
staff members also frequently participate in individual firm dialogues even if a resolution 
is filed by only a single ICCR member organization. 
 
Since the 2007 resolution was the first time shareholders had ever asked companies to set 
voluntary GHG reduction targets for their products, ICCR members were unsure whether 
it would pass a challenge at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
even more uncertain whether large institutional investors (e.g. public pension funds, 
TIAA-CREF) would support the new resolution. According to Sister Pat, ―We thought 
this was a win even if we got a three percent vote‖ in favor of the resolution. ICCR 
members had decided to file new, more stringent resolutions asking companies to go 
beyond GHG emissions disclosure after a soul-searching ICCR meeting during the 
summer of 2006. At that annual meeting, members wrestled with whether they still had 
an effective role to play in climate change investor engagement given the heightened 
interest in the issue by greater numbers of mainstream investors and the establishment of 
the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) by the NGO Ceres (www.incr.com). 
Ultimately, they decided that filing these new resolutions was the way for them to remain 
a ―prophetic voice‖ among shareholders by pressuring firms to take increasingly 




The 2007 resolution dialogue took place during a time of upheaval at Ford. Three months 
before the resolution was filed, Bill Ford Jr. stepped down as CEO of the company and 
was replaced with Alan Mullaly, the former CEO of Boeing. Shareholders were unsure 
how the appointment of Mullaly would affect the firm‘s response to the resolution. 
During several meetings about the resolution in February 2007, shareholders were told by 
managers in the Sustainable Business Strategies Division that Ford was still addressing 
emissions in a serious manner, but not publicly. The company said it would not set public 
targets for GHG reductions that year. Don Kirshbaum, representing the State of 
Connecticut in the dialogue, said that in the shareholders‘ minds, ―2007 was a step back 
compared to 2006.‖ As a result, Sister Pat and the other investors decided they would 
move forward and present the resolution for a vote at the annual meeting. 
 
At Ford‘s May 10, 2007 annual meeting in Delaware, Sister Pat presented the 
shareholders‘ case to the Board of Directors. The resolution received a fourteen percent 
vote in favor from other shareholders, making it eligible for re-filing the next year. SEC 
rules state that a resolution must receive three percent or greater the first year it is filed, 
six percent the second year, and ten percent or more every year after. Although some 
researchers argue that shareholder resolutions are a success if they receive 50 percent 
plus one of the vote (Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner 1996), a vote of ten percent is 
sometimes high enough to get a company to engage investors in dialogue and negotiation, 
particularly if the vote is accompanied by negative publicity. Only one climate change 
resolution has ever received a majority vote (51.2 percent at IDACORP in 2009), but 
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almost half of companies receiving climate resolutions in 2008 and 2009 negotiated 
withdrawals with investors to avoid having these resolutions go to a vote.    
 
Despite Ford and the investors‘ inability to reach a consensus on the resolution, Sister 
Pat‘s treatment at Ford‘s annual meetings provides initial insight into her unique standing 
with the company and the special nature of the relationship between Ford managers and 
religious shareholders. Similar to most other publicly traded U.S. firms, Ford only allows 
shareholders a few minutes at the podium to address the Board of Directors during annual 
meetings. A buzzer rings to stop speakers at the end of their time. However, Sister Pat 
and one other long-time shareholder activist named Evelyn Davis are allowed to speak as 
long as they want. According to the managers I interviewed, the time limit is relaxed for 
Evelyn as a show of respect for her attendance at every annual meeting since the 
company became publicly traded. As for Sister Pat, if any shareholder complains about 
the special treatment for her, managers respond by pointing out the value of her 
relationship with the company:  
―So Evelyn doesn‘t get the shot clock and Sister Pat doesn't either. And if 
someone questions us about Sister Pat we'll say we have a very good 
relationship with Sister Pat that‘s productive, and if other shareholders have the 
same productive relationship that we do, and you appeal to values that add like 
Sister Pat does, then we won't put the shot clock on you. In order to keep the 
meeting moving in an orderly manner, we feel the need to limit the amount of 
time people can speak.‖ (Interview with Ford manager). 
 
Following a description of the data and methods used in the case, the remainder of the 
chapter considers how the religious identity of the shareholders facilitated a two-year 
dialogue process that led Ford to agree to publicly announce GHG reduction goals for 
their products at the request of shareholders. It should also be noted that the investors 
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filed the same climate resolutions at General Motors in 2007 and 2008. However, a 
withdrawal agreement was not reached at GM in 2008 after dialogue between 
shareholders and the company. General Motors was also placed on the 2009 ―Climate 
Watch List‖ of companies with poor records of addressing climate change before it filed 
for bankruptcy that summer. Throughout the case, prominent U.S. firms (e.g. GM and 
ExxonMobil) serve as shadow comparisons to Ford regarding stakeholder engagement on 
climate change to help flush out the role identity plays in shareholder resolution 
outcomes. 
 
 DATA AND ANALYSIS  
During four months of fieldwork at ICCR during the fall of 2007, I observed Sister Pat 
and ICCR partners drafting the 2008 climate change resolutions for Ford and General 
Motors. During this time, I spoke informally with the shareholders filing the resolutions 
about why they were being filed again and collected background material related to the 
resolutions. I also observed informal interactions between the shareholders and Ford 
managers at ICCR‘s 2007 annual meeting, which brings together religious investors, 
other institutional investors, and corporate managers.  
 
When the resolution was withdrawn by the Sisters of St. Dominic after dialogue with 
Ford in March 2008, I obtained permission from the company and shareholders to 
conduct a formal case study examining how the resolution was successfully negotiated 
and withdrawn. Explanatory single case study designs are well-suited for expanding and 
refining theory (Yin 2003; Weick 2007), which is the goal of this case. Further, the study 
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represents a critical case (Yin 2003: 40) that calls into question traditional theories 
regarding firm-stakeholder relationships (e.g. investor capitalism, greenwashing, etc.) and 
may reveal alternative explanations for firm behavior not generally considered in the 
business literature.  
 
Between July and October 2008, I conducted semi-structured interviews with two of the 
resolution filers, seven mid and upper-level managers at Ford, two former employees in 
Ford‘s Sustainable Business Strategies Division, and one environmental NGO 
representative who participated in the 2008 dialogue. The interviews lasted between 
thirty minutes and four hours, and the median interview length was about one hour.
1
 The 
interviews are supplemented with archival data provided by the shareholders and the 
company, including: filing letters written from shareholders to Ford, email 
communication between shareholders, dialogue meeting agendas, and Ford proxy 
statements.  
 
The interviews with Ford managers were taped, transcribed, and coded using the 
qualitative coding software HyperRESEARCH 2.8. I began my coding using an inductive 
process that permitted codes and categories to emerge from the data (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). My initial coding focused on individual incidents (Charmaz 2006) where 
shareholders and Ford managers interacted in discrete meetings or encounters. Following 
the initial coding, I looked for commonalities across these encounters regarding how 
                                               
1 All interviews with Ford managers were conducted after the U.S. government agreed to provide U.S. 
automakers with $25 billion in loan assistance but before the December 2008 Congressional hearings about 
whether to provide bridge loans to the U.S. auto sector. Ford continued to dialogue with shareholders on 
climate change during this time, and the author was granted access to a phone dialogue between senior 
management and the investors on the company‘s status and strategy on December 10, 2008.   
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different participants described their actions and perceptions of religious investors in 
them. From those subcategories, I identified the identity of the shareholders and the 
firm‘s openness to stakeholders as key categories in the data. I then moved back and forth 
between theories of embeddedness and the categories in my data to understand how 
identity was influencing the relationship between the firm and shareholders. Throughout 
the coding process, I also drew upon knowledge I gained about shareholder-management 
relationships through participant-observation fieldwork and interviews I conducted with 
corporate governance analysts and fiduciary trustees during 2007.  
 
IDENTITY AND EMBEDDEDNESS 
Resonance and Robust Action 
On the surface, it may seem like little more than a small curiosity that a major 
manufacturing firm maintains a particularly close relationship with nuns from New 
Jersey. I argue, however, that this relationship has important theoretical implications for 
how we understand the relationship between embeddedness and identity. Common 
explanations for firm responsiveness to shareholders do not adequately explain the 
outcome of this case. Notably, the Sisters of St. Dominic owned less than 200 shares of 
stock in Ford each time they filed their climate change resolution, meaning that the 
Sisters have a very small investment stake in the firm. And while one of the nuns‘ co-
filers – the State of Connecticut Retirement Fund – owns a larger number of shares, the 
fund is not one of Ford‘s largest shareholders. According to investor capitalism 
explanations of corporate responsiveness to shareholders (Useem 1996), religious 
investors should not be able to influence managers at all given their small number of 
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shares. Furthermore, the resolution filers are not influential members of the local Detroit 
community (Davis and Greve 1997; Marquis 2003; Marquis et al. 2007) or professional 
experts on emissions and automobiles like environmental scientists or engineers. 
 
I discuss the role the filers‘ religious identity played in the investor dialogue at Ford in 
2007 and 2008 below. First, though, I focus attention on how Sister Pat‘s religious 
identity affects the way she is perceived by Ford managers in her roles of shareholder and 
Catholic nun. A comment on levels of analysis is necessary before proceeding. Although 
the case focuses primarily on one individual (Sister Pat), she is more broadly 
representative of the organization ICCR and religious shareholder activists. I include 
references to both Sister Pat and ICCR throughout the case to highlight how the influence 
of religious identity on shareholder-management relationships is applicable at multiple 
levels of analysis. While Sister Pat is the lead filer on climate change resolutions at Ford, 
she is not the only nun or religious investor in the room during dialogues and conference 
calls with the company. And as noted earlier, the firm has also engaged with other 
religious investors from ICCR on a variety of social and environmental issues.  
 
Further, there are many professional religious figures (e.g. nuns, priests, brothers, 
ministers) aside from Sister Pat who maintain longstanding relationships with other large 
U.S. firms in a variety of industries, including retail, discount, and energy companies. 
Another prominent example of a religious professional who engages with U.S. firms is 
Sister Barbara Aires, who has represented the Sisters of Charity in their long-term 
dialogue with Wal-Mart on board diversity and discrimination. Capuchin Brother Mike 
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Crosby also represents a group of Franciscan Friars‘ investment interests in his long-term 
dialogues with a variety of firms and is a founding member of ICCR (ICCR 2009).   
 
Sister Pat and other religious activist investors are many things to many people. They 
maintain relationships with a variety of firms in addition to investor groups like ICCR, 
the Investor Network on Climate Risk, environmental NGOs, and their own local and 
religious communities. At first glance then, Sister Pat and ICCR might appear to be 
perfect examples of multi-vocal actors (Padgett and Ansell 1993; Stark 1996), those with 
―the ability…to participate effectively in multiple kinds of ties with diverse parties‖ 
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2008: 608). Like Cosimo de‘ Medici, Sister Pat interacts with 
many alters who do not know one another and/or do not interact frequently. According to 
Padgett and Ansell (1993), multi-vocal actors have ―Rorschach blot identities, with all 
alters constructing their own distinctive attribution of the identity of the ego‖ (1263).  
 
Possessing a multi-vocal identity is advantageous because it enables one to engage in 
robust action, which entails creating conditions where one can force others to reveal their 
end goals while obscuring one‘s own agenda. The purpose of robust action is to maintain 
the ability to engage in ―flexible opportunism‖ when the winds of fortune change and an 
actor wants to pursue a new strategy to benefit herself (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1263). 
This obfuscation of one‘s true identity and goals were what enabled Cosimo de‘ Medici 
to be perceived as an ally by many groups simultaneously without ever revealing his true 




Unlike Cosimo de‘ Medici, though, Sister Pat is not a ―sphinx‖ whose motives and goals 
are shrouded by compartmentalizing her different identities of investor and nun when 
interacting with different groups. She is quite open about her religious motivations for 
getting involved in shareholder activism. While she acknowledges that her organization 
has an interest in the performance of companies because of their financial stake in them, 
she admits, ―In any conversation with a company…it‘s clear that I‘m there because of a 
faith commitment‖ (quoted in Slater 2007).  
 
Sister Pat possesses a highly resonant (Baron 2004) and authentic identity (Peterson 
1997) by the mere fact of being a nun. Becoming a nun requires an individual to 
internalize a host of religious values (Stryker 1968), and "resonant identities [also] tend 
to be oppositional, defining a collectivity by virtue of its rival standing vis-à-vis another 
(mutually exclusive) identity" (Baron 2004: 11). The identity of ―nun‖ versus ―laity‖ is 
clearly mutually exclusive. Because being a nun is so resonant, Sister Pat‘s religious 
identity defines all of the other roles she plays, including investor. Whereas many mental 
pictures of ―investors‖ are available to most people, only one or two generally come to 
mind when one refers to a nun. This type of identity is sometimes referred to as a ―master 
identity‖ (Charmaz 1994). It is also an identity that has a high degree of authenticity 
(Peterson 1997; Baron 2004) in that becoming a nun requires a serious commitment not 
likely to be pursued by opportunistic women for non-religious ends (at least not in 
modern society). It is also highly unlikely that Dominican nuns‘ or other professional 
religious investors‘ identities will change over time either, which lends them an 
additional degree of authenticity. Unlike other types of environmental and social activists 
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who move frequently between the private, NGO, and government sectors, religious 
investors remain firmly rooted in the religious sphere regardless of the work they do.  
 
As a comparison, consider the difference between religious investors‘ identity and the 
perceived identity of labor union shareholder activists. Despite the fact that both labor 
and religious identities are highly salient to external audiences, a story told at the 2007 
ICCR General Meeting by an ICCR member shows that religious investor activism is 
viewed as more legitimate than union activism in the eyes of at least some firms. At that 
meeting, the member relayed a comment from a CEO at a Fortune 100 company (not 
Ford) who said he appreciated working with ICCR members because he views them as 
―true social advocates…without an agenda.‖ This CEO said he felt like religious 
investors truly care about societal welfare unlike other activist groups that solely 
represent their own interests. Among shareholder activists then, a religious identity, while 
highly resonant, has potentially less constraint placed upon it than a labor identity. While 
unions are viewed as self-interested actors by the CEO mentioned above, religious 
investors are viewed as engaging in activities central to their identity.  
 
Ford’s Identity Orientation 
If the religious identity of investors is the sole explanation for why Ford engages with 
them and agreed to set public GHG reduction goals, then one would also expect most 
other major U.S. firms to engage in dialogue with religious investors in a similar manner. 
As the discussion that follows highlights, however, many firms do not maintain the same 
type of relationship with religious investors as Ford. Thus, religious identity tells only 
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part of the story. This is where the second element of an identity interaction – identity 
orientation – reveals itself as a crucial explanatory element in the case. This section 
shows that Ford‘s evaluation of faith investors‘ actions as legitimate is largely a function 
of the firm having a collectivistic identity orientation (Brickson 2007) toward 
stakeholders. A collectivistic orientation means that a firm views itself as part of a 
common group membership with other stakeholders, whether it is the local community, 
the nation, or even the global community more broadly. Brickson (2005) suggests 
collectivistic organizations are likely to describe themselves as ―community-oriented,‖ 
―promoting a cause,‖ ―politically active,‖ or ―providing a public service‖ (588). This 
orientation toward a larger whole makes Ford both more willing to engage with many 
different types of stakeholders than individualistic firms, and I find it also enables 
managers to relate to and trust the motivations of religious investors.  
 
To illustrate the difference between Ford and less collectivistic firms, we can observe the 
reception religious investors receive at Ford compared to companies like ExxonMobil 
and General Motors. Whereas Ford‘s General Counsel threatened to fire an employee 
who accidentally buzzed Sister Pat to stop while she was speaking at the annual meeting 
one year, shareholders filing climate resolutions at Exxon view it as progress when some 
of the board members simply make eye contact and appear to be listening to them (Slater 
2007). In years past, Sister Pat and her co-filers have been accused at the Exxon annual 
meeting of trying to overthrow the free-enterprise system, and Sister Pat says she ―always 
has a headache leaving that meeting‖ (quoted in Slater 2007).  General Motors, while 
more willing to engage in dialogue with religious investors than Exxon, also approaches 
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its relationship to them in a more arms-length manner than Ford. In my interviews with 
investors who have engaged both Ford and GM on climate change, they noted that Ford 
provides them the opportunity to meet with employees and managers at all levels and in 
all departments of the company, whereas the breadth of interactions at GM is much 
narrower. When I ask shareholders and NGOs about the main differences between the 
two automakers, most cited a difference in organizational culture, which they feel affects 
how the companies approach their relationships with shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
We can also look at management responses to climate change resolutions to see 
differences in orientation toward activist shareholders. For example, although Ford 
recommended that shareholders vote against the 2007 climate resolution, the firm‘s proxy 
response acknowledged their desire to continue dialogue with the proponents. The 
company noted that ―[Ford] has sustained its commitment to engage in a proactive 
relationship with interested parties who have shown a willingness to engage in a 
constructive dialogue on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and will continue this 
engagement as we continue to move beyond dialogue into action‖ (Ford Motor Company 
2007). Among other climate resolutions that have gone to a vote at U.S. companies, few 
if any firms explicitly commit to continued engagement with a specific group of 
shareholders in a proxy statement. The company made a similar commitment in its 2003 





One can contrast Ford‘s proxy statements to Exxon‘s response to shareholders filing 
climate resolutions, which accuses filers of having a political agenda. In 2003, Exxon 
argued that filers were ―[framing] climate change risks and strategies, such as targets and 
emissions trading, from the narrow political perspective of those seeking to encourage 
near-term regulatory controls‖ (ExxonMobil 2003). While language that criticizes 
shareholder activists‘ motives on climate change has diminished in Exxon‘s proxy 
responses since the replacement of Lee Raymond with Rex Tillerson as CEO, Exxon has 
never referenced a desire to engage in dialogue with shareholders on the issue. Rather, all 
of Exxon‘s proxy responses highlight the company‘s scientific and business acumen 
related to climate change compared to shareholder activists.   
 
Returning to Ford‘s approach to stakeholder input, it is also noteworthy that the firm 
engages frequently with a variety of environmental NGOs and has recently put together a 
Transformation Advisory Council (Ford Motor Company 2008), a group comprised of 
high-profile thought leaders on environment and innovation, including Amory Lovins, 
Paul Hawken, and Peter Senge. The interest in engaging with stakeholders extends 
beyond environmental issues as well. In addition to the long-term engagement with ICCR 
members on human rights issues, Ford is the only U.S. automaker currently participating 
in the United Nations Global Compact and the only global automaker asked to participate 
in the UN‘s Global Compact Working Group on business and human rights. How do we 
explain these differences in stakeholder approaches among equally high-profile and 
structurally similar firms? While all of these organizations are in a position of power to 
evaluate whether activist shareholders are conforming to appropriate social codes and 
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determine the worthiness of engaging with them, they make differential assessments of 
faith-based investors. This highlights the acknowledged need for greater understanding of 
how and why similar audience members evaluate the same actor differently (Hsu 2006). 
 
Brickson (2007) finds that firms have a large degree of autonomy to determine their 
orientation to stakeholders and that this orientation is not heavily determined by structural 
characteristics of the firm. It is notable that Ford and General Motors take such a different 
approach to shareholders on climate change, for instance, despite having virtually 
identical market identities (Zuckerman 1999) and being situated in the same geographic 
location (Davis and Greve 1997; Marquis 2003; Marquis et al. 2007).
 2
  Furthermore, if 
anticipation of future climate regulation (Hoffman 2007) fully explains companies‘ 
willingness to engage with shareholders on climate change, one would expect other auto 
industry firms to act in a similar fashion to Ford.  
 
At the time of the resolution, all U.S. auto companies were subject to the same pressures 
from GHG reduction legislation in California. On July 22, 2002, California adopted AB 
1493 (Pavley) that required passenger vehicles to reduce their GHG emissions by 30 
percent by 2016. The automotive industry sued the State of California, claiming that 
Pavley overlapped with the federal government‘s authority to set corporate average fuel 
economy (CAFÉ) gas mileage standards. A federal district court ruled in favor of 
California in December 2007, but the EPA under the Bush administration declined to 
grant California a waiver under the Clean Air Act to regulate tougher emission standards 
                                               
2 This study was conducted before General Motors and Chrysler filed for bankruptcy in 2009, an event that 
has differentiated the market identities of Ford and other U.S. automakers.  
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than established by federal law (the Obama administration set a new federal CAFÉ 
standard in 2009). Unlike General Motors, Ford continued to engage with investors on 
climate change resolutions despite the lawsuit and conflict over the Pavley standards.  
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that Brickson‘s identity orientation concept does 
not require us to intuit that collectivistic organizations will not benefit financially from 
possessing this orientation. Ford might well gain strategic benefits from their openness to 
stakeholder input in the form of new ideas or advance notice on emerging market trends. 
Rather, what is more important for the purposes of this case is whether different 
orientations lead to different relationship outcomes in shareholder-firm interactions. The 
quotes from Ford managers below reflect ―identity-referencing discourse‖ (Whetten 
2006) regarding how managers view the firm‘s orientation to stakeholders. Regardless of 
how loosely or tightly coupled they are to action, these types of statements ―are 
characterized by an imperative tone, associated with commonly understood categorical 
standards" (Whetten 2006: 224) among managers. The following is a representative 
identity statement among the managers I interviewed regarding their view of the 
company‘s values as they relate to sustainability: 
―When you talk about Bill Ford, what his passion is, I think a lot of his passion 
is just driven by the values of the company. And you could go all the way back 
to, not to get too nostalgic, but to Henry Ford and providing affordable 
transportation to the masses…and that is a personal passion of Bill's as well as 
how we continue to provide affordable transportation and do it in a way that 
doesn't impact the environment. And Bill talked about that back in early 2000. 
So that has always been really part of our values in terms of producing products 





In addition to providing insight into how managers see the fit between sustainability and 
the organization‘s identity, the statement highlights how managers tie the values of the 
company as a whole to the values of the Ford family and the firm‘s history. Top 
management support for addressing climate change is clearly part of the explanation for 
why Ford embraces their relationship with religious investors more than some other 
firms. Bill Ford, Jr. has been an institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio 1988; Lounsbury 
and Glynn 2001) on environmental issues at the company, both in his previous role as 
CEO and in his current position as Chairman of the Board. Under his direction, the firm 
produced its first corporate citizenship report in 2000 and wrote the first Climate Risk 
Report among U.S. automakers in 2005. Bill Ford is also publicly known as a lifelong 
environmentalist (Magee 2005; Vlasic 2008).  
 
Further, the idea that founders influence organizational identity and orientation toward 
stakeholders fits well with Whetten‘s (2006) argument that organizations use historical 
frames of reference to justify their actions and express their organizational integrity. The 
case does not attempt to explain either the origins or motivations behind Ford‘s 
collectivistic orientation. Rather, the interest here is on how identity orientation 
influences identity interactions to affect shareholder resolution outcomes on climate 
change. However, the emphasis placed on the Ford family‘s legacy conform to arguments 
that organizational identity is historically imprinted (Stinchcombe 1965), sticky (Scott 
and Lane 2000), and influenced by organizational founders (Carroll 1984; Mackey and 
Whetten 2009). Even research that attempts to move beyond leadership as an explanation 
for firms‘ corporate social responsibility programs acknowledge that founder support for 
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an issue often leads to more effort being invested into it by the firm. Marquis, Glynn, and 
Davis (2007), for example, find this to be the case in Columbus, Ohio, where Wendy‘s 
founder Dave Thomas devoted a large amount of resources toward children‘s needs and 
shaped local corporate giving in the process.  
 
Research conducted on equal opportunity programs in firms has also shown that 
managerial support is one of the biggest predictors of compliance with the law (Edelman 
1992).  In every interview I conducted with Ford managers, Bill Ford‘s support for 
sustainability and corporate citizenship was cited as a key reason why the firm engages 
with activist shareholders. At the same time, receptivity to external stakeholders on the 
part of Ford‘s Sustainable Business Strategies Division employees was also frequently 
noted by managers throughout the company. A top-level Ford manager in a different 
department credited the former and current members of that division for ―knowing how 
to reach out, [knowing] how to work with people on the outside.‖ The first Director of the 
Division (then called the Corporate Governance Office) coordinated a firm-NGO summit 
on the environment with Bill Ford‘s support in 2002, which brought together top leaders 
of environmental NGOs and senior management in Dearborn for a two day discussion 
regarding environmental issues facing the firm and auto industry more broadly. When a 
new Director took over in 2004, employees continued to engage with both more radical, 
campaigning NGOs and shareholder activist groups like ICCR. When asked about the 
Division‘s role in engaging stakeholders, one former Director of the group said:  
―I think Bill Ford provided, even if it most of the time it was in the background, 
that permission space that said yeah, it‘s OK for this group of [Ford employees] 
to actually have these conversations. So that created the space. But I think it was 
the individuals that were in our little shop and the relationships we were able to 
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build up externally that made a big part of that difference. And then to be able to 
translate those conversations back inside and talk to other parts of management 
and say, OK, some of what you‘re hearing out there may sound completely off 




These first and second generation members of the Sustainable Business Strategies team 
can be viewed as ―institutional entrepreneurs‖ (DiMaggio 1988) on climate change issues 
as they engaged in dialogue with external and internal stakeholders on the issue. 
However, supporting the idea that identity and identity orientation are enduring rather 
than transitory attributes of an organization, it is worth noting that openness to 
shareholder input has continued through three shifts in managerial leadership in the 
Division, the most recent of which saw a transfer of leadership from a Director with a 
background in communications to the former chief engineer of the Ford Expedition and 
Navigator programs. The Division has also been placed under new senior management 
leadership with the creation of a Senior Vice President of Sustainability position in 2007 
(also occupied by an engineer) and Alan Mulally‘s replacement of Bill Ford as CEO of 
the company. During the first year of dialogue with the new senior management at Ford 
in 2007, shareholders expressed a lot of uncertainty about whether a process of 
productive engagement would continue at the firm. However, as the discussion of the 
2008 dialogue shows below, these concerns were largely ameliorated after several rounds 
of engagement with the new managers.  
 
CEOs clearly set the tone for many stakeholder relationships, but there are multiple 
centers of decision-making power within top management and the Board of Directors. 
Although Bill Ford is a Ford family member and Chairman of the Board, he does not 
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have carte blanche to implement radical changes in the products the company makes. 
Ford has to obtain sustainability commitments from the rest of the Board of Directors, 
and Sister Pat openly admits that part of her motivation for filing climate resolutions is to 
help Bill Ford keep going back to the Board to tell them shareholders still want more 
action from the company on climate change. Thus, openness to stakeholder input from 
the CEO is certainly a necessary – but not wholly sufficient – condition for a firm‘s 
collectivistic identity orientation. For such an orientation to exist, it must permeate 
throughout the organization and serve as a cognitive template for managers at multiple 
levels of the firm. 
 
Identity Interaction 
This section turns attention to the interaction between Sister Pat‘s religious identity and 
Ford‘s collectivistic orientation (Brickson 2007). Although Sister Pat is operating in the 
role of shareholder through the corporate governance process at Ford, the resonance and 
authenticity of her religious identity places her and the other religious investors in a 
unique category among shareholders at the company. In my interviews with Ford 
managers, interviewees consistently referred to Sister Pat and ICCR as ―shareholders who 
are also stakeholders,‖ and according to managers I interviewed, it is their religious 
identity that makes them special types of both. This unique identity gives Sister Pat 
leverage to continuously challenge the company to do more on climate change without 




First, Sister Pat‘s religious identity affects her legitimacy compared to non-shareholder 
external stakeholders like West Coast environmental NGOs in the eyes of Ford managers. 
Stakeholders are typically divided into the following discrete categories: customers, 
suppliers, employees, shareholders, and community (McVea and Freeman 2005). NGOs 
typically fall into the community category, although community is not limited to the local 
Detroit metropolitan community. Community tends to be a catch-all phrase that includes 
local citizens, local and national NGOs, civic groups, and social movement organizations. 
When applied to large, national NGOs, it is a label that can connote outsider status and a 
hostile approach to firms, such as Rainforest Action Network or Global Exchange 
(Global Exchange 2008). Campaigning organizations are frequently kept at arm‘s length 
from large, publicly traded companies, although as a collectivistic firm, Ford has chosen 
to engage with these groups as well. However, one former manager pointed out that ―a 
completely different set of conversations‖ occur between the company and these 
stakeholders compared to religious investors. The shareholders filing climate resolutions 
work closely with the company on environmental business initiatives and strategies, 
whereas campaigners and the company developed more of a ―tacit agreement to stay in 
touch with each other, to give each other a heads up when we were doing things‖ 
(interview with former Ford manager).   
 
What makes Sister Pat different from activist NGOs – and shareholder activists perceived 
as gadflies (discussed below) – is that managers also view her as a contributing member 
of the Ford Motor Company. One manager even joked that he views Sister Pat as ―part of 
their management team,‖ although he laughed and said she would ―probably cringe‖ if 
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she heard him say that. Her religious identity makes Sister Pat and religious investors 
seem like trustworthy and legitimate groups to bring into the firm for dialogue.  As 
Suchman (1995) notes, ―Audiences perceive the legitimate organization not only as more 
worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy‖ (575). 
One manager acknowledged that his general impression of NGOs can be quite negative, 
but Sister Pat and ICCR are an exception. In his view, ―it‘s hard not to trust nuns, priests, 
and ministers.‖ Sister Pat and the resolution co-filers are clearly distinguished from NGO 
groups by their investor identity as well. As one manager said,  
―They have an interest in our ability to stick around for the long term to address 
the issue where maybe activists aren't as concerned about us sticking around for 
the long term. They just want us to address the problem.‖  
 
This comment highlights the fact that shareholders are a special category of stakeholder, 
particularly those viewed as caring about the company‘s long-term survival. However, 
historical work on shareholder activism shows that companies typically view all 
shareholder activists as nuisances (Talner 1983). This is not the case at Ford, though, 
where religious investors are viewed much more positively than other types of activist 
investors. As an example, one member of Ford‘s in-house counsel relayed a story about 
an individual shareholder activist who exasperates their office with multiple resolutions 
each year. This shareholder circumvents the SEC rule that an investor can only file one 
resolution each year by buying shares for his family and then submitting multiple 
resolutions under different names to the company. The lawyer noted that the resolutions 
are all typed on the same paper with the same formatting and every filer has his family 
name. However, because these resolutions are technically filed by different individuals, 




Given the general disdain of shareholder activists by firms, one might expect religious 
investors to receive a negative reception at Ford because they are violating the social 
codes typically associated with an investor identity. The term ―investor‖ in both 
economics and sociology is primarily associated with a set of social codes related to 
maximizing returns, exercising exit over voice (Hirschman 1970), and passivity over 
activism. What we think of as legitimate or illegitimate investor behavior is still 
dominated by economic rather than sociological categorizations (Schrank 2008), and 
even organizational researchers who use investor organizations as their level of analysis 
tend to contrast activist funds as anomalies to default investor labels such as ―passive,‖ 
―profit-driven,‖ and ―short-term oriented‖ (Davis 1994; Useem 1996). In this case, Ford 
could penalize faith-based investors for violating these investor codes.  
 
Alternatively, if we draw on structural theories from economic sociology, one might 
expect Sister Pat to be penalized for not adhering to a single identity: nun or investor. Her 
investor identity is inseparable from her religious identity, making evaluation of her 
actions more complicated. Complicated identities are generally more difficult for 
audiences to evaluate, though, and Zuckerman (1999) has shown that firms that do not fit 
clearly into one industry category receive negative evaluations from securities analysts. 
Zuckerman et al (2003) also find that young actors experience better labor market 
outcomes by being stereotyped into a single film genre, although veteran actors have 




Unlike veteran actors who successfully switch film genres later in their careers (e.g. Jim 
Carrey or Jamie Foxx), though, faith-based investors do not become uniformly viewed as 
legitimate investors by all firms regardless of the number of years they engage with them. 
As mentioned earlier, faith-based investors engage with some firms for decades without 
reaching successful withdrawal agreements on social and environmental issues. 
According to Brickson (2005, 2007), individualistic firms like these do not value 
interactions with internal or external stakeholders, so they may be more likely to use a 
blunt evaluation process to evaluate religious investor actions. Individualistic firms may 
simply sanction shareholder activists for violating the standard social code of passivity 
associated with a traditional investor identity.  They may either regard a faith-based 
investor like Sister Pat as only a nun and not a real investor or just another shareholder 
activist, neither of which has the skill or legitimacy to raise issues with management. In 
either case, faith-based investors would not be viewed as conforming to the accepted 
social codes of an investor identity by individualistic firms. 
 
More recent work on identity evaluation takes a slightly different view from Zuckerman 
and colleagues regarding the causal mechanisms at work when actors receive negative 
identity sanctions. In their study of eBay auctions and U.S. feature film projects, Hsu et 
al. (2009) argue that ―when audience members value category-specific identities, 
generalists get penalized not because generalization indicates poor skill…but because of 
who they are; less than full members of the category‖ (166). But due its collectivistic 
orientation, Ford does not appear to value category-specific identities as much as other 
firms. Rather, not being full members of a single category works to faith investors‘ 
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advantage when dealing with a firm that possesses a collectivistic orientation. Given their 
openness to many types of stakeholders, collectivistic firms have exposure to many 
different organizations, even those typically viewed as hostile actors to most firms (e.g. 
activist NGOs). By not being viewed as fully part of any one of those groups – while still 
being compared to them – religious investors enjoy what can be thought of as evaluative 
bonus points. Rather than viewing Sister Pat as a ―nun and not an investor‖ or ―a 
shareholder activist and not a proper investor,‖ the firm instead views faith investors as 
―not activist environmental NGOs‖ and ―not illegitimate shareholder activists.‖  
 
By possessing an overarching religious identity, Sister Pat is able to distinguish herself 
from the negative social codes associated with shareholder activists and radical NGO 
identities despite sharing many of the same end-goals with these actors. It is the 
interpretation of her actions through a social lens that changes the evaluation. When 
evaluating Sister Pat‘s actions, Ford places as much emphasis on what she is not as on 
what she is (a nun). Although she is an activist investor, Sister Pat is distinguished by 
Ford managers from the man who files multiple resolutions through his family members. 
To illustrate how this distinction influences the interaction between the company and 
Sister Pat, consider the following statement by a lawyer in Ford‘s General Counsel‘s 
Office: 
 ―Now for something like a substantive violation of an [SEC] rule, I don't have 
to tell [filers] within two weeks. I don't have to tell them at all, actually. I can, 
and sometimes I do…but I don't have to…it depends on our experience with the 
shareholders. For someone like Sister Pat I would, because we have a great 
relationship with her and we want to foster that. It's a beneficial relationship. We 





The discussion above highlights why it is crucial not to overlook the central, enduring 
and distinctive elements (Albert and Whetten 1985) an organization possesses when 
evaluating another actor. Both the internal and evaluative components of identity are 
necessary pieces of the puzzle to explain inter-organizational ties and outcomes resulting 
from those ties. Without accounting for the fact that Ford possesses a collectivistic 
identity orientation toward stakeholders, we would not be able to explain why the firm‘s 
evaluation of faith investors – and decision to interact with them – differs from other 
similar U.S. firms. In this case, identity interactions aid theorizing efforts regarding the 
conditions under which various identities of firms and shareholders will differentially 
affect shareholder resolution outcomes. 
 
Identity Implications: 2008 Dialogue 
The way in which the identity interaction between Ford and religious shareholders 
affected the withdrawal of a resolution is nicely illustrated by the 2008 investor dialogue. 
In December 2007, Sister Pat notified Ford that she was re-filing the GHG reduction 
resolution for Ford‘s 2008 annual meeting. At their first dialogue meeting in February 
2008, Sister Pat told Ford‘s Director of Sustainable Business Strategies that ―there is a 
precedent that Ford is the first one out of the gate on these issues,‖ reminding him of 
Ford‘s public withdrawal from the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) – a business group 
denied climate science and opposed action on climate change – ahead of other U.S. 
automakers in 1999.  In early March, Ford agreed to set a public target that they felt met 
―the intent of the resolution‖ (interview with Ford manager). The target Ford provided to 




The investors wanted external environmental experts to vet the target and weigh in on 
whether it was a legitimate move forward before withdrawing the resolution, though. 
They asked the company for permission to share the proposed target with analysts at the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS). These prominent environmental NGOs have members on the Ceres Board of 
Directors and frequently play an external expert role for investors on environmental 
issues.  
 
Roland Hwang, the senior policy analyst on transportation at NRDC‘s San Francisco 
office, was skeptical when he first heard the target that Ford had set. On December 19, 
2007, President George W. Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act into 
law. This legislation required automakers to increase their fleet-wide corporate average 
fuel economy (CAFÉ) to thirty-five miles per gallon by 2020, including light trucks. 
Hwang said when he heard the Ford target, he immediately thought of the new 
legislation: 
―We turned around and looked at it and said wait a minute. This looks an 
awfully lot like the inverse of the 40 percent increase of going from 25 to 35 
miles per gallon which was just passed into law. So this looks an awful lot like, 
gee, maybe Ford is completely innocent on this but we‘re going to send the 
warning flag up here that at the very minimum the optics of it are that this looks 
like greenwashing…We told Sister Pat Daly, this looks like they‘re basically 
saying they will comply with the bare minimum of the Energy Independence 
and Security Act.‖  
 
Sister Pat took these concerns back to Ford and their management team responded that 
the target was based on in-depth, quantitative scenario analyses the company had been 
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conducting the past two years. The company said the scenario analysis looked at what 
reduction targets Ford would need to set in order to reduce the auto sector‘s contribution 
to GHG emissions and move toward stabilizing CO2 levels at 450 parts per million 
(ppm).
3
 Ford‘s management team wanted the investors and NGOs to look at their analysis 
before dismissing the target as greenwashing when it went public. Ford asked Sister Pat 
to invite NRDC and UCS representatives to review Ford‘s scenario analyses and have a 
conversation about the assumptions Ford used to get the target. When I asked a Ford 
manager whether these NGOs would have been contacted to look at Ford‘s scenario 
analysis independently of the religious investor pressure, the response was ―probably 
not.‖ This manager said, 
―I really do think that Sister Pat was a broker of all this. But having said that, I 
don‘t want to short sell us. I think we‘ve done some pretty incredible stuff 
without Sister Pat, but I do think she was a catalyst. You know what she did? 
She provided us credibility [with the NGOs].‖ 
 
 
Just as Cosimo de‘ Medici‘s sphinx-like identity created brokerage opportunities, Sister 
Pat‘s master religious identity gives her legitimacy to engage with multiple actors as a 
shareholder and a nun. Unlike Cosimo, though, Sister Pat – and ICCR members more 
generally – do not keep their allies separated from one another. Rather, their strategy is to 
act as a broker and bring them together (Obstfeld 2005). In essence, Sister Pat behaves as 
a ―tertius lungens‖ (third who joins) rather than a ―tertius gaudens‖ (third who profits). 
The NGOs had been previously unaware of the scenario analysis being conducted at 
Ford, and after talking to Sister Pat, they agreed to send representatives to meet with the 
                                               
3 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide is the number commonly cited as the concentration needed 
to stabilize global GHG emissions and is used as the stabilization threshold in the UN‘s Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change‘s (IPCC) 2007 Fourth Assessment Report. However, some environmental groups 
and scientists now argue 350 ppm is the number needed to stabilize emissions. 
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company and assess whether the analysis was greenwashing or a good faith effort to 
reduce product emissions. After reviewing the analysis, the NGOs were satisfied enough 
to eliminate their initial concerns about greenwashing: 
―I think it‘s fair to say that our community was convinced that the model they 
built and the analysis they did was…a good faith effort to answer the question of 
what level of fuel economy standards do you need for the auto sector in the U.S. 
to put the U.S. transportation sector on the correct trajectory to achieve…80 
percent reduction scenarios.‖ (Interview with senior analyst at NRDC)  
 
 
During a March 26th conference call between the company and shareholders, NRDC and 
UCS told Sister Pat and Connecticut that Ford‘s scenario analysis represented a good 
faith effort. As a result, Sister Pat agreed to withdraw the 2008 resolution if Connecticut 
would also agree not to renew its own separate 2008 climate resolution. Although Ford 
had gotten the Connecticut resolution omitted by the SEC for being duplicative of 
ICCR‘s resolution, if their resolution was withdrawn, Connecticut‘s would become live 
again. Connecticut‘s separate resolution was part of the reason they were included in the 
dialogue process. After Ford agreed to expand the climate change reporting section of 
their 2008 sustainability report (Ford Motor Company 2008), Connecticut agreed to 
withdraw and Sister Pat sent Ford a letter on March 27, 2008 officially withdrawing the 
resolution. The letter stated: 
―Shareowners are grateful to our colleagues at Ford Motor Company for the 
seriousness in which this request has been received. We appreciate the challenge 
to consider such diverse variables as you chart a business plan to compete in a 
carbon constrained economy, while taking seriously the moral imperative to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As the first company to respond to this 
request by shareholders, I believe that Ford is once again making a significant 
contribution to both the auto industry and other industries in facing the business 





For its part, Ford agreed to include a statement in its annual proxy noting the resolution 
had been filed and successfully withdrawn after dialogue with the shareholders. This is a 
highly unusual action for a firm to take. Almost all resolutions that are withdrawn remain 
out of public view due to confidentiality agreements. In my interviews, Ford managers 
noted the potential risk the company took by including a statement on the withdrawal in 
the proxy. One manager said that the firm really wanted to acknowledge the success of 
this one shareholder resolution with this particular group of investors, but ―Ford didn't 
want the message to go out and have people think that you want to get something 
changed, put a resolution in and the company will change it‖ (interview with Ford 
manager). In the end, the firm acknowledged the productive relationship with the 
shareholders on the issue of climate change but also included language from the 
shareholders complimenting the company on its actions.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Contributions to Identity and Embeddedness Research 
A great deal remains to be unpacked about how identity interactions affect relationships 
between firms and stakeholders – and ultimately, firm behavior. A single case study is 
not sufficient to make generalizations about how different identity orientations affect the 
outcomes of different types of firm/stakeholder interactions. However, the findings here 
strongly suggest that structurally similar firms approach stakeholders with varying 
cognitive orientations and evaluate the legitimacy of stakeholders‘ identities differently. 
This in turn affects whether a firm believes there is merit to fostering a strong 
relationship with a given stakeholder. These facts suggest the need for more process-
147 
 
oriented concepts related to embeddedness – like identity interactions – to account for the 
role of identity in economic relationships. 
 
The case shows that although religious investors‘ engagement with firms takes place in 
an atypical sphere (e.g. the market), and by unconventional methods (e.g. shareholder 
resolutions), Ford does not see their actions as illegitimate. Although they engage with 
one another in an economic setting, the resonance of the religious shareholders‘ social 
identities to managers brings forth notions of societal distinctions that are ―entangled in 
longstanding divisions and sentiments associated with [social] and cultural 
understandings" (Hsu and Hannan 2005: 482). This distinction works to religious 
investors‘ advantage. Churches and religious figures have long played a prominent role in 
civil rights, human rights, and social justice movements, so it does not seem contradictory 
to managers for religious investors to pursue environmental goals in the economic arena. 
As a result, it is easier for Ford to see ―a logic of appropriateness‖ (March and Olsen 
1995) in Sister Pat‘s actions than other stakeholders – such as activist individual investors 
and environmental NGOs – who do not possess identities that are as resonant or authentic 
as a Catholic nun.  Further, the firm trusts the motivations of religious investors more 
than other groups who they believe are acting out of self-interest. As a collectivistic 
organization, Ford also sees itself as a part of and concerned about about the greater 
―collective‖ of society in a manner that parallels religious investors. In this way, there is a 




However, the firm‘s positive evaluation is also a function of its openness to stakeholder 
input more generally. Compared to individualistic firms that do not value stakeholder 
input, I suggest Ford engages in a different evaluation process given its greater variety of 
interactions with diverse stakeholders. Individualistic firms assert that stakeholders 
should not tell them what issues to attend to because their managers will always do what 
is required to make the firm a top performer. In the case of a relationally-oriented firm, 
by contrast, management only responds to stakeholder requests originating from parties 
with whom the firm cares about maintaining a strong relationship (e.g. employees or 
important clients). For example, managers at a relational firm that privileges firm-
employee relations would be more likely to respond to employee demands for firm action 
on climate change than similar requests from shareholders. In contrast, by virtue of their 
openness to a variety of stakeholders, collectivistic firms are more likely to engage in 
more fine-grained evaluations of stakeholder legitimacy based on identity and past 
interactions.  
 
The distinctions managers make among stakeholders at Ford are important ones because 
they suggest that in areas where the firm has discretion over its interactions with them, 
different constraints are placed on different stakeholders based on the legitimacy of their 
identity. While organizational ecologists acknowledge that audiences sometimes enforce 
different types of constraint on actors with the same identity, they argue that ―such 
identities are fragile and are unlikely to be sustained‖ (Polos et al. 2002: 96). As 
demonstrated above, though, religious investors‘ religious identity compensates for many 




Organizational and economic sociologists with an interest in how identity affects 
economic ties should be mindful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater when 
deciding how to conceptualize organizational identity. I argue that new work on the 
evaluative component of identity (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 
2007) should not totally discard the idea that identity is comprised of the central, 
enduring, and distinctive elements of an organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). Rather, 
this new work should be viewed as an extension on previous identity work among 
organizational researchers. The term I introduce in this case – identity interaction – is a 
mechanism that brings this complementarity into relief. On the one hand, an organization 
approached by an external stakeholder will evaluate whether the other entity is a 
legitimate player with whom to engage. On the other hand, the organization‘s own 
identity orientation influences this evaluation and what groups they place in legitimate 
versus illegitimate categories. Organizations with strongly collectivistic identity 
orientations make fine-grained evaluations of stakeholders based on their experiences 
engaging with many different groups. 
 
Understanding the connections between organizational identity and inter-organizational 
relations may put organizational researchers in a "considerably stronger position to 
predict and to understand organizations‘ policies, practices, and behaviors toward 
[stakeholders]" (Brickson 2005: 577). Just as importantly, focusing on identity 
interactions helps researchers bring into relief the social and cognitive underpinnings of 
economic ties. Drawing on the Polanyian tradition that asserts that the economy ―is 
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embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic‖ (250), Krippner 
(2001) has argued that even among economic sociologists, ―the market has tended to 
elude researchers as a sociological object‖ (478). This case study has employed the 
concept of identity interaction in an attempt to bridge the gap between purely structural 
accounts of embeddedness and a more cognitive/cultural analysis of economic ties that 
accounts for identity influences. 
 
Future Directions 
Moving forward, one fruitful extension to this research would be to test the effect of firm 
identity orientation on firm strategies while controlling for shareholders‘ organizational 
identities using a large sample of firms (see Chapter 4). This would provide insight into 
whether a firm‘s degree of individualistic/collectivistic orientation affects the likelihood 
that a climate change (or any shareholder resolution) gets withdrawn before going to a 
vote among shareholders. Conducting longitudinal analysis on identity orientation 
requires finding a proxy measure for the concept, however. While Brickson (2005, 2007) 
surveyed multiple employees in an organization to an aggregate measures of the firm‘s 
identity orientation, this measurement is neither feasible for historical analysis nor 
practical for large-scale studies that demand as little missing data as possible.  
 
I propose that one promising proxy measure of firm identity orientation available to 
researchers is Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini‘s (KLD) corporate rating system (Graves 
and Waddock 1994; Berman et al. 1999; Hillman and Keim 2001; Deckop, Merriman, 
and Gupta 2006; Kacperczyk 2009). KLD is an independent social investment research 
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firm that rates firms on their responsiveness to stakeholders on social and environmental 
issues. The KLD database is considered the gold standard for measuring corporate social 
performance (CSP) in the organizational literature (Waddock 2003).  
 
Many scholars use the KLD rankings to reflect a firm‘s social and environmental 
performance, but others have recently called into question whether the KLD rankings 
actually measure environmental or social performance (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel 
2009). These researchers suggest that most KLD data simply measures positive and 
negative attention to stakeholders rather than any direct impact on stakeholder groups 
(Berman et al. 1999; Hillman and Keim 2001; Kacperczyk 2009). In essence, the KLD 
data captures general receptivity or hostility to different stakeholders (e.g. community, 
employees, customers), making it a useful data source to create proxies for identity 
orientation for large-scale studies on the topic. The KLD ratings are updated annually, so 
they capture changes in firm identity orientation over time. Most KLD ratings of a single 
firm do not change dramatically from year to year, supporting the idea that identity 
orientation is a relatively sticky (Scott and Lane 2000) and enduring construct (Albert 
and Whetten 1985). However, the benefit of this longitudinal database is that it does 
reflect orientation changes when they do occur (e.g. after mergers or other punctuating 
events). 
 
On the other side of the identity interaction, Sister Pat raised the point that there will be 
fewer professional religious women doing shareholder activism work in the future as the 
number of Catholic nuns in the United States continues to decline. Indeed, the ―graying‖ 
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of religious professionals currently engaged in shareholder activism is noticeable at 
ICCR‘s annual meetings.  In our interview, she said she wonders whether the movement 
toward more faith-based institutions doing shareholder activism (e.g. healthcare 
institutions, church board of pensions) will make a difference in how companies view 
faith-based investors. The representatives from these organizations are typically not 
professional religious individuals (i.e. nuns, priests, or ministers). Also, given the rise of 
public pension fund involvement in climate change shareholder activism through Ceres‘ 
Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), it is also unclear whether firms view the 
legitimacy of these new players differently than faith-based investors.  
 
Another question left unanswered in the case is whether the religious affiliations and 
beliefs of mid and top-level managers affects the ways in which they view religious 
investors and whether their religious beliefs differ from managers at other companies that 
choose not to engage with faith-based investors. During the course of my interviews, 
several managers referenced their Catholic backgrounds when discussing their 
interactions with Sister Pat. One individual quipped, ―I was brought up in a good Catholic 
school, so I'm not going to give Sister Pat a hard time.‖ While not uniformly referenced 
across the interviews, these comments emerged often enough in the data to raise some 
interesting questions regarding the effect of religious identification and managerial 
religiosity on firm behavior.  
 
There has been surprisingly little contemporary analysis on how religion manifests itself 
in economic relationships and markets (Fukuyama 2005; although see Weaver and Agle 
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2002; Baker and Forbes 2006). The neglect of religion in economic sociology is all the 
more ironic given that Max Weber‘s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 
1905) is a canonical citation in organizational research and sociology. There are obvious 
challenges to collecting rigorous and accurate data on mid and upper-level managerial 
religiosity, and even more with connecting this data to firm strategies. However, this does 
suggest a ripe opportunity for collaboration between economic sociologists and scholars 
working in the sociology of religion area. Sociology of religion researchers are well-
versed in data collection and survey instrument techniques to obtain measures of 
religiosity, and economic sociologists are well-poised to determine what settings and firm 
strategies are most interesting to examine through a religious lens. There is a lot of 
potential for fascinating empirical work at the intersection of these two research domains.  
 
Finally, contrary to the common economic and sociological conception of ―investors‖ as 
passive, purely profit-oriented, and atomistic, the case finds that Sister Pat‘s economic 
actions are not divorced from her religious identity at collectivistic firms. This suggests 
the need for further work around conceptualizing our notions of ―the investor,‖ a figure 
that has been greatly under-theorized in economic sociology (Preda 2005; Schrank 2008). 
The case also finds that Ford‘s orientation toward stakeholders differs from other 
structurally similar firms in terms of size and industry. Future research on audience 
evaluation of identity can and should include measures that capture differences in identity 
orientation among firms. More broadly, this case demonstrates that economic 
sociologists, regardless of their theoretical and methodological stripes, are well-served by 
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employing identity concepts and variables in their research to gain greater clarity into 
how the social is fused with the economic in market relationships.   
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Research interest in corporate responses to social and environmental issues has grown 
dramatically over the past decade, perhaps best evidenced by the recent publication of an 
academic handbook on the topic (Crane et al. 2008). Explanations for firms‘ willingness 
to engage in corporate social action related to environmental issues range from 
anticipation of future regulation (Hoffman 2007), institutional ownership pressures 
(Johnson and Greening 1999), industry pressure resulting from environmental disasters 
(Hoffman 1999), CEO values (Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld 1999), and greenwashing 
(Lyon and Kim 2006). Perhaps the most researched topic on corporate social action, 
however, has been the link between corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance (Waddock and Graves 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Hillman and 
Keim 2001; Margolis and Walsh 2003). In a recent meta-analysis of the link between 
social and environmental performance, though, Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) 
argue that research in this arena ―should be redirected to better understand why 
companies pursue [corporate social action]‖ (2) rather than just the financial outcomes of 




I propose that management and sociological theories about organizational identity can 
shed some light on why some firms engage in corporate social action. Specifically, this 
study poses the question, ―How does organizational identity affect the likelihood that 
firms and investors reach withdrawal agreements on climate change shareholder 
resolutions?‖ We know from organizational theory that identity affects how firms react to 
external threats or crises (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Elsbach and Kramer 1996).  We 
also know that ―identities situate the organization, group, and person‖ (Albert, Ashforth, 
and Dutton 2000:13), making them a useful vehicle to see how beliefs about the 
legitimacy and value of certain identities affect relational ties between actors. Actors 
involved in inter-organizational relationships constantly evaluate one another‘s behavior 
(Goffman 1959), using identity as a measure of whether another organization‘s actions 
are appropriate (March and Olsen 1995).   
 
Whereas the classical definition of identity in the organizational literature defines identity 
as the ―central, enduring, and distinctive‖ elements of an organization (Albert and 
Whetten 1985; Whetten 2006), organizational ecologists have begun conceptualizing 
identity as "social codes" that are evaluated by audiences (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 
2002). The former places the locus of identity internally whereas ecologists focus 
primarily on external audience evaluations of populations of individuals or organizations. 
Rather than being mutually exclusive, I argue both of these conceptualizations are 
necessary to understand how identity influences stakeholder engagement outcomes 




I introduce the concept of ―identity interaction‖ to reflect the dual ways in which identity 
evaluation by external audiences and internal identity attributes influence inter-
organizational relationships. Identity interactions occur when one organization evaluates 
the identity of another before deciding whether and how to engage in a relationship with 
it. This evaluation is contingent, however, on the firm‘s own orientation toward 
stakeholders (Brickson 2005, 2007). Thus, the identity interaction concept is comprised 
of two components that interact with one another in firm-stakeholders negotiations; the 
stakeholder‘s organizational identity and the firm‘s identity orientation. Stakeholder 
organizational identity refers to the ―central, enduring, and distinctive‖ attributes of an 
organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). In this study, I pay particular attention to 
whether the social identities of one type of stakeholder – shareholder activists – are 
rooted in religion, finance, or special interest areas like the labor and environmental 
movements.  
 
The other component of identity interactions is the identity orientation of firm, which 
captures how firms evaluate the legitimacy of stakeholders‘ social identities and whether 
they want to negotiate with them. Identity orientation is defined as the ―the nature of 
assumed relations between an organization and its stakeholders—are relations 
independent, dyadically interdependent, or derived from a common group membership?‖ 
(Brickson 2005: 577). According to Brickson (2007), firms can be placed in three 
different orientation categories: individualistic, relational, or collectivistic. Organizations 
with each of these orientations approach their relationships with stakeholders differently. 
Whereas an ―individualistic orientation is associated with concern for one‘s own 
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welfare,‖ organizations with relational orientations are ―associated with an emphasis on 
the well-being of particular relationship partners and on maintaining relationships, and a 
collectivistic orientation is associated with a concern for the welfare of the greater group 
as a whole‖ (Brickson 2005, 579). In essence, identity orientation captures how a firm 
approaches its relationships to different stakeholders. It also captures heterogeneity 
among firm evaluation of stakeholders and corrects for a tendency in organizational 
ecology research on identity to assume that all audience members (i.e. firms) evaluate the 
same stakeholders in the same way (Polos et al. 2002).  
 
While acknowledging the three identity orientations are ideal types and recognizing that 
hybrids also exist, the labels provide a starting point from which to consider why there is 
variation in the approach firms take in their relationships with stakeholders. 
Individualistic organizations are primarily concerned about their own welfare, whereas 
collectivistic organizations prioritize the welfare of a larger group in stakeholder 
interactions, which they often conceptualize as ―community‖ or ―society‖ (Brickson 
2005). Hence, firms with different orientations evaluate different stakeholders using 
different lenses and likely have different dialogue outcomes with shareholders on climate 
change shareholder resolutions.  
 
The study builds on the Ford Motor Company case study outlined in the previous chapter, 
where I found the withdrawal of a climate change resolution was facilitated by the 
shareholders‘ religious social identity and Ford‘s collectivistic identity orientation 
(Brickson 2005, 2007). Ford displayed openness to many different types of stakeholders, 
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but its view of religious stakeholders as especially trustworthy and rightly motivated 
created a quicker withdrawal agreement on a contentious climate resolution than one 
would normally expect. This paper attempts to generalize those findings by analyzing 
what factors influence the likelihood that climate change shareholders resolutions will be 
successfully withdrawn using a dataset of U.S. resolutions filed from 2002 to 2009.  
 
There are three organizational identity variables of interest in the study. First, in line with 
organizational ecologists, I test whether the legitimacy of the resolution filers‘ identities 
affect how firms respond to their resolution requests. Second, I turn attention to the firm‘s 
identity and test whether Brickson‘s notion of firm identity orientation impacts the 
likelihood of withdrawal. Finally, I test whether an ―identity interaction‖ between the 
filer‘s identity and firm‘s identity orientation explains different firm responses to 
shareholder activism on climate change.  
 
The article makes contributions to both the organizational identity and the business 
literature on corporate social action and stakeholder engagement. In regard to research on 
organizational identity, it is the first study that tests the explanatory power of different 
identity theories, specifically theories from traditional management literature (Albert and 
Whetten 1985; Brickson 2005, 2007; Whetten 2006) and organizational ecology (Polos et 
al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll 2007; Hsu 2006; Hsu, 
Hannan, and Kocak 2009). Despite the potential to inform one another, these two 





The study is also motivated by the lack of attention paid to stakeholder-firm interactions 
in studies of corporate responses to stakeholder demands, particularly how identity 
impacts the outcomes of these interactions. The study builds on an earlier longitudinal 
study by Eesley and Lennox (2006) that examined how stakeholder legitimacy and power 
interacted with a firm‘s power (measured as firm assets) to influence the outcome of 600 
environmental conflicts between firms and external stakeholders in the U.S.  However, 
while that study focused attention on how financial resources of firms and stakeholders 
influence conflict outcomes, I extend their study a step further by attending to how 
identity influences firm-stakeholder interactions. In this way, the study answers the call 
by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) for researchers to attend more to why firms 
pursue corporate social action rather than whether it enhances their financial performance 
(or vice versa). As Eesley and Lenox (2006) note, large-scale statistical analyses of 
―which stakeholder influences matter to managers and to which stakeholders firms are 
likely to respond‖ are few and far between in the business literature (766). This study 
addresses those questions directly.  
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
The shareholder resolution process provides the empirical setting for this article. Under 
Rule 14-a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, any shareholder owning at least 
$2,000 of stock in a company has the right to file an advisory shareholder resolution at 
publicly-traded U.S. firms. Shareholder resolutions are non-binding advisory proposals 
regarding corporate governance or social and environmental issues. They are included in 
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a firm‘s proxy statement and are voted upon by all shareholders. The proposals must be 
under five hundred words in length, and each one ends with a ―resolved‖ clause asking 
the firm to take a given action (e.g. separate C.E.O. and chairman roles, report on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions).  
 
Firms can respond to shareholder resolutions in four ways. First, a firm can choose to 
engage in shareholder dialogue with the resolution filer and reach an agreement for 
withdrawal. Shareholders generally withdraw resolutions from the ballot if they hold 
closed-door dialogue meetings with firm managers who agree to take action on the issue 
outlined in the resolution. In the case of climate change resolutions, withdrawal 
agreements are generally reached when firms agree to disclose their GHG emissions or 
set voluntary GHG reduction targets. Alternatively, a firm can ignore the resolution and 
allow all shareholders to vote on its merits. With few exceptions, shareholder proposals 
that go to a vote are opposed by management, and the company will include a ―no‖ vote 
recommendation on the proposal in their proxy statement.  
 
Third, firms can petition the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to exclude 
shareholder resolutions from the proxy ballot. The SEC will permit the company to omit 
a resolution if it rules the issue to be a personal grievance or part of ―ordinary business.‖ 
Finally, a firm can decline to enter into dialogue with shareholders but still disclose their 
GHG emissions or set voluntary targets. Recent studies of corporate responses to climate 
change have examined what factors affect whether firms disclose their emissions through 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a voluntary reporting structure (Reid and Toffel 
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2009; H. Buhr and K. Buhr 2010). The relationship between climate change resolutions 
and firm GHG disclosure is not entirely clear, though. Using 2006-2007 data, Reid and 
Toffel (2009) found that S&P 500 firms targeted by climate resolutions or in industries 
where peer firms are targeted are more likely to disclose their GHG emissions, although 
Buhr and Buhr (2010) did not find a significant effect on firm reporting from shareholder 
resolutions for S&P 500 firms in 2008.  
 
Regardless of whether a resolution is withdrawn through dialogue, the shareholder 
resolution process requires repeated interactions between firm managers and 
shareholders. Many resolution proponents file the same or multiple resolutions with firms 
for many years, and because a firm is not required by law to engage in closed-door 
dialogue with shareholders to resolve resolution demands, these resolutions provide an 
ideal empirical setting to explore the impact of organizational identity on shareholder 
dialogue outcomes. In essence, shareholder dialogue is a type of ―private politics,‖ which 
Baron (2003) defines as ―situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on 
law or government‖ (31).  
 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Filer Identity 
Investors who file shareholder resolutions are not homogenous actors, and the population 
of shareholder activists has shifted significantly since the 1990s. Historically, shareholder 
activists were comprised of primarily three groups; religious investors, individual 
investors, and special interest investors. Modern shareholder activism was spearheaded 
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by individuals and groups with explicit social concerns such as employment 
discrimination and apartheid in South Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Among firms 
and shareholder activists, names like the Gilbert Brothers, Saul Alinsky and Evelyn Davis 
are viewed with disdain by the former and reverence by the latter (Talner 1983). The 
Medical Committee on Human Rights‘ landmark 1968 resolution against Dow 
Chemical‘s production of napalm is perhaps the most famous historical example of a 
special interest group using the proxy ballot to further a social goal. In that case, the 
Committee said the firm faced significant reputational risks from producing napalm when 
the human consequences of napalm on humans became publicized by journalists during 
the Vietnam War. 
 
The types of investors who engage in shareholder activism have expanded over the last 
several decades, however, and now include the old guard of shareholder activists (i.e. 
religious investors) as well as more mainstream investors. Following the Enron scandal in 
2001 and continuing through the current financial crisis, institutional investors – 
particularly public pension funds – have been paying greater attention to governance 
issues at firms whose stock they own (Cogan 2006). There has been a similar rise in 
investor interest in climate change. For example, the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(INCR) – a network of institutional investors that considers financial risks and 
opportunities related to climate change – has grown from ten public pension funds and 
state treasurers managing $600 billion in assets in 2003 to over 90 members managing 
almost $10 trillion in 2010. And while the majority of climate resolutions were filed by 
religious and environmental groups in the 1990s, the 2000s marked the entry of public 
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Given that institutional investors filing climate resolutions have different organizational 
identities, it is reasonable to assume that their relevant audience (Polos et al. 2002) – 
large U.S. firms – do not view them as homogeneous actors. In a large-scale study of 
shareholder resolutions, for example, David, Bloom, and Hillman (2007) find that firms 
are more likely to negotiate resolution withdrawals with investors associated with 
established shareholder organizations like the Council on Institutional Investors (CII) and 
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). Other studies on shareholder 
proposals have come to similar conclusions (Gordon and Pound 1993). 
 
The assumption that different types of shareholders are viewed more/less favorably by 
firms is also supported by evidence in the Ford Motor Company case study outlined in 
the previous chapter. Current and previous Ford managers openly acknowledged that they 
hold different views of different types of shareholder activists. The shorthand Ford 
managers often use is ―East Coast and West Coast‖ to distinguish among those NGOs 
they feel are ―solutions-based‖ (East Coast) and those that are more likely to launch 
negative campaigns against the company (West Coast). One manager went so far as to 
even note differences in the way these two groups dressed when visiting with top-level 
managers. The East Coast NGOs tend to wear suits and whereas the West Coast are 
generally more ―California causal.‖ In this domain as well, the East Coast NGOs were 
                                               
4 As a note of interest, Loyola University of Chicago became the first U.S. university to file a climate 
change resolution in 2010 with JPMorgan Chase.  
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better matched with Ford‘s corporate culture than the West Coast organizations. In the 
world of shareholder activism, professional investors like public pension funds act and 
dress like the ―East Coast‖ while special interests investors like individuals and 
environmental groups are viewed as more ―West Coast.‖ 
 
The above suggests that a shareholder‘s legitimacy matters to firms. Legitimacy, defined 
as the ―assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions‖ 
(Suchman 1995: 574) is strongly tied to organizational identity. Thus, how the firm 
perceives the identity of the filer likely affects whether a resolution withdrawal 
agreement is reached. Eesley and Lennox (2006) use a rank ordering from public opinion 
surveys to define stakeholder legitimacy in their study of environmental conflict between 
firms and stakeholders. Given that it is the firm‘s perception of the stakeholders‘ 
legitimacy and not the general public‘s that matters in firm-stakeholder conflicts, though, 
I do not consider this an appropriate measure of stakeholder legitimacy in shareholder 
resolution conflicts.  
 
Rather, I hypothesize that the social legitimacy of religious figures and financial 
legitimacy of professional investors as compared to special interest investors will make 
firms less willing to reach withdrawal agreements with special interest investors like 
unions or environmental NGOs than other investors. Drawing on the studies outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, one can infer that religious investors gain legitimate 
status from firms given their ―selfless motives‖ and long-term engagement with 
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companies on both social and environmental issues. Secular professional investors, on the 
other hand, likely gain legitimacy vis-à-vis their identity as profit-driven investors 
executing their fiduciary duties of responsibility. Both are likely advantaged over special 
interest investors in shareholder resolution disputes, as firms presume these investor 
groups are representing the interests of their own members (e.g. labor or 
environmentalists) rather than looking out for the best interest of society or the 
company‘s bottom line.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (filer identity) – Resolutions filed by special interest groups are less likely 
to be withdrawn than those filed by religious or secular professional investors. 
 
Identity Orientation 
A limitation of Hypothesis 1 is that it does not account for differences among firms 
themselves that may influence how they evaluate shareholder activists. As recent work in  
organizational research has acknowledged (Hsu et al. 2009; King, Felin, and Whetten 
2010), one of the most pressing needs in identity research is to ―consider heterogeneity 
within an audience‖ (Hsu et al. 2009: 167) and understand the drivers behind their 
differential evaluations of a single actor – shareholders in this case. In their study of firm 
responses to secondary stakeholders on environmental issues, Eesley and Lenox (2006) 
also find that ―stakeholder power is less a stakeholder attribute than an attribute of a 
stakeholder–firm pair" (767). As an example, they discuss how the saliency of 
environmental NGO‘s request for a firm to stop emitting pollutants into a river will 
depend on the stakeholder‘s attributes but also ―the nature of the request, and the 
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attributes of the targeted firm‖ (767).  While they focus on whether financial differences 
between firm and stakeholder affect the outcomes of their conflicts, I focus on whether 
identity and legitimacy affect firm-shareholder resolution outcomes.  
 
However, evaluation of shareholder legitimacy likely differs among different firms. As 
King et al (2010) have recently reminded organizational theory scholars, ―an actor-
focused perspective [on organizations] implies that there are differences between 
organizations and these differences manifest themselves not just between different types 
of organizations…but also within seemingly similar organizational populations‖ (300). 
To address identity heterogeneity among S&P 500 firms, I employ Brickson‘s (Brickson 
2005, 2007) identity orientation constructs. Brickson suggests that her three ideal types of 
identity orientation – collectivistic, individualistic, and relational – are often visible in 
identity statements made by organization members. Firm characterizations like ―‗the top 
performer in the industry‘ (individualistic), ‗accommodating and loyal to partners‘ 
(relational), and ‗promoting the ecological sustainability of the earth‘ (collectivistic) [all] 
reveal a different assumed nature of relations with stakeholders‖ (Brickson 2005: 577). 
These ideal types are drawn from the social psychology literature on how ―other-
regarding‖ individuals are (Brewer and Gardner 1996), and the orientations are assumed 
to impact relational patterns between an actor and others.  
 
I focus first on firms with collectivistic orientations. Members of collectivistic 
organizations ―view the organization as part of a larger collective and as characterized by 
traits that connect it to a larger whole…[their] emphasis is on maximizing the welfare of 
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the larger group‖ (Brickson 2005, 580). In the case of collectivistic organizations then, 
one would expect them to be more likely to withdraw climate resolutions with all 
shareholder activists compared to individualistic firms because of their higher concern for 
broader society and their belief that they have responsibilities to the collective 
community. As a result, collectivistic firms are the most likely of the three types to work 
with diverse stakeholder groups toward a common goal that may or may not be related to 
the organization‘s bottom line. Thus, I hypothesize collectivistic firms are more willing 
than less collectivistic firms to negotiate climate resolution withdrawals with investor 
regardless of the identity of the investor filing the resolutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (collectivistic identity orientation) – Resolutions filed at firms with 
collectivistic identity orientations are more likely to be withdrawn than firms with less 
collectivistic identity orientations.  
 
The Ford Motor Company – a firm that scores high on the collectivistic orientation 
measure used in this study – provides additional evidence to support this hypothesis in 
Chapter 3. Despite having more positive feelings toward certain stakeholders (i.e. 
religious investors), Ford differs from other large firms by engaging with all stakeholders, 
including special interest groups like Rainforest Action Network and other environmental 
NGOs. The firm has also put together a Transformation Advisory Council (Ford Motor 
Company 2008) to advise management on sustainability issues comprised of high-profile 
sustainability leaders like Amory Lovins, Paul Hawken, and Peter Senge. These actions 





However, one of the acknowledged limitations of the Ford case study is its single-case 
design and focus on a firm with a very strong collectivistic identity orientation. From the 
case, one is unable to determine whether firms that have more neutral or negative 
orientations toward their communities respond to shareholders filing climate resolutions 
differently. Organizational researchers (Albert and Whetten 1985; Gioia and Thomas 
1996; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Foreman and Whetten 2002) often contrast firm 
behavior among firms holding ―utilitarian identities emphasizing economic factors such 
as profit maximization (individualistic) and normative identities emphasizing ideological 
factors like advancing broader welfare (collectivistic)‖ (Brickson 2005: 579). In contrast 
to collectivistic firms that see themselves as part of a community, Brickson‘s typology 
suggests individualistic firms value traits that set them apart from others, including: 
autonomy, creativity, innovation, and even greed (Brickson 2005: 599). As a result, I also 
expect more individualistic firms will be less likely to reach withdrawal agreements with 
all shareholders than less individualistic firms.  
 
Identity Interaction 
I also take organizational ecologists‘ assumptions about audiences and Brickson‘s 
identity orientation concepts one step further and hypothesize there is also an identity 
interaction between a firm‘s identity orientation and the filer‘s identity. Identity 
interactions occur when one organization evaluates the identity of another before 
deciding whether and how to engage in a relationship with it. This evaluation is 
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contingent, however, on the former‘s own cognitive identity orientation (Brickson 2005, 
2007) toward stakeholders. The purpose of this concept is to bridge the divide between 
identity definitions used by management theorists (Albert and Whetten 1985) and 
organizational ecologists (Hannan et al. 2007). Eesley and Lennox (2006) also suggest 
that a ―stakeholder–request–firm triplet" is a better predictor of stakeholder-firm 
outcomes rather than any one of the variables in isolation. 
 
In this study, I hold the request constant by only examining climate change shareholder 
resolutions. To build my hypotheses about how collectivistic firms will respond to 
different types of shareholders filing climate resolutions, I again draw upon the findings 
in Eesley and Lennox‘s (2006) study of environmental stakeholder conflicts with U.S. 
firms as well as the Ford case study and fieldwork with institutional investors outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3 to inform my hypotheses. Eesley and Lennox operationalized 
stakeholder group legitimacy using a ranking from a public opinion poll on 
environmental actors, and surprisingly, they found that as legitimacy increased, 
successful resolution of environmental conflicts with firms decreased. Religious investors 
were rated as relatively illegitimate actors in their measure, however, and the authors 
acknowledged this operationalization was not ideal since firms may view stakeholder 
legitimacy differently based on their firsthand experiences with them. 
 
Compared to the general public, I also believe some firms may view religious groups as 
more legitimate than other shareholder activists in climate resolution conflicts, but I 
hypothesize there will be evaluation differences among firms with different identity 
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orientations. Specifically, I expect collectivistic firms are more likely to reach 
withdrawals with religious investors compared to professional or special interest groups. 
Since collectivistic firms view themselves as being part of – and responsible to – a larger 
collective, they are likely to view religious investors as sharing similar goals with the 
firm (i.e. helping society) and possessing the ―purest motivations‖ for engaging in climate 
change activism. As a result, they may trust these investors more than institutional 
investors representing labor, environmental groups, or political interests.  
 
This hypothesis is also supported by the findings from the Ford case study in Chapter 3. 
In the case, for example, a Ford manager said his general impression of activists can be 
quite negative, but religious investors are an exception. In his view, ―it‘s hard not to trust 
nuns, priests, and ministers.‖ Firm managers frequently cited this identity-based trust of 
religious investors as a reason for allowing the investors access to top-level management 
and confidential information, which facilitated the climate resolution withdrawal at Ford.  
If we assume that collectivistic firms are more likely to reach withdrawals with investors 
whose identities ―match‖ or ―fit‖ with their own identity orientations, then it is reasonable 
to hypothesize religious investors will be more likely to reach withdrawal agreements 
with these firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (collectivistic interaction) – Resolutions filed by religious investors are 
more likely to be withdrawn at collectivistic firms than at non-collectivistic firms relative 




Predicting how individualistic firms will respond to different types of shareholders is 
more difficult. On the one hand, one could predict reticence on the part of individualistic 
firms to engage with any stakeholder unless the encounter serves a purely instrumental 
purpose (e.g. supplier who gives the best price). In the case of institutional investors then, 
one would expect individualistic firms to be more willing to negotiate withdrawal 
agreements with investors who make a strong business case for addressing climate 
change. Whereas the emphasis of a collectivistic organization is on ―maximizing the 
welfare of the larger group (e.g., promoting the well-being of the Madison community),‖ 
at an individualistic firm, ―the emphasis is on maximizing the organization‘s own welfare 
(e.g., status)‖ or profits (Brickson 2005: 580). 
 
From Chapter 2 of this dissertation on logic work, we know that professional investors 
like public pension funds, foundations, and mutual funds frame their decisions to engage 
in climate change shareholder activism based solely on the financial risks and 
opportunities presented by the issue. Compared to religious and special interest investors, 
these groups exclusively employ their fiduciary identity to justify their shareholder 
activism on climate change with firm managers. As one public pension fund manager in 
the Midwest colorfully puts it, ―OK, we're polluting the atmosphere, what does that mean 
to our portfolio…we're not statutorily or fiducially charged with saving the earth.‖ Thus, 
individualistic firms may be more likely to negotiate withdrawal agreements with secular 
professional investors, as these investors are the most likely to make a purely economic 
argument for addressing climate change to the firm. This fits with Brickson‘s notion that 
individualistic firms are most attuned to maximizing their own welfare. Additionally, the 
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absence of social or moral arguments from these investors make them appear more 
similar to individualistic firms. These investors may have more successful engagements 
based on the good identity match or ―fit‖ between their organizational identities.  
 
Hypothesis 4a (individualistic interaction) – Resolutions filed by secular professional 
investors at firms with individualistic identity orientations versus non-individualistic 
firms are more likely to be withdrawn than those filed by religious and special interest 
groups.  
 
There is another possibility, however. Other organizational theories suggest 
individualistic firms might be more willing to negotiate climate change withdrawals with 
religious and special interest group than secular professional investors. In a theoretical 
article on stakeholder theory and the firm, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) suggest that 
firms are responsive to stakeholders based on a combination of stakeholder legitimacy, 
power, and urgency. Therefore, a firm‘s view of shareholder legitimacy could work in the 
opposite way as hypothesized above. Drawing on institutional theory, one could 
hypothesize that individualistic firms will be less likely to reach withdrawals with 
professional investors because the firm is sanctioning them for violating isomorphic 
norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) of investor passivity and pure profit motives in the 
financial field (Preda 2005; Schrank 2008).  
 
Whereas individualistic firms are well-accustomed to getting pressure on social and 
environment issues from religious and special interest groups, they may view 
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professional investors like public pension funds as ―rogue‖ investors. Both Davis and 
Thompson (1994) and Romano (2001) find that public pension fund fiduciaries are often 
elected public officials who engage in shareholder activism for political gain. If the 
individualistic firm perceives a political motive on the part of professional investors, they 
may be less willing to negotiate with them. Here the mechanism driving the firm‘s 
response is not an ―identity match‖ between the firm but whether the firm‘s 
individualistic orientation causes it to view the most financially legitimate shareholder 
activist as violating their investor identity codes. Regardless of whether the interaction is 
positive or negative, I expect a differential response to shareholder requests filed by 
professional versus religious or special interest investors at individualistic firms.  
 
Hypothesis 4b (individualistic interaction) – Resolutions filed by secular professional 
investors at firms with individualistic identity orientations versus non-individualistic 
firms are less likely to be withdrawn than those filed by religious and special interest 
groups.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
I obtained data on all climate change shareholder resolutions filed at S&P 500 firms from 
2002-2009 from RiskMetrics Group, a financial risk management and proxy research 
firm, and publicly available data from the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(www.incr.com). The data includes 232 resolutions filed at 113 companies from 2002-
2009. Forty-seven percent of resolutions (N=109) were withdrawn before going to a vote, 
and 53 percent (N=123) were not withdrawn. Of the 123 resolutions not withdrawn, 30 
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were omitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after being challenged 
by firms and 93 went to a final vote.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of interest is a binary indicator reflecting whether a climate 
change resolution is withdrawn or not. A withdrawal indicates that the firm and the 
shareholders were able to reach a negotiated agreement behind closed doors prior to the 
resolution going to a vote among all shareholders or being challenged at the SEC. From 
the shareholder perspective, it is viewed as a successful outcome in the shareholder 
resolution process. Two important notes are necessary to make before proceeding, 
however. First, not all S&P 500 firms receive climate change resolutions. This raises a 
serious concern about sample selection bias in the study (Berk 1983). To address the 
possibility of selection bias, I also run a Heckman two-stage selection model using data 
collected on all S&P 500 firms (N=4055) from 2002-2009. The rationale for using this 
model and the results are described in the statistical model section below. Second, some 
firms receive more than one resolution in a given year so I cluster the observations by 




To test Hypothesis 1 that predicts shareholder identity will affect the likelihood that a 
climate resolution is successfully withdrawn, I create shareholder identity dummy 
variables for different types of resolution filers. The RiskMetrics database identifies 
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seven categories of investors: religious investors, public pension funds, individuals, 
foundations, unions, socially responsible (SRI) funds, and special interest groups (e.g. 
environmental groups). I combine these filer identifications into three identity categories 
based on differences in how they perceive their own organizational identities and how 
their identities are perceived by firms and other stakeholders. The three categories 
include the following groupings: secular professional investors (pension funds, SRI 
funds, foundations), religious investors, and a combined category for special interest 
investors (unions, individuals, and special interest/environmental groups).  
 
The shareholder identity categories were chosen based on the study of institutional 
investors outlined in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. That study found that the groups of 
investors above differ in the way they talk about climate change (e.g. as a moral issue or 
fiduciary duty), the shareholder activism tactics they believe are appropriate for their 
organization (e.g. creating climate change proxy guidelines versus filing large numbers of 
resolutions), and how firms view them (e.g. as adversaries or good-faith partners). 
Through my fieldwork, I also found that these different groups of investors differ in their 
manner of dress, language style, and demeanor toward firm managers. The follow-up 
case study on Ford Motor Company‘s engagement with shareholders revealed that these 
identity differences are also salient to the companies who receive shareholder resolutions. 
One Ford manager quipped that Sister Pat is a ―part of their management team,‖ and a 
member of General Counsel noted that unlike other shareholders, religious investors are 




Hypotheses 2a and 2b test whether a firm‘s identity orientation toward stakeholders also 
affects whether a resolution withdrawal will be reached. The variable firm identity 
orientation captures a firm‘s openness to stakeholders (Brickson 2005, 2007). While 
Brickson (2005, 2007) uses survey responses from multiple organizational members to 
measure identity orientation, this type of measure is not feasible to collect for a 
longitudinal study. Further, methodological questions also arise about who has the 
authority to represent the organization‘s identity orientation and whether all levels of the 
organization are represented in these measures. Finally, collecting this data requires 
participation from all firms in the relevant sample (i.e. to administer the survey) and low 
response rates make this measure difficult to use for even large-scale cross-sectional tests 
of the identity orientation construct.  
 
As an alternative, I use measures of firm attention to stakeholders in the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Socrates database as a proxy measure of identity 
orientation. KLD is an independent investment research firm that specializes in 
measuring U.S. firms‘ environmental and social performance. KLD uses publicly 
available information to evaluate firm strengths and weaknesses on the following issues: 
community, diversity, human rights, environment, employees, products, corporate 
governance, and controversial business issues (e.g. gambling, tobacco, weapons).
5
 The 
KLD database is considered the gold standard for measuring corporate social 
performance in the organizational literature (Waddock 2003).  
 
                                               




However, while KLD refers to their evaluations as ―social rankings‖ and some scholars 
use the rankings to measure corporate social and environmental performance, others have 
called into question whether KLD rankings actually measure social and environmental 
performance. Aside from finding the KLD environmental weaknesses category does a 
relatively good job at capturing past environmental performance (Chatterji, Levine, and 
Toffel 2009), there is little evidence that other KLD indicators are a good measure of 
social performance. The Chatterji et al (2009) study, for example, found that the KLD 
environmental strength measures do not correlate with pollution levels or compliance 
violations. The caution raised by this study is familiar ground for economic sociologists 
who have long acknowledged firms‘ ability to decouple their actions from impacts 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
 
Recognizing this limitation of the KLD data, organizational researchers have begun 
suggesting that KLD‘s social rankings are best interpreted as a measure of attention to 
stakeholders (Berman et al. 1999; Hillman and Keim 2001; Mattingly and Berman 2006; 
Kacperczyk 2009) rather than social performance. Mitnick (2000) puts it best, saying that 
one must make a ―critical distinction‖ between social performance and social action. He 
argues that ―outcomes (impacts) are not at all the same thing as outputs (activities)‖ 
(426). Further, using KLD data as a measure of corporate social performance (CSP), 
David, Bloom and Hillman (2007) find that firms who reach withdrawal agreements with 
shareholders on social and environmental shareholder resolutions do not see 
improvement in their subsequent KLD scores. Although that study‘s use of the KLD data 
is methodologically flawed (discussed below), it does suggest the KLD measures are 
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more appropriately employed as measures of attention – or identity orientation – to 
different types of stakeholders than as performance indicators. 
 
To measure a firm‘s collectivistic identity orientation, I create a composite score for 
collectivistic orientation using the KLD total community strength score for each firm. 
Unlike some of the other categories in the KLD data that have merged or changed over 
time, the sub-categories under the community category have been consistently collected 
during the 2002-2009 time period of my study. Firms have scores ranging from zero to 
four in the community strength data, with zero representing a firm that has no strengths in 
its approach toward its community and a four showing a highly proactive and positive 
approach to its community. Firms get strength points in community sub-categories such 
as generous and innovative charitable giving, volunteer programs, support for housing 
and education, etc.  
 
I also construct a variable for individualistic identity orientation using the KLD total 
community weaknesses variable. This variable ranges from zero (no weaknesses) to a 
score of two (more negative toward the community). Firms get points for community 
weaknesses based on activities like having a negative economic impact on the 
community, tax disputes, and investment controversies. In essence, this variable measures 
how hostile a firm is toward the local community or communities where it does business. 
Since over 60 percent of firms receive a score of zero on the community weaknesses 
variable, I treat it as a binary indicator. For robustness, I also run models treating the 
variable as ordinal and get the same results. Each of the KLD variables is lagged one 
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year. Before proceeding, it is also worth noting the KLD variables are relatively 
conservative estimates of identity orientation. KLD analysts who assign the scores have 
to reach a relatively high bar to assign a strength or weakness point to firms on a given 
issue. For this reason, the negative community scores in particular are a robust indicator 
of an individualistic orientation in that only firms that are most visibly hostile in their 
approach to external stakeholders receive points in this category.  
 
Given that KLD has strength and weakness scores for each stakeholder category, at first 
glance it might seem attractive to simply subtract community weaknesses from strengths 
to get a continuum measure of a firm‘s orientation toward community stakeholders. 
Indeed, it is common practice by some researchers to aggregate ―strengths‖ and 
―concerns‖ in the KLD data to  get a single measure (Graves and Waddock 1994; Griffin 
and Mahon 1997; Waddock and Graves 1997; Johnson and Greening 1999; Ruf et al. 
2001; David et al. 2007). However,  Mattingly and Berman (2006) have shown that 
subtracting KLD community weaknesses from strengths is problematic. Using an 
exploratory factor analysis, they find that the two categories ―are both empirically and 
conceptually distinct constructs and should not be combined in future research‖ (20). 
Furthermore, ―aggregation might cloak important differences: a firm with five KLD 
strengths and five KLD concerns is surely different from a firm with only one of each, a 
distinction lost in the summing of strengths and concerns.‖ (Chatterji et al. 2009: 134). 





Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning that Brickson (Brickson 2005, 2007) includes a 
third ideal-type identity orientation in her theoretical framework. She refers to ―relational 
firms‖ as those that champion their relationships with valued internal stakeholder groups 
(e.g. employees and clients) above everything else. These relationships are more than just 
means-end interactions for relational firms, and they expend effort to nurture them 
beyond what one would expect from a neo-classical economic perspective. Shareholders, 
as owners of the firm, are by definition internal stakeholders. However, shareholder 
activists violate the norms of passivity and anonymity among shareholders (Preda 2005; 
Schrank 2008), making it difficult to hypothesize how a firm‘s relational orientation will 
impact its response to climate change resolutions. Hence, my hypotheses focus on 
individualistic and collectivistic orientations. However, I included a KLD measure for 
firms‘ positive and negative orientation toward employees and diversity as measures of 
relational orientation in early exploratory models for the study. Neither variable was 
significant nor improved model fit, so I exclude them from the models reported here.  
 
Control Variables 
To capture the impact of public, highly salient punctuating events (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993) on climate resolution withdrawals, I include dummy variables for resolutions 
filed pre-2006, between 2006 and 2007, and 2008 to 2009. These divisions mark the time 
before Hurricane Katrina and the release of Al Gore‘s climate change documentary An 
Inconvenient Truth in 2005, as well as the shareholder resolution period following the 
2008 U.S. Presidential primary elections when both the Republican and Democratic 
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candidates – John McCain and Barack Obama – publicly stated support for some kind of 
federal climate legislation.  
 
There is also some evidence that institutional investor pressure may affect firm behavior 
on environmental and social governance issues (David et al. 2007; Kacperczyk 2009; 
Reid and Toffel 2009). To control for this influence, I calculate the percentage of firm 
shares owned by U.S. and Canadian investors who are signatories to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP). The CDP sends out an annual letter to large U.S. and 
international firms on behalf of over 534 institutional investors holding $64 trillion in 
assets, requesting that firms disclose all of their GHG emissions. Ownership data for U.S. 
and Canadian investors was collected from Thomson Financial and then divided by the 
total number of common shares outstanding listed in Compustat. The variable is lagged 
one year, and following Reid and Toffel (2009), I top-code the variable at the 95
th
 
percentile of the distribution (31.9 percent ownership stake) to reduce the effect of 
outliers on the results.  
 
I also control for firm size, firm performance, industry emissions intensity, firm 
environmental performance, and stringency of the resolution. Firm size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of sales. Firm size has been shown to predict whether a company 
receives a shareholder resolution (Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves 2004), and Margolis et 
al‘s (2009) meta-analysis finds that financial performance is a better predictor of 
corporate social action than vice versa. Performance captures the amount of 
organizational slack (Cyert and March 1963; Thompson 1967) a company has to address 
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issues that management views as peripheral to core operations. Following Kacperczyk 
(2009), it is measured here by return on assets (measured as the ratio of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets). Both of these 
measures are drawn from Compustat and lagged one year to establish temporal priority.  
 
To measure industry effects on climate resolution withdrawals, I use Reid and Toffel‘s 
(2009) binary classification for emissions-intensive (EI) industries. Following Cho and 
Patten (2007), they code firms as 1 if they are in Auto and Transport, Integrated Oils, 
Utilities, and other Energy sectors. Firms in Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Financial Services, Health Care, Materials and Processing, Producer Durables, 
Technology and other sectors are coded as 0. Firm environmental performance is 
measured by a count measure using the KLD total environmental weaknesses score, 
which Chatterji et al (2009) find accurately captures past environmental performance.  
 
Finally, the stringency of the climate resolution is a binary variable reflecting whether the 
resolution asks the firm for a report on how it will respond to climate change or whether 
it requests the firm take more aggressive action (e.g. invest in renewable energy R&D, set 
voluntary emission reduction targets). Tkac (2006) argues that the stringency of a 
shareholder request impacts a firm‘s response to the resolution, and while this is a 
seemingly obvious and important control variable, its absence is noticeable in prior 
research on shareholder resolutions. Although some studies account for resolutions 
targeting different issues like equal opportunity for employees versus human rights 
(Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner 1996; Graves and Waddock 1994; David et al. 2007), 
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almost none of these studies have accounted for variations in the stringency of the actions 
requested in the resolution (although see Gordon and Pound 1993 for an exception). This 
is a particularly serious omission, as the greenwashing literature has shown that firms are 
more willing to take symbolic environmental actions (Lyon and Kim 2006) compared to 
more serious commitments like setting voluntary GHG reduction targets.  
 
Statistical Model 
The dependent variable of interest is whether a climate resolution gets withdrawn, but 
there is a potential problem with selection bias given that not all S&P 500 firms receive 
shareholder resolutions on climate change (Rehbein et al. 2004). The firms that receive 
the resolutions may differ in significant ways from those that do not (Heckman 1979; 
Berk 1983), so if selection bias exists in the data, the estimators will be biased. Previous 
studies on shareholder resolutions have either neglected the issue of selection bias 
completely (Gordon and Pound 1993; Wahal 1996; David et al. 2007), simply compared 
variables from firms receiving shareholder resolutions to industry means (Strickland et al. 
1996), or matched targeted and non-targeted firms based only on market capitalization 
(Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling 1996).  
 
A more rigorous approach is taken here. To assess potential selection bias, I collected 
financial and climate change resolution data on all S&P 500 firms from 2002-2009. 
Using this data, I ran a two-stage Heckman selection model to determine whether there 
was selection bias in my models. The variables I chose for the selection model included 
all relevant firm characteristics that might make it a target to investors, including: firm 
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size, financial performance, environmental performance, and whether the firm is in an 
emissions-intensive industry. I also included a variable reflecting the percentage of shares 
owned by CDP signatories to capture any possible investor strategies to target firms with 
high levels of CDP signatory ownership.  
 
Because the results from Heckman models are highly sensitive to model specification, I 
ran a variety of models including different combinations of the variables listed above in 
the selection model. In every combination I used, the correlation value between the first 
and second stages of the Heckman model (rho-value) was close to zero, indicating 
selection bias is not an issue in the data. Therefore, for ease of interpretation and 
presentation, I report the results from bivariate logistic regression models here using only 
data from firms who receive resolutions. These models and the second-stage of the 
Heckman model produce the same overall results.
6
 As a further robustness check, I also 
ran a bivariate probit model and got the same results. The logistic regression model is as 
follows:  
 
Pr(yit = 1) = F(β1Sit + β2Cit + β3Iit +  β4Uist + β5Xit + εi) 
 
where i indexes firms, t indexes the year, and yit is the dependent variable climate 
resolution withdrawal equal to 1 if a resolution is withdrawn and 0 otherwise. The 
explanatory variables that measure the effects of organizational identity are shareholder 
filer identity (Sit), the company‘s collectivistic identity orientation (Cit), and the firm‘s 
individualistic identity orientation (Iit). The vector of control variables, Xit, includes firm 
                                               
6 The Heckman model results are available upon request from the author.  
195 
 
environmental performance, firm financial performance, log net sales, percent of shares 
held by CDP investors, industry emission intensity, and stringency of the climate 
resolution request. Because some firms receive more than one resolution per year, the 
observations are not statistically independent. To correct for this problem, I compute 
robust standard errors by clustering the observations by firm (Mizruchi and Stearns 2001; 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all of the variables in 
models. Given the possible multicollinearity problems among the environmental 
performance, emissions intensive (EI) industry, and firm size variables, I regress the 
variables on withdrawal status and get a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 2.04. 
This is below the commonly accepted threshold of ten. However, the VIF for 
environmental performance is 4.12 and 2.90 and 2.46 for firm size and EI industry, 
causing some concern about multicollinearity between the negative environmental 
performance and the other two variables. When I remove the firm size and EI industry 
variables individually and together from the models, however, the results do not change. 
Thus, to be conservative, I leave the firm size and EI industry variables in the models.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the results from logistic regression models and Wald chi-square 
goodness of fit tests. Table 2 presents results for Hypotheses 2 and 3 that suggest firm 
collectivistic identity orientation affects the probability of climate resolution withdrawals. 
                                               




Surprisingly, I do not find support for Hypothesis 2 that strongly collectivistic firms are 
more likely to reach resolution withdrawals or that there is an interaction between 
collectivistic firms and the identity of the filers (Hypothesis 3). Neither the main effect of 
collectivistic identity orientation nor the interaction effect is significant in any of the 
models. These findings conflict with Brickson‘s (2005, 2007) identity orientation theory 
and my findings from the Ford Motor Company case study, which I discuss in detail in 
the discussion section below.   
 
Thus, I turn attention to the results in Tables 3 and 4 that examine whether filer identity 
affects resolution withdrawal and whether there is an interaction between a firm‘s 
individualistic identity orientation and filer identity. Table 3 uses professional investors 
as the reference category to test Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b. However,  to test Hypothesis 1 
about filer identity, I need to use special interest investors as the reference category. I 
show this model in Table 4. From Table 4, we can see that climate resolutions filed by 
special interest investors are less likely to be withdrawn than those filed by professional 
or religious investors, supporting Hypothesis 1. When I convert the logistic coefficients 
for the dummy variables ―religious‖ and ―professional‖ to odds ratios in Model 1 of 
Table 4, I find that resolutions filed by religious or professional investors both have about 
5.6 times the odds of being withdrawn compared to special interest groups.  
 
Support for Hypothesis 1 provides evidence that the audience evaluating investors – U.S. 
firms – view religious and secular professional investors (e.g. public pension funds, 
mutual funds) as more legitimate actors in shareholder negotiations. This seems to 
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provide support for organizational ecologists‘ conceptualization of identity as an 
―evaluation of social codes‖ (Polos et al 2002; Hannan et al 2007). Interestingly, 
however, religious and professional identities seem to be viewed as equally legitimate 
among firms. This provides support for the idea that religious investors‘ seemingly 
―selfless motivations‖ and public pension funds‘ emphasis on ―fiduciary duty‖ and 
―financial risk‖ make firms more willing to negotiate with them than special interest 
investors who appear to companies to be out for themselves. As a robustness check, I also 
ran the models with a variable for the number of times an investor had filed a climate 
resolution at the firm previously to capture the length of relationship between managers 
and particular shareholders. The variable was not significant and did not change the filer 
identity effect.  
 
Returning to Table 3, I find that a firm‘s individualistic orientation negatively affects the 
probability of resolution withdrawal in Model 1, but once I control for firm 
characteristics in Model 2, the effect is no longer significant. Thus, just as collectivistic 
orientations do not appear to positively influence the probability of withdrawals, I do not 
find evidence that an individualistic orientation negatively influences the probability of 
withdrawal agreements.  
 
Among the two competing hypotheses that individualistic firms will be more/less willing 
to reach withdrawals with professional investors (Hypotheses 4a and 4b), I find support 
for 4b that individualistic firms are less likely to reach withdrawals with professional 
investors compared to religious investors in Model 4 of Table 3. Given the complexity of 
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interpreting interaction effects, I provide the predicted probabilities of withdrawal for the 
different types of filers in a bar chart in Figure 4.1.  
 
From this bar chart, one can see that the predicted probability of withdrawal among 
professional and religious investors is the same among firms that do not have strong 
individualistic identity orientations, but firms with individualistic orientations are much 
less likely to reach withdrawals with professional investors. Although not quite 
significant at the .10 level (p = .102), the interaction effect for special interest investors 
shows that the predicted probability of withdrawal between professional and special 
interest investors at individualistic firms is almost the same. The implications of these 
findings are discussed below. The Wald test for the full model with the interaction versus 
the model without the interaction approaches significance at the .05 level (p = .067). 
Given the small sample size in the study and smaller number of special interest filers 
compared to religious and professional investors, I attribute this marginal significance to 
lack of statistical power rather than a non-significant effect.  
 
Finally, Model 4 in Table 3 also shows that as environmental performance worsens, the 
odds of getting a withdrawal decrease. When I convert the logistic coefficient for 
‗Negative Environmental Performance‖ in Model 4 to an odds ratio, I find that for every 
one unit increase in poor environmental performance, the odds of a withdrawal decrease 
by 35 percent. Not surprisingly, resolutions that ask for more than disclosure or reporting 
also have a significant negative effect on the probability of resolution withdrawal. When 
converted to an odds ratio, the ―More than Disclosure‖ variable in Model 4 of Table 3 
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shows that a resolution asking a firm to do more than simply report their GHG emissions 
or how they will deal with pressure to address climate change has only 38 percent the 
odds of withdrawal as a resolution that asks for reporting only. This finding is especially 
significant given that few prior studies of shareholder resolution withdrawals have 
included this variable. It suggests that most shareholder resolution research suffers from 
serious omitted variable bias, and the results of these studies must be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
Also, although it is only statistically significant at the .10 level, the number of shares held 
by CDP signatories has a negative effect on probability of resolution withdrawal rather 
than an expected positive effect. Thus, it does not appear that institutional investor 
pressure – in line with theories of investor capitalism (Useem 1996) – are driving firm 
decisions to reach withdrawal agreements on shareholder resolutions. The time period 
following the 2008 U.S. presidential primaries is also a significant predictor of 
withdrawal at the .01 level in Model 4, showing that the odds of a resolution withdrawal 
increased by a factor of 2.82 following the 2008 U.S. presidential primaries compared to 
2002-2005. This provides support for including dummies for societal punctuating events 
rather than just year dummies. In early models (not reported here), I also ran the models 
with year dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity. None of the year dummies 





Given that neither collectivistic nor individualistic identity orientations had a significant 
effect on the probability of climate resolution withdrawal (Hypotheses 2), one may 
question whether Brickson‘s (2005, 2007) identity orientation theory holds up 
empirically. As a main effect, Brickson‘s theory that the identity orientation of a firm 
affects dialogue outcomes with stakeholders is not borne out in this study. This finding 
should be interpreted with some caution, however, given the limited dataset and 
substantive focus on a very specific conflict (i.e. climate change). It is possible that there 
is something about climate change as a stakeholder issue that makes identity orientation 
less influential in firm-stakeholder interactions, although comparison studies using other 
types of shareholder resolutions would have to be conducted to confirm or reject this 
idea. It is also possible that the KLD measures of identity orientation used in the study 
are simply not refined enough to capture the effect of identity orientation on firm-
stakeholder negotiation outcomes. Rather than rejecting Brickson‘s theory outright, I 
suggest additional research with more precise measures is needed to definitively reject or 
support the identity orientation theory. Some ideas about identity orientation measures 
that future research might use are discussed below.  
 
The finding that collectivistic identity orientation does not have a main effect or 
interaction effect with filer identity also calls into question the previous chapter‘s 
findings regarding Ford Motor Company‘s successful climate negotiation with religious 
investors. In the case study, I found that the shareholders‘ religious identity and the firm‘s 
collectivistic identity orientation facilitated dialogue and the successful withdrawal of a 
climate resolution at the firm. Interviews with Ford managers revealed that the 
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shareholders‘ religious identity gave them legitimacy with managers that other 
organizations and investors campaigning for climate action did not possess. As one might 
expect from a collectivist firm that views itself as part of a larger collective, the firm‘s 
managers engage with a wide range of stakeholders on contentious issues, including 
hostile groups. However, Ford managers were quick to point out that the firm has ―a 
completely different set of conversations‖ with religious investors than more hostile 
investors or NGO groups (interview with Ford manager).  
 
These in-depth dialogues with religious investors lead to more collaborative interactions 
between the two groups and even led the firm to allow a less trusted group of 
environmental NGOs to vet the firm‘s GHG reduction targets at the request of investors. 
In essence, the investors‘ religious identity provided them legitimacy at the firm and 
facilitated the climate resolution withdrawal agreement. For Ford and religious investors 
then, the shareholder dialogue process was an ―equilibrium private institution‖ of 
repeated rounds where ―both the activist and the firm must continue to participate even 
when incidents occur that suggest the standard might have been violated‖ (Baron 2003: 
62). 
 
Despite the results of this study, the Ford case study findings on identity interactions are 
still compelling and deserve further inquiry. It is important to note that Ford is an outlier 
firm in regard to its collectivistic identity orientation compared to other firms. In the time 
period during which the Ford case study was conducted, the firm had the highest KLD 
community strength score of all firms in the dataset (and no community weaknesses). It 
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may be the case that identity interactions for collectivistic firms are only influential in 
climate change dialogues at firms with extremely collectivistic orientations. Miles (1987), 
for example, has found that insurance firms‘ social action is heavily influenced by ―top 
managers‘ philosophies‖ using a grounded theory approach, similar to the findings 
regarding the Ford family‘s strong influence on the firm‘s collectivistic orientation in my 
case study. Bill Ford, Jr. has been an institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio 1988; 
Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) on social and environmental issues at the company, and 
under his direction, the firm produced its first corporate citizenship report in 2000 and 
wrote the first Climate Risk Report among U.S. automakers in 2005. This suggests that 
future work using larger datasets than available for this study should look at whether 
firms with extremely high scores for collectivistic orientations react to shareholder 
resolutions differently than those with marginally collectivistic or neutral orientations.  
 
I now turn attention to the significant findings in the study, namely, Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 4b. I return to Mitchell, Agle and Wood‘s (1997) theory that firm 
responsiveness to stakeholders is based on a combination of stakeholder legitimacy, 
power, and urgency. This study holds urgency constant by examining the same tactic 
across all shareholders (e.g. climate resolutions), which has confounded interpretation in 
previous studies (Eesley and Lenox 2006). Support for Hypothesis 1 confirms Mitchell et 
al‘s theory that stakeholder legitimacy affects their interactions with firms. In this case, 
the illegitimacy of special interest investors in the eyes of the audience evaluating them 
(i.e. firms) decreases the odds that such investors will successfully negotiate climate 




Hypothesis 1 also partially confirms organizational ecology theory that audiences 
sanction organizations for violating social codes associated with their identity. In 
comparison to professional secular investors who frame their shareholder activism as 
being profit-motivated and part of their fiduciary duty to pension benefit members, 
special interest investors are likely viewed as pursuing social or political ends, and thus 
violate the social codes of an investor identity (Polos et al. 2002; Hannan et al. 2007) in 
the eyes of firms. However, organizational ecologists might have a harder time 
explaining why religious investors do not suffer the same negative evaluation as special 
interest investors despite sharing similar social and moral motivations.  
 
One explanation might be that while religious investors also violate investor codes of 
passivity and pure profit motive (Preda 2005; Schrank 2008), they might benefit from 
having an especially socially legitimate religious identity that is both highly salient 
(Baron 2004) and authentic (Peterson 1997). In this case, firms may prioritize their 
religious identity over their investor identity, and view religious investors as ―good-faith‖ 
actors (no pun intended!) in the shareholder dialogue process. Among shareholder 
activists then, religious investors appear to have less constraint placed upon them than 
special interest investors who possess similar social goals to religious investors but 
possess a less legitimate identity in the eyes of firms.  
 
The most interesting finding in the chapter, however, is that individualistic firms are 
significantly more likely to negotiate climate resolution withdrawals with religious 
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investors than secular professional investors and almost equally likely to reach 
withdrawals with professional and special interest investors. These results support 
Hypothesis 4b that there is a negative identity interaction between firms with 
individualistic orientations and professional filers. Interpreting the causal mechanism 
behind the identity interaction is more challenging, however. On the one hand, one can 
interpret the finding based on theories of legitimacy and identity sanctioning mentioned 
at the beginning of the paper. From this perspective, one would argue that the results 
show individualistic firms are sanctioning professional investors for violating investor 
social codes (Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2007) of passivity 
and profit maximization by engaging in shareholder activism for political gain or 
ideological reasons (Davis and Thompson 1994; Romano 2001).  
 
Whereas individualistic firms expect morally and ideologically motivated shareholder 
activism from religious and special interest investors, they do not view such activism by 
professional investors as acceptable. And in the case of religious investors, individualistic 
firms appear to find less fault with their identity and motivations, hence their greater 
likelihood of reaching withdrawal agreements with them than either professional or 
special interest investors. This interpretation supports the quote in Chapter 2 from a CEO 
at a highly individualistic Fortune 100 company. He said he appreciates working with 
religious investors because he views them as ―true social advocates…without an agenda.‖ 
 
However, one cannot ignore the fact that power is also a part of Mitchell et al‘s 
stakeholder framework. Using the lens of resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 
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1978), an alternative explanation for Hypothesis 4b is that individualistic firms respond 
more favorably to resolutions filed by religious and special interest investors due to 
power dynamics rather than identity sanctioning. First, one could interpret individualistic 
firms‘ responsiveness to religious investors as an effort at co-optation (Selznick 1949). 
Religious investors from ICCR engage with firms over long periods of time and 
frequently engage firms on multiple social and environmental issues, not just climate 
change. ICCR member investors who champion different issues at the same firm (e.g. 
climate change and human rights) meet with some firms as a group to discuss all of the 
issues at one time.  
 
One reading of individualistic firms‘ greater responsiveness to religious investors on 
climate is that they make a tacit exchange on climate change for temporary relief from 
shareholder pressure on issues like human rights. This might be a particularly attractive 
option if the company is already considering doing GHG reporting in anticipation of 
future federal cap and trade legislation so they can get early credit for their efforts to 
reduce emissions. On the flip side, any firm that has dealt with religious investors on 
social and environmental issues knows they are not easily dissuaded from pursuing 
resolution to all the issues they put in front of a firm. It would not be an overstatement to 
say ICCR member investors wear their dogged persistence and indefatigability as a badge 
of honor. As the ICCR Executive Director Laura Berry recently quipped in a New York 
Times story on religious investors, ―We may be annoying. We may be trivialized. But we 
do our homework, and we don‘t go away‖ (Haberman 2010). Teasing the causal 
mechanism at work in dialogues between individualistic firms and shareholders will 
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require more ethnographic and case study work on individualistic firms, where access 
may be more difficult – although not impossible – for social science researchers to attain 
(see Hoffman 1996 as an example).  
 
In regard to special interest investors, the mechanism at work might be slightly different. 
Individualistic firms may view special interest groups as more of a threat to their public 
reputation than professional investors. Whereas it is highly unlikely the State Treasurer of 
Connecticut is going to hang banners from office buildings of large U.S. banks for their 
lending practices to coal companies, Rainforest Action Network (RAN) has no qualms 
taking such action (Rainforest Action Network 2010). This type of negative publicity 
provides a reputational threat to individualistic firms and may make them more willing to 
negotiate with special interest investors who engage in actions like RAN or partner with 
organizations that do even if the firm dislikes them. In both the cases, special interest and 
religious investors have resources at their disposal that professional investors do not 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Unlike Eesley and Lenox‘s (2006) suggestion, though, the 
resources that matter the most would appear to be political rather than financial.    
 
Whether legitimacy or power is the primary driver of individualistic firms‘ actions cannot 
be definitively determined by this study, and furthermore, Mitchell, Agle and Wood 
(1997) argue it is always a combination of both. More case study and large-N research is 
needed to more definitively establish the relative influence of causal mechanisms 
explored here. What both the legitimacy and power interpretations suggest, though, is 
that any study of the outcomes of firm-stakeholder relationships should account for how 
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identity attributes of audience members (i.e. firms) and the actors they evaluate (e.g. 
shareholders) interact to produce different outcomes.  
 
Future Research 
As noted above, there are some limitations to the KLD data that suggest the need for 
additional research to confirm and/or refine the findings from this study and the Ford 
Motor company case study. While KLD is arguably the most comprehensive measure of 
corporate social attention available – and certainly the most widely employed by 
organizational researchers (Waddock 2003) – it has also been critiqued on various fronts. 
One of the greatest limitations of the KLD data is that its measures of corporate social 
action sacrifice depth for breadth of coverage. The sub-categories for positive and 
negative action in the KLD data are broad and assignment of positive/negative points is 
done in a relatively conservative fashion.  
 
Another KLD weakness is that the data does not enable researchers to create a scale 
measure of most individualistic to most collectivistic firms by subtracting community 
strengths from weaknesses (Mattingly and Berman 2006), although researchers continue 
to use this faulty measurement (David et al. 2007). The KLD strength and weakness 
measures capture different constructs, and the correlation between the positive and 
negative KLD community measures is actually positive. This means that some firms 
possess both indicators of collectivistic and individualistic orientations. Brickson (2005, 
2007) finds that many firms possess hybrid versions of collectivistic, individualistic, and 
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relational identity orientations, so this positive correlation may simply reflect hybrid 
orientations at organizations.  
 
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that KLD‘s negative community measures 
are simply a better indicator of individualistic identity orientations than positive 
community measures are of collectivistic orientations. It may be the case that firms have 
more incentives to ―fake‖ a collectivistic than an individualistic orientation because the 
former is viewed more positively by external stakeholders than the latter (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Without delving deep inside an organization – like the Ford case study in 
Chapter 3, it might be easier to capture individualistic orientations at large U.S. firms 
using standardized measures like the KLD indicators than collectivistic ones. 
Additionally, the KLD data ranks all community strength and weakness subcategories 
equally, so it is not possible to determine which subcategories have a larger influence on 
firms. The best one can do with the KLD data is control for the countervailing effects of 
collectivism at individualistic firms and vice versa.  
 
Indeed, organizational researchers who study environmental and social governance will 
benefit greatly from more fine-grained measures of firm identity orientation than are 
currently available through KLD and measures that are more amenable to large-scale 
studies than Brickson‘s self-reported survey measures. In regard to the KLD data, new 
social and environmental governance databases like the Innovest iRatings from 
RiskMetrics Group may be promising. Innovest is a relatively new social scoring system 
for large, publicly traded firms, and its construct validity has not yet been vetted by 
209 
 
academic researchers. Although it cannot be used to do historical analysis of identity 
orientation, it may prove useful for cross-sectional studies now and longitudinal studies 
moving forward. It is also a helpful comparison data source to benchmark the construct 
validity of KLD‘s measurements.  
 
And since survey measures – like those used by Brickson (2005, 2007) – are unlikely to 
yield high enough response rates from S&P 500 firms to do the type of analysis 
conducted in this study, future researchers in the identity stream might task themselves 
with developing rigorous, standardized measures for identity orientation based on firms‘ 
public statements and disclosures that solve some of the scale weaknesses in the KLD 
data. This type of measure would also avoid the problem of having to determine who in 
the organization best reflects firm identity orientation given that perceptions of 
organizational identity have been shown to vary widely among employees at different 
levels of the organization (King et al. 2010). Regardless of how future work on identity 
and identity interactions proceeds, though, it is clear that researchers interested in 
corporate social action have only scratched the surface in considering how identity affects 
the outcomes of firm-stakeholder conflicts. There are many promising theoretical and 
empirical directions for future research in this area.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study has aimed to contribute to organizational identity and stakeholder theory in the 
business management literature. The study finds evidence that the audience evaluating 
investors – U.S. firms – view religious and secular professional investors as conforming 
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appropriately to their identities in shareholder negotiations (Polos et al 2002; Hannan et 
al 2007). The findings also suggest that heterogeneous audience members (i.e. firms) 
reward and sanction stakeholders differently based on their identity orientation. 
Individualistic firms are more likely to reach climate withdrawal agreements with 
religious investors than professional or special interest investors. These results highlight 
the need for organizational researchers – and particularly organizational ecologists 
(Hannan et al. 2007; Hsu et al 2009) – to pay greater attention to how identity 
heterogeneity among firms may affect their evaluations of whether other organizations 
are violating or conforming to the social codes associated with their identity.  
 
The study also provides some interesting insights for stakeholder theory in the business 
literature. Rather than attending to the over-studied question of whether corporate social 
action creates better financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2003), the study is one 
of the first to focuses explicit attention on possible motivations behind firm responses to 
stakeholder requests on climate change. With her identity orientation constructs, Brickson 
(2007) provides us with a set of motivational assumptions that she argues will create a 
more balanced view of the firm. She suggests the identity orientation framework is 
―perfectly positioned to inform how businesses relate to stakeholders and why they relate 
to them as they do‖ (Brickson 2007: 865). King et al (2010) endorse this perspective as 
well, arguing that motivational differences are such ―that decision-making criteria [will] 
vary greatly across organizations‖ (300). Within the stakeholder and corporate 
responsibility literature, Eesley and Lennox (2006) have also made similar calls for more 
large-scale studies on how firm and stakeholder characteristics interact in corporate 
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governance conflicts like the ones on climate change examined here. While a main effect 
for identity orientation on the likelihood of a climate resolution withdrawal was not found 
in the study, the results suggest firm identity orientation interacts with stakeholder 
identity, warranting further investigation of both identity orientation and identity 
interactions. 
 
Understanding firm motivations also has implications for those in the camp who believe 
the sole responsibility of business is to increase its profits (Friedman 1970) and those in 
the stakeholder theory camp who do not (Freeman 1984). For those who believe 
corporate social responsibility is inappropriate, understanding firms‘ motivations will 
provide a better gauge of whether managers are acting as responsible agents to their 
principals (i.e. shareholders). For those who believe firms have responsibility to society, 
the study suggests that if shareholders are dealing with an individualistic firm, it is 
potentially more effective to send in actors who can play ―good cop‖ and ―bad cop‖ 
simultaneously (i.e. religious investors).  
 
This raises larger questions about the role of the corporation in society as well. In a recent 
essay, Reich (2008) has roundly criticized the notion that we can or should rely on 
corporations to solve social and environmental problems. In his view, resolving social 
and environmental issues through ―private politics‖ (Baron 2003) rather than through the 
democratic process will continue to fall short of protecting societal interests. Whether this 
criticism is valid or not, the scope of issues being raised and addressed through corporate 
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rather than public governance structures continues to expand. As a result, research into 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Individualistic 0.392 0.489 0.00 1.00 1.00
(2) Collectivistic 0.784 1.187 0.00 4.00 0.31 1.00
(3) Neg Environ Perform 2.022 1.836 0.00 5.00 0.49 0.31 1.00
(4) Firm Perform 0.136 0.101 -0.32 0.36 0.32 0.08 0.36 1.00
(5) Firm Size 10.045 1.608 6.81 12.96 0.48 0.56 0.67 0.29 1.00
(6) EI Industry 0.642 0.480 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.06 0.71 0.36 0.28 1.00
(7) Owned by CDP Signatories (%) 1.601 0.836 0.50 3.19 -0.24 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.08 -0.19 1.00





Table 2 - Estimated Effects of Collectivistic Identity Orientation on Climate Change Resolution
Withdrawal at U.S. Companies (Logistic Regression Models)
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4
                              coef. coef. coef. coef.
 (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.)
Post-Katrina 0.116 0.116 0.642 0.644
                              (0.411) (0.485) (0.565) (0.553)
Post-Presidential Primary -0.316 -0.081 0.971 + 0.964 +
                              (0.346) (0.365) (0.580) (0.572)
Filertype: Religious† -0.225 0.177 0.398 0.564
(0.322) (0.325) (0.347) (0.413)
Filertype: Special Interest† -1.533 ** -1.324 * -1.191 * -1.247 +
                              (0.507) (0.544) (0.563) (0.676)
Collectivistic                -0.131 0.096 0.081 0.233
                              (0.113) (0.135) (0.131) (0.205)
Individualistic               -0.682 * -0.329 -0.315 -0.313
                              (0.289) (0.348) (0.348) (0.349)
Neg Environ Perform           -0.36 * -0.403 ** -0.394 **
                              (0.146) (0.148) (0.151)
Firm Perform                  2.562 + 1.711 1.887
                              (1.528) (1.480) (1.558)
Firm Size                     -0.193 -0.151 -0.161
                              (0.148) (0.144) (0.143)
Emission Intensive Industry 0.53 0.585 0.603
                              (0.502) (0.517) (0.516)
Owned by CDP Signatories (%)  -0.469 + -0.462 +
                              (0.252) (0.251)
More than Disclosure          -0.923 * -0.884 *
                              (0.464) (0.446)
Religious*Collectivistic -0.263
                              (0.289)
Special Interest*Collectivistic -0.054
                              (0.425)
Constant                      0.595 * 1.982 2.093 + 2.057 +
                              (0.295) (1.319) (1.227) (1.216)
N                             232 232 232 232
Wald chi-squared 34.000 *** 17.740 ** 6.390 * 0.830
LL (pseudo) -148.791 -140.735 -136.626 -136.200
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
(two-tailed tests) 





Table 3 - Estimated Effects of Individualistic Identity Orientation on Climate Change Resolution
Withdrawal at U.S. Companies (Logistic Regression Models)
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4
                              coef. coef. coef. coef.
 (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.)  (s.e.)
Post-Katrina 0.116 0.116 0.642 0.739
                              (0.411) (0.485) (0.565) (0.554)
Post-Presidential Primary -0.316 -0.081 0.971 + 1.035 +
                              (0.346) (0.365) (0.580) (0.584)
Filertype: Religious† -0.225 0.177 0.398 0.000
(0.322) (0.325) (0.347) (0.472)
Filertype: Special Interest† -1.533 ** -1.324 * -1.191 * -1.725 *
                              (0.507) (0.544) (0.563) (0.772)
Individualistic               -0.682 * -0.329 -0.315 -1.049 *
                              (0.289) (0.348) (0.348) (0.494)
Collectivistic                -0.131 0.096 0.081 0.046
                              (0.113) (0.135) (0.131) (0.146)
Neg Environ Perform           -0.360 * -0.403 ** -0.393 *
                              (0.146) (0.148) (0.156)
Firm Performance               2.562 + 1.711 1.464
                              (1.528) (1.480) (1.433)
Firm Size                     -0.193 -0.151 -0.179
                              (0.148) (0.144) (0.155)
Emission Intensive Industry 0.530 0.585 0.545
                              (0.502) (0.517) (0.538)
Owned by CDP Signatories (%)  -0.469 + -0.470 +
                              (0.252) (0.271)
More than Disclosure          -0.923 * -0.976 *
                              (0.464) (0.441)
Religious*Individualistic 1.314 *
                              (0.642)
Special Interest*Individualistic 1.620
                              (0.990)
Constant                      0.595 * 1.982 2.093 + 2.531 +
                              (0.295) (1.319) (1.227) (1.339)
N                             232 232 232 232
Wald chi-squared 34.000 *** 17.740 ** 6.390 * 5.420
LL (pseudo) -148.791 -140.735 -136.626 -134.475
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
(two-tailed tests) 





Table 4 - Estimated Effects of Individualistic Identity Orientation on Climate Change Resolution
Withdrawal at U.S. Companies (Logistic Regression Models)
(Special Interest Investors as Reference Category)
Variable M4
                              coef.
 (s.e.)
Post-Katrina 0.739
                              (0.554)
Post-Presidential Primary 1.035 +
                              (0.584)
Filertype: Religious† 1.724 *
(0.811)
Filertype: Professional† 1.725 *
                              (0.772)
Individualistic               0.571
                              (0.844)
Collectivistic                -0.306
                              (1.017)
Neg Environ Perform           -1.62
                              (0.990)
Firm Performance               0.046
                              (0.146)
Firm Size                     -0.393 *
                              (0.156)
Emission Intensive Industry 1.464
                              (1.433)
Owned by CDP Signatories (%)  -0.179
                              (0.155)
More than Disclosure          0.545
                              (0.538)
Religious*Individualistic -0.47 +
                              (0.271)
Professional*Individualistic -0.976 *
                              (0.441)
Constant                      0.806
                              (1.449)
N                             232
LL (pseudo) -134.475
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
(two-tailed tests) 
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The primary finding of this dissertation is that organizational identity matters in private 
politics over climate change, albeit in complex and sometimes surprising ways. No single 
research project can by itself create a fully comprehensive model of private politics 
predicting the rise of campaigns, choice of targets, strategies chosen by activists, and 
negotiation outcomes. However, the findings from this dissertation suggest that 
organizational identity – and the way identities interact in inter-organizational conflicts – 
is an important variable for researchers of all methodological stripes to incorporate into 
future work on corporate social action around climate change and private politics more 
generally.  
 
Because the study in Chapter 2 speaks more to research on institutional logics, whereas 
the Ford case and S&P 500 studies address organizational identity theories and the 
embeddedness literature, I discuss the theoretical contributions the dissertation makes to 
each of these bodies of research in turn below. Within each section, I also explore 
potentially fruitful avenues for future research that have emerged from the studies‘ 
findings. Finally, I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of the policy implications 
of private politics related to climate change and their impact on U.S. regulatory and 
legislative governance processes. 
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THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Institutional Logics  
Although empirical research on logics has been mounting since the publication of 
Friedland and Alford‘s (1991) seminal work, theorizing efforts regarding the form and 
membership of logics have been less fruitful. The overwhelming majority of research on 
logics relies on a conceptualization that fails to account for diverse organizational 
identities among logic adopters (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 2008; Thornton 2004; 
Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Rather, the idea of logic work suggests that 
organizations must agree upon a diagnostic frame for action and uses their organizational 
identities as tools to either justify taking more aggressive actions under the guise of the 
sustainability logic or distance themselves from actors who take more radical action. 
Following calls to incorporate social movement theory more explicitly into organizational 
research (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000; Rao et al. 2003; Davis, Scott, and Zald 2005), the 
study presents the concept of ―logic work‖ to capture the framing and negotiation 
activities undertaken by challengers to mount their offense against a dominant field logic.  
 
The study shows that logic work encompasses two primary activities. The first activity is 
negotiating a common diagnostic frame (Benford and Snow 2000) to justify why 
challenger organizations are promoting a new logic and taking action. In the case of the 
institutional investors in Chapter 2, the frame chosen is a financial one that all investors 
can agree upon. Under the ―sustainability logic of investing,‖ investors believe that 
climate change presents financial risks and opportunities to firms. This framing is 
adopted by even the most radical of investors who have adopted the ―sustainability 
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logic,‖ namely religious and labor shareholder activists. While this framing does not 
capture their social and moral motivations for engaging firms on climate change, they 
find it a sufficient and useful frame to mobilize greater numbers of investors on the issue.  
 
Motivational differences among the investors under the ―sustainability logic‖ must be 
continuously managed and reconciled to hold the logic together, though. I find that the 
second and most important element of logic work is the ways in which organizations use 
their own and other investors‘ identities as tools (Swidler 1986) to either distance 
themselves or draw nearer to other challenger organizations. Both more radical and 
traditional investor use identities as tools. In order for identity to be used as a tool, 
though, at least one set of challenger organizations has to be multi-vocal; that is, possess 
many ties with diverse parties (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008). By being multi-vocal, 
these organizations can draw upon alternate identities to justify taking actions under the 
logic that other challengers may oppose. Among adherents to the ―sustainability logic of 
investing,‖ religious investors are the multi-vocal actors that enable the logic to hold 
together. These investors draw on their social identities as religious figures or labor 
activists rather than their investor identities to justify taking new, more radical actions 
under the sustainability logic (i.e. asking firms to set voluntary GHG reduction goals).  
 
When the religious and union investors take action that is deemed too radical by more 
traditional investors, though, the latter also use the former‘s social identity as a tool to 
distance themselves from more radical investors. This is a tactic used most frequently 
among public pension funds new to investor activism, in which they emphasize their 
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fiduciary duty to explain why they are not endorsing certain actions by more socially or 
morally motivated investors. The sustainability logic does not fall apart in these 
instances, however. Rather, this identity distancing is more of signaling mechanism 
among the different challenger organizations about whether they are in agreement that a 
particular action falls within the confines of the sustainability logic. Often, by reframing a 
new action in financial rather than social terms – as in the case of the new GHG reduction 
resolutions – religious and union investors are able to expand the actions deemed 
appropriate under the sustainability logic by all organizations. In cases where agreement 
is not possible, using identity as tool kit enables the organizations to manage conflict 
without directly abandoning the logic itself by rationalizing one another‘s behavior as 
tied to their social or fiduciary identity.  
 
Logics do not appear out of thin air. They are socially constructed cognitive templates for 
action, and the ways in which they are negotiated and maintained has been previously 
under-theorized. Chapter 2 uncovers the framing and identity work necessary to create 
and maintain a logic when organizations adopting it have diverse motivations and goals. 
In particular, the study highlights the important role identity plays as a tool to manage 
conflict among challengers. This is the centerpiece of logic work, a concept that 
following Lounsbury et al‘s (2003) notion of field frame, captures the endogeneity of 
framing and logic maintenance within an organizational field. 
 
Future Research  
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In the realm of private politics (Baron 2003), there several directions for future research 
that emerge from the studies in this dissertation. Chapter 2 informs us that logics adopted 
by diverse organizations with conflicting identities and missions require logic work to 
maintain themselves. One fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine the 
conditions under which logic work activities like framing and maintenance (i.e. using 
identity as tool kit) becomes easier or more difficult for challengers over time. Is there a 
tipping point where framing and/or identity distancing is no longer necessary for 
organizations to feel comfortable supporting the logic or is negotiation and maintenance 
necessary until a challenger logic defeats the dominant logic in a field? Also, do 
dominant logics require logic work? Proponents of the institutional logics concept argue 
that logics are more durable templates for action than collective action frames (Thornton 
2004; Thornton and Ocasio 2008), but it does not necessarily follow that negotiation 
among adopters is absent.  
 
For scholars working at the intersection of social movement and organizational research, 
it would also be useful for future research to flesh out the theoretical and empirical 
divides between frames and logics as well as the signals that indicate when the former 
turns into the latter. In regard to challenger and dominant logic contests, it is also worth 
investigating whether competing logics outcomes differ when the competition is between 
a logic embraced by a diverse set of organizations versus one with homogenous actors. 
More specifically, does the effort required by logic work weaken a challenger logic‘s 




Organizational researchers who are proponents of combining institutional logics and 
social movement research recently co-hosted an academic workshop entitled ―Social 
Movements, Civil Societies, and the Corporation‖ in southern France in May 2010. One 
of the stated purposes of the workshop was to promote more research on the ways 
identities, networks and audiences affect how movements work with one another and 
their relationships with other organizational audiences. This dissertation ties directly into 
these research questions, and research interest into this area continues to grow. Following 
the conference, the organizers have decided to host a special issue on social movements, 
civil societies, and corporations in the journal Organization Studies. Hopefully some of 
the questions posed in this section will be addressed by the papers in that issue.  
 
Organizational Identity and Identity Interactions 
Chapter 1 provided a lengthy discussion of why anticipation of future regulation 
(Hoffman 2007) and greenwashing were not adequate explanations for Ford‘s successful 
withdrawal of the climate change resolution filed by religious shareholders. This section 
turns attention to the findings from the Ford case and S&P 500 studies in Chapters 3 and 
4 and the theoretical contributions they make to the organizational identity literature. The 
findings from these two chapters support the need for researchers to pay greater attention 
to the ways in which central, enduring, and distinctive elements of organizational identity 
(Albert and Whetten 1985) affect evaluations of an organization‘s actions by relevant 
audiences (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan, Polos, and 




The Ford case study introduces the concept of ―identity interaction‖ to clarify the process 
by which these evaluations occur. The case shows how shareholders‘ religious identity 
and the firm‘s collectivistic identity orientation facilitated dialogue between the two 
parties on climate change. In brief, the shareholders‘ religious identity gave them 
legitimacy with managers, and the firm‘s openness to stakeholder input affected its 
evaluation of the worthiness of shareholders‘ claims.  
 
The case shows that although religious investors‘ engagement with firms takes place in 
an atypical sphere (e.g. the market), and by unconventional methods (e.g. shareholder 
resolutions), Ford does not see their actions as illegitimate. Although they engage with 
one another in an economic setting, the resonance of the religious shareholders‘ social 
identities to managers brings forth notions of societal distinctions that are ―entangled in 
longstanding divisions and sentiments associated with [social] and cultural 
understandings" (Hsu and Hannan 2005: 482). This distinction works to religious 
investors‘ advantage. Churches and religious figures have long played a prominent role in 
civil rights, human rights, and social justice movements, so it does not seem contradictory 
to managers for religious investors to pursue environmental goals in the economic arena. 
As a result, it is easier for Ford to see ―a logic of appropriateness‖ (March and Olsen 
1995) in Sister Pat‘s actions than other stakeholders – such as activist individual investors 
and environmental NGOs – who do not possess identities that are as resonant (Baron 
2004), authentic (Peterson 1997), or legitimate (Oliver 1991) as a Catholic nun.   
However, the firm‘s positive evaluation is also a function of its openness to stakeholder 
input more generally. To capture differences among firms‘ approaches to stakeholders, I 
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draw up Brickson‘s (2005, 2007) identity orientation constructs. According to Brickson 
(2007), firms can be placed in three different orientation categories: individualistic, 
relational, or collectivistic. Individualistic organizations are primarily concerned about 
their own welfare, whereas relational organizations care most about dyadic relationships 
with partners, and collectivistic organizations prioritize the welfare of a larger group in 
stakeholder interactions.  
 
Compared to individualistic firms that are indifferent or hostile to engaging with any 
stakeholders, I suggest Ford engages in a different evaluation process given its 
collectivistic identity orientation. As the case shows, Ford allows managers to engage 
with a wide variety of stakeholders on climate change, including groups as far-ranging as 
religious shareholder activists to hostile environmental NGOs. From these interactions, 
Ford differentiates among the various stakeholders‘ motivations and tactics for pressuring 
the firm. By virtue of their openness to a variety of stakeholders, collectivistic firms are 
more likely to engage in more fine-grained evaluations of stakeholder legitimacy based 
on identity and past interactions than individualistic firms. Brickson‘s (2005) work  
suggests that individualistic firms, on the other hand, will assert that stakeholders should 
not tell the firm what issues to attend to because management will always do what is 
required to make the firm a top performer.  
 
The distinctions managers make among stakeholders at Ford are important ones because 
they suggest that in areas where the firm has discretion over its interactions with 
stakeholders, different constraints are placed on different stakeholders based on the 
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legitimacy of their identity. While organizational ecologists acknowledge that audiences 
sometimes enforce different types of constraint on actors with the same identity, they 
argue that ―such identities are fragile and are unlikely to be sustained‖ (Polos et al. 2002: 
96). As the case demonstrates, though, Sister Pat‘s religious identity compensates for 
many negative evaluations she could receive given her activist shareholder behavior.  
I argue that new work on the evaluative component of identity in organizational ecology 
(Polos et al. 2002; Hsu and Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2007) should not totally discard 
the idea that identity is comprised of the central, enduring, and distinctive elements of an 
organization (Albert and Whetten 1985). Rather, this new work should be viewed as an 
extension on previous identity work among organizational researchers. The term I 
introduce in this case – identity interaction – is a mechanism that brings this 
complementarity into relief. On the one hand, an organization approached by an external 
stakeholder will evaluate whether the other entity is a legitimate player with whom to 
engage. On the other hand, the organization‘s own internal identity attributes influence 
this evaluation and what groups they place in legitimate versus illegitimate categories. 
Organizations with more collectivistic identity orientations are likely to make different 
evaluations of stakeholders than individualistic ones given their willingness to engage 
with more diverse groups of stakeholders. 
 
Because firms approach stakeholders with varying cognitive orientations, they also 
evaluate the legitimacy of stakeholders‘ identities differently. This in turn affects whether 
a firm believes there is merit to fostering a strong relationship with a given stakeholder. 
These facts suggest the need for more process-oriented concepts related to embeddedness 
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– like identity interactions – to account for the role of identity in private politics contests. 
The purpose of doing the Ford case study was to help uncover the connections between 
organizational identity and inter-organizational relations in order to better "predict and 
understand organizations‘ policies, practices, and behaviors toward [stakeholders]" 
(Brickson 2005: 577).  
 
The findings from the S&P 500 study in Chapter 4 complicates the findings from the 
Ford case study, however. Unlike the Ford case, Chapter 4 did not find an identity 
interaction between collectivistic firms and shareholders with different identities. The 
study also failed to find a main effect of firm identity orientation on climate change 
resolution withdrawal outcomes, although two issues must be discussed to place the S&P 
findings in their proper context. The first is the issue that the case study was written about 
a U.S. firm that has an exceptionally collectivistic identity orientation. During the time 
period of the Ford case, the firm received the highest community strength score in the 
KLD data and had no community weaknesses. Indeed, the firm is an outlier in terms of its 
openness to stakeholders. Given the small sample available for the S&P 500 study in 
Chapter 4, it was not possible to determine whether firms with extreme outlier scores on 
collectivism – like Ford – have significant identity interactions with shareholder activists 
on climate change.  
 
Even with these data limitations, though, the study finds evidence that the audience 
evaluating investors – U.S. firms – view religious and secular professional investors as 
more legitimate actors in shareholder negotiations. The findings also reveal that 
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heterogeneous audience members (i.e. firms) reward and sanction stakeholders 
differently based on their identity orientation. Individualistic firms are more willing to 
reach climate withdrawal agreements with religious investors than professional or special 
interest investors. The results suggest the need for organizational researchers – and 
particularly organizational ecologists (Hannan et al. 2007) – to pay greater attention to 
how identity heterogeneity among firms may affect their evaluations of whether other 
organizations are violating or conforming to the social codes associated with their 
identity. With the exception of one study by Eesley and Lennox (2006), few empirical 
studies have tested the effect of stakeholder attributes on outcomes of private politic 
conflicts with firms.  
 
Future Research 
In regard to making choices about what shareholders should file resolutions at different 
types of firms, the S&P study suggests shareholders will be most effective at 
individualistic firms when they send in investors that can simultaneously play ―good cop‖ 
and ―bad cop‖ (e.g. religious investors). Whether individualistic firms are more willing to 
negotiate with religious investors because their actions conform to their social identity 
(one focused on social justice and morality) or because they are trying to relieve pressure 
from these investors on human rights or other social issues is not entirely clear.  
 
One way to improve on the findings in Chapter 4 is to expand the sample size of studies 
on climate change shareholder resolutions. However, this strategy is limited by the 
number of resolutions filed each year (although this number continues to rise). During the 
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2010 proxy season, 95 climate resolutions were filed by shareholders, a 40 percent 
increase over 2009. Another way to extend and further test the findings from this 
dissertation would be to expand the S&P 500 study to include resolutions covering all 
social and environmental issues. These issues range run the range of human rights issues, 
supply-chain standards, labor issues, pollution, and diversity. While the focus on climate 
change in this dissertation precluded using all of these resolutions, it is an interesting 
avenue for future research on corporate social action and would provide a larger sample 
size for researchers.  
 
More broadly, these two studies provide a unique insight into investors as not just 
fiduciary automatons, but social and political actors. Contrary to the common economic 
and sociological conception of ―investors‖ as passive, purely profit-oriented, and 
atomistic, the case finds that religious investors‘ economic actions are not divorced from 
their religious identity at collectivistic firms. Further, just as Davis and Thompson (1994) 
and Romano (2001) find political motivations drive public pension fund activism, the 
dissertation suggests there is more than just financial motivations driving institutional 
investor action on climate change. Climate change is a particularly helpful issue to 
uncover the ways in which investors (both individual and organizational) socially 
construct an issue as a ―financial issue,‖ and they also suggest the need for further work 
around conceptualizing our notions of ―the investor,‖ a figure that has been greatly under-





In some ways, it is curious that the U.S. Congress remains bitterly divided over climate 
change when many of the largest firms in the U.S. – traditionally opposed to more 
environmental legislation – support federal cap and trade climate legislation. Almost all 
U.S. firms (even the longstanding hold-out Exxon) have expressed support for the idea 
that climate change is occurring and is at least in part attributable to human behavior. Of 
course, the firms at the policy table have an interest in promoting provisions in the 
legislation that are most favorable to them. In the case of cap and trade legislation, 
decisions over allocation of credits and the permissibility of using offsets are already 
spurring large lobbying efforts on the parts of different industries and firms. But at the 
end of the day, the fact remains that many U.S. firms still want legislation even if it 
imposes some costs on them. Firms in highly capital-intensive industries – like U.S. 
energy firms – have expressed particular anxiousness to get climate legislation passed so 
they can determine what investments they will need to make in the medium and long-
term future (Gupta 2010).  
 
There is still a need to for research on segments of the private sector and larger society 
that continue to oppose climate legislation, however. There are few (if any) studies on the 
climate skeptic movement, for example, although a few sociologists have begun 
examining the U.S. conservative movement‘s success in promoting doubts about climate 
science (McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010). High-profile skeptics retain a seat at the 
Congressional table (U.S. House 2010), and even though the majority of scientists, 
academics, and many policymakers may reject the skeptic movement‘s viewpoint, it is 
impossible to evaluate their effect on climate policy without understanding the 
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underlying motivations and cultural foundations of their arguments.  
 
In the course of an ongoing research project on climate skeptics outside of this 
dissertation, I recently attended a climate skeptic conference to collect qualitative data on 
how skeptics frame their arguments. Many of the presenters at the Heartland Institute 
conference – both scientists and individuals from conservative policy think tanks – make 
up the small group of high-profile skeptics repeatedly asked to testify in front of 
Congress by representatives of the U.S. House and Senate. Notably, identity claims were 
the most explicit themes to emerge from the data.  
 
For example, one of the primary frames invoked by the skeptic movement is that climate 
science and climate policy is a covert way for liberal environmentalists and the 
government to interfere in the market and diminish citizens‘ personal freedom. In the 
words of one skeptic presenter, skeptics believe ―the issue isn‘t the issue‖ and ―the 
environmental agenda seeks to use the state to create scarcity as a means to exert their 
will, and the state‘s authority, over your lives.‖ Many of the presenters invoked the idea 
that ―climate change is just another attempt to diminish our freedom‖ and climate policies 
will decrease personal liberty. One went so far as to suggest that a binding international 
agreement on climate change would end with individuals being required to carry ―carbon 
ration cards‖ on their person. What these short quotes suggest is that there are strong 
individual and organizational identity forces at work not only among firms and investors 
grappling with the question of how to address the issue, but also among those who object 
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to addressing the issue at all.  
 
Another intriguing theme that emerged from the skeptic conference is a strong distrust of 
the scientific peer review process. Skeptics argue that public funding of science in the 
post-WWII era through organizations like the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
corrupted the scientific process. In their view, ―peer review‖ turned into ―pal review,‖ 
and establishment scientist editors only published work by colleagues they liked and 
whose scientific research findings agreed with their own (Lehr and Gemmell 2010). 
Many of the conference presentations focused on how scientists have violated their own 
professional identity codes that champion neutrality, skepticism, and experimentation to 
become ideological motivated manipulators of statistical models for political and 
financial gain. The possibilities for research on these skeptic themes among sociologists 
in the science and technology studies and performativity subfields are extensive, and they 
also have important policy implications for understanding how these identity attacks 
influence legislators and the broader public‘s faith in climate science.  
 
There are also fruitful, untapped research topics awaiting those more interested in climate 
change dynamics specifically in the private sector. There has been almost no scholarly 
inquiry into the complexities of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‘s position(s) on climate 
change, for example. With over three million members, the Chamber is the largest 
business association in the world and a powerful lobbying organization at the municipal, 
state, and federal levels. The Chamber‘s resistance to proposed federal climate legislation 
– despite support for the same legislation by many of its members discussed in the 
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introduction – raises some interesting questions about levels of governance and the 
intersection of corporate and public politics.  
 
In a conversation with a business member of the Chicago U.S. Chamber of Commerce at 
a sustainability networking event recently, I ask the member what the Chicago chapter 
thought about the U.S. Chamber national staff‘s stance on climate change. She responded 
that the issue had not been discussed much at the local level, and the Chicago Chamber 
continued to partner with the City on its Climate Action Plan (CCAP) goals to reduce 
GHG emissions by participating in the City‘s Green Office Challenge and Earth Hour. 
The Chicago Chamber‘s website (www.chicagolandchamber.org) also notes that the 
Chamber hosted a talk by the IPCC Chair Dr. Rajendra Pachauri on the importance of 
private sector engagement in climate change and gave a leadership/visionary award to 
Chicago-based Exelon CEO John W. Rowe in 2008 for his corporate social responsibility 
efforts. It would be illuminating to study whether the Chamber‘s national position on 
climate change influences climate initiatives taken by local Chamber‘s in their 
communities and whether it affects partnerships between local Chambers and municipal 
governments.  
 
In particular, has the Chamber‘s public disapproval of the Waxman-Markey ACES bill 
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2009) and resistance to the EPA‘s endangerment finding 
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2010) been undermined by prominent members who 
protested the Chamber‘s position? What is the effect of the fissure over climate among 
member organizations on the Chamber‘s lobbying influence and how does this fracturing 
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manifest itself at the national level versus the local level? Under what conditions does a 
local Chamber reject or embrace the National Chamber‘s climate change position? 
According the Chamber‘s website (www.uschamber.com), almost 96 percent of the 
Chamber‘s members are small businesses with less than 100 employees. How do these 
small businesses view climate change compared to large U.S. firms? Does business 
support for federal climate legislation vary across firm size, geographic location, type of 
business?  
 
Answering these questions would create a much more nuanced picture of private sector 
support for federal climate policy. We know from the introduction chapter that belief in 
climate change and support for climate action has decreased among individuals in the 
U.S., but little is known about the organizational positions of the population of business 
owners in the United States and how that influences climate policy at different levels of 
governance. In particular, we know little about how the personal and organizational 
identities of business leaders and their firms impact their beliefs and actions on climate 
change. Their climate beliefs and actions also influence the debate on climate policy, 
although with less publicity and visibility than climate skeptics and public opinion. 
Uncovering the conditions under which business policy preferences influence legislators 
– and how they influence them – is a promising research stream to understand barriers 





Given their unsuccessful efforts to change public policy at the federal level around 
climate change, investors and activists sought ways to ―expand the conflict‖ 
(Schattschneider 1960) through private politics (Baron 2003) in the early 2000‘s. This 
dissertation has focused on one type of private politics – shareholder resolutions – to 
capture the ways in which organizational identity influences private politics processes. 
Given its necessarily limited scope, the dissertation does not delve into whether these 
private politics efforts have changed the public regulatory or legislative debate on climate 
change. I provide a few concluding thoughts about that issue here, however. 
 
Institutional investors have placed consistent and growing pressure on firms and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to address climate change over the past two 
decades, and they may be seeing some signs of success. Pressure on firms to disclose 
GHG emissions through voluntary reporting structures such as the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP), Climate Registry, and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), for example, has 
come largely from institutional investors and is increasing. Over the last decade, the 
number of organizations reporting emissions through the CDP has increased from 235 in 
2003 to 2,500 in 2010. The number and size of institutional investor CDP signatories 
making the disclosure requests is also growing. There are currently 534 CDP signatories 
representing over $64 trillion in assets compared to 95 investors representing $10 trillion 
in assets in 2003 (www.cdproject.net). The most recent UN-sponsored Investor Summit 
on Climate Risk in January 2010 was also attended by over 520 finance, corporate, and 




The prolonged engagement with the private sector on GHG risk disclosure and voluntary 
reductions may be yielding some progress in the regulatory sphere as well. In February 
2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission provided written guidance regarding 
climate change disclosure for the first time (SEC 2010). The SEC cited ongoing investor 
petitions for interpretative guidance on climate change (CalPERS et al. 2007)  and quotes 
from business leaders about the necessity of addressing climate change as evidence that 
the financial and business community is seeking more information on the materiality of 
climate risk. 
 
The 30 page document discusses the Commission‘s ―views with respect to our existing 
disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change matters,‖ (SEC 2010: 3) and it 
analyzes how future legislation and international agreements might affect the materiality 
of climate risk for U.S. firms. The document also addresses situations in which disclosure 
of climate risk might be currently required in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A) section of the firm‘s SEC 
filings. The document is far from definitive on how firms should consider the materiality 
of climate change, but it has put climate change on the agency‘s public agenda.  
 
Although some institutional investors and activists view increased voluntary reporting by 
firms and the new interpretative guidance from the SEC as successes, critics like Reich 
(2008) would argue these are token changes at best and not the not the type of wide-
sweeping climate change decisions needed through public governance structures (i.e. 
legislation and regulation). Others have also suggested that environmental NGOs and 
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investor activists have been co-opted by large corporations on climate change by 
partnering with them through coalition organizations like the United States Climate 
Action Partnership (USCAP) and the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR). In 2008, 
a former staff member at Conservation International wrote a scathing book criticizing 
environmental NGOs for working with corporations and imitating their strategies and 
tactics (MacDonald 2008). The book, Green, Inc., lambasts environmental NGOs for 
providing positive PR for greenwashing firms and accepting money from them.  
Others have taken a more mixed view of the relationship between stakeholders and 
corporations. Epstein and Kramer (2007), for example, suggest that radical stakeholders 
who refuse to engage with corporations and more moderate ones like the investors 
analyzed in this dissertation may complement rather than undermine one another. They 
argue the radical stakeholders create a ―radical flank effect‖ that makes the demands 
made by moderate stakeholders appear more reasonable to firms than they would 
otherwise and provides an incentive for firms to engage with moderate stakeholders. I 
classify the investor activists in this dissertation as moderate stakeholders since they seek 
a seat in the boardroom rather than on the picket line. I chose to focus on stakeholder 
working ―within the system‖ rather than without because I also thought firms would be 
more willing to engage with them, and among other things, I was interested to see 
whether and how the investors‘ multiple identities (e.g. fiduciaries, nuns, state treasurers) 
affected firm responses to them. 
 
At the beginning of this research endeavor, however, I did not expect organizational 
identity would be the dominant theoretical lens I would rely on to explain firm and 
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stakeholder reactions to climate change. Typical of inductive research endeavors, the 
theoretical framework for the dissertation emerged directly from the data, and the identity 
themes captured in my fieldwork and interviews were simply too powerful to ignore. I 
also believe that now, more than ever, identity is an apt lens to study climate change 
conflicts. Many in the environmental, business, and policy arenas have experienced 
something akin to ―climate whiplash‖ between the time I conducted fieldwork for this 
dissertation and wrote up my results. In the past year, climate skeptics have received 
increased attention in the wake of the East Anglia email scandal, public belief that 
humans are affecting the climate has decreased, federal cap and trade legislation has not 
been passed by the U.S. Congress, and no binding international agreement on GHG 
emission reductions was reached at the Copenhagen COP 15 climate meeting. As the 
quotes from the climate skeptic conference above suggest, identity influences how 
individuals and organizations are framing the climate debate. However, we still know 
little about which skeptic identity frames resonate with the public and influential 
organizations, and under what conditions these frames shift climate change opinion and 
policy.   
 
In light of the recent increase in climate skepticism, examining the role identity plays in 
shaping organizational responses to climate change is more crucial than ever. It is my 
sincere hope that organizational theorists and social science researchers will ramp up 
research efforts to understand the role culture and identity is playing in climate policy 
outcomes. Many powerful organizations have chosen sides on the climate debate, 
including influential groups like the Chamber of Commerce and the National Academies 
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of Science (albeit on different sides). However, most governments remain divided on the 
issue, most notably the U.S. Congress and member countries of the United Nations 
debating a post-Kyoto agreement. Ultimately, these organizations will determine the 
trajectory of climate policy and behavior changes within society and the global economy. 
Like King et al (2010), I subscribe to belief that ―organizations influence their 
environments in unique ways, and understanding an organization‘s actions requires us to 
more carefully consider the attributes that make this action possible‖ (292). In closing 
then, I make a call for sociology and organizational scholars to use their professional 
tools of the trade to build a better understanding of how organizational identity shapes 
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